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Abstract 
Earnings conference calls are an important platform of financial communication. They 
provide researchers with unique opportunities to observe firm managers’ and financial 
analysts’ interactions and natural communication style in a daily-task environment. 
Relying on multidisciplinary theories and methods, this dissertation studies financial 
communication in conference calls from both the managers’ and the sell-side analysts’ 
perspectives. It consists of three self-contained studies. Chapter 2 focuses on managers’ 
communication strategies in conference calls. It explores, in the small non-negative 
earnings surprises setting, whether non-manipulators design communication strategies to 
separate themselves from earnings manipulators, and whether manipulators pool through 
obfuscation. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on sell-side analysts’ communication behaviour in 
conference calls. Chapter 3 examines how analysts’ people skills affect their 
communication behaviour and relationships with firm management. Chapter 4 applies 
both qualitative and quantitative discourse analyses and investigates how analysts use 
linguistic politeness strategies to establish socially desirable identities in publicly 
accessible analyst-manager interactions. The three studies combined contribute to the 
accounting literature by furthering our understanding of managers’ and analysts’ 
financial communication incentives and behaviour from multiple perspectives. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This dissertation investigates various financial communication phenomena in the 
setting of earnings conference calls. Conference calls have become an increasingly 
important channel of corporate voluntary disclosure since the 1990s (Bushee et al., 2003). 
Survey evidence shows that the majority (more than 90%) of U.S. public firms host 
quarterly earnings conference calls (NIRI, 2014). A typical conference call consists of 
two sections: the presentation section and the question-and-answer section (hereinafter, 
the Q&A section). During the presentation section, senior managers give presentations 
on firm strategies, past performance and forward-looking guidance. During the Q&A 
section, the audience (e.g. sell-side financial analysts) ask questions regarding managers' 
presentation, challenge managers' interpretation of company performance and seek 
information that managers might be unwilling to disclose (Hollander et al., 2010). 
There are three main motivations for the investigation on financial 
communication through conference calls. First, these calls reflect the important role of 
the spoken component of corporate voluntary disclosure in financial markets. It has long 
been established that conference calls provide useful information to various groups of 
market participants. For example, Bowen et al. (2002) report that calls increase the 
amount of information available to analysts and their earnings forecast accuracy, as well 
as decrease forecast dispersion. Brown et al. (2004) document that calls lead to long-term 
reductions in information asymmetry among equity investors. Their results suggest that 
firms that hold conference calls more frequently have lower cost of capital. Kimbrough 
(2005) investigates whether conference calls accelerate analysts’ and investors’ 




the initiation of conference calls reduces both analysts’ and investors’ underreaction to 
currently announced earnings. 
Second, conference calls allow researchers to observe managers’ natural 
disclosure behaviour directly. Traditional written financial documents such as annual 
reports are prepared in advance and carefully scripted. Conference calls, on the other 
hand, consist of verbal communication between managers and the audience. While the 
presentation section of these calls is typically scripted in advance (Larker and 
Zakolyukina, 2012), the Q&A section consists of ad hoc interactions between managers 
and the audience and hence is more immediate, interactive and intense in nature than 
written disclosure (Merkl-Davis and Brennan, 2007; Lee, 2016). These characteristics of 
earnings conference calls provide managers with an opportunity to disclose information 
in a less-constrained fashion (Matsumoto et al., 2011). Therefore, conference calls 
provide researchers with a unique opportunity to observe managers natural disclosure and 
linguistic style.  
Research shows that managers’ linguistic disclosure style in conference calls is 
informative to investors. For example, Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) develop a 
linguistic-based model based on CEO’s and CFO’s word use to predict financial 
restatement. They report that the model’s predictive power is at least equivalent to models 
based on accounting and financial variables. Lee (2016) studies the consequences of 
managers adhering to predetermined scripts in the Q&A section. He explores the textual 
similarity between the presentation and Q&A sections and documents that a high level of 
similarity is associated with negative abnormal returns and analyst recommendation 
downgrades. Bushee et al. (2018) examine the linguistic complexity in earnings 
conference calls. They develop a novel approach to empirically decompose managers’ 




linguistic complexity as the benchmark. They document that the obfuscation (information) 
component is positively (negatively) associated with the firm’s information asymmetry. 
Third, as financial analysts can ask questions and directly interact with managers 
during the Q&A section, earnings conference calls provide a unique setting to study 
analysts’ behaviour, incentives and relationships with firm management. Financial 
analysts are essential information intermediaries in the financial market and the main 
participants of conference calls. While there are numerous studies examining analysts’ 
incentives and behaviour, early research provides limited insights due to the lack of 
access to analysts’ behaviour in a daily-task environment (Bradshaw, 2011). The 
emergence of publicly accessible conference calls therefore provides fruitful avenues for 
researchers to observe analyst-manager interactions and examine analysts’ behaviour 
more directly. 
Both regulators and researchers have expressed concerns that, in order to access 
firm-specific information, analysts have incentives to maintain close relationships with 
firm management which results in optimistic bias towards the firm (e.g. Francis and 
Philbrick, 1993; Richards, 2002; Francis et al., 2004; Chen and Matsumoto, 2006; 
Westphal and Clement, 2008). Conference calls provide a unique setting to study analyst-
manager relationships and interactions because managers have the discretion to choose 
which analysts to ask questions and typically pick analysts with friendly questions to set 
a favourable tone for the call (Mayew, 2008; Cen et al., 2019). The literature documents 
that sell-side analysts who are chosen to participate in these calls are more favourable 
and have better relationships with firm management (Mayew, 2008), have superior access 
to firm-specific information (Mayew et al., 2013), and have better career outcomes (Cen 




managers during calls and that analysts who use more favourable language have better 
access to firm-specific information (Milian and Smith, 2017; Milian et al., 2017). 
This dissertation consists of three related yet self-contained studies that aim to 
contribute to the financial communication literature from both the managers’ and the sell-
side analysts’ perspectives. Chapter 2 investigates managers’ conference call disclosure 
strategies when firms report small non-negative earnings surprises. Prior research 
documents that investors view small non-negative earnings surprises as a red flag for 
managerial opportunism and penalize all firms with such results even in the absence of 
hard evidence of earnings manipulation (Keung et al., 2010). This chapter extends the 
research on this pooling equilibrium by investigating managers’ responses during the 
corresponding conference call. Results show that, compared with earnings manipulators, 
non-manipulators engage in credible disclosure and provide more negative forward-
looking discussions and obfuscate less. Findings also show that manipulators 
intentionally pool by increasing obfuscation when they report small non-negative 
earnings surprises. Finally, the results suggest that the capital market responses to non-
manipulators’ and manipulators’ conference call are statistically equivalent. Investors 
underreact to non-manipulators’ calls initially and correct such an underreaction 
throughout the next quarter. The evidence suggests that, when opportunistic disclosers’ 
pooling effect is strong, the informativeness of credible disclosers’ conference calls can 
be compromised. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the behaviour of sell-side analysts in conference calls. This 
chapter examines the effects of people skills on analysts’ relationships with firm 
management and their informational outputs. People skills represent individuals’ ability 
get along with, to communicate effectively with, and to foster trusting relationships with 




foster close relationships with firm management. Relying on research in psychology, 
sociology and economics, this chapter reasons that analysts from more individualistic, 
more trusting and lower power distance ethnic backgrounds have better people skills. 
Accordingly, an empirical proxy for people skills is developed using the first principal 
component of these three ethnic cultural traits. This empirical proxy is validated through 
analysts’ linguistic behaviour during earnings conference calls. Empirical results show 
that analysts with better people skills have a higher probability of participating in 
conference calls and ask earlier questions. Mediation analysis suggests that analysts with 
better people skills benefit from good management relationships and possess superior 
firm-specific information. This chapter is the first to show the effects of people skills in 
the analyst labour market. 
Chapter 4 also focuses on sell-side analysts. This chapter employs both qualitative 
and quantitative discourse analyses and examines how analysts use politeness in language 
to construct socially desirable identities during conference calls. Sell-side analysts have 
two conflicting identities. On the one hand, as their primary responsibility is for investor 
clients, they are “competent professionals” to investors. On the other hand, as they have 
incentives to seek good relationships with managers, they are “dependants of companies” 
who may bias their informational outputs towards management. As conference calls are 
publicly accessible in the U.S., analysts are expected to use politeness in language to 
present socially desirable identities. Discourse analysis shows that analysts use various 
politeness strategies to promote and balance the two identities depending on the context 
of conference calls. During calls with firms reporting extreme earnings increase, analysts 
use politeness to weaken the strength of their questions and promote their identity as 
dependants of companies. During calls with firms reporting extreme earnings decrease, 




politeness behaviour. My study contributes to the literature by showing the importance 
of politeness in financial communication and illustrating how analysts use politeness in 
language to actively engage in identity construction in publicly-observable analyst-
manager interactions. 
A unique feature of this dissertation is its interdisciplinarity. Financial 
communication is a dynamic and multifaceted process that involves different groups of 
market participants. Both the content of conference call information and the way the 
information is communicated (i.e. the linguistic characteristics of managers and analysts) 
are informative. Apart from accounting researchers, researchers in other disciplines such 
as linguistics and computational science have studied various financial communication 
phenomena. Theories and empirical methods from areas outside of accounting, including 
psychology and linguistics, are useful for analysing and interpreting these phenomena. 
By bridging theories and methods from various disciplines, the studies in this dissertation 
aim to contribute to our knowledge on financial communication from multiple 
perspectives.  
The remainder of my dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 investigates 
the conference call communication strategies of earnings manipulators and non-
manipulators when they report small non-negative earnings surprises. Chapter 3 studies 
how sell-side analysts’ people skills affect their relationships with firm management and 
informational outputs. Chapter 4 examines how analysts use linguistic politeness 
strategies to establish socially desirable professional identities during conference calls. 





Chapter 2. Small Non-negative Earnings Surprises and Conference Call 
Communication 
2.1. Introduction 
Managers have incentives to avoid missing earnings benchmarks and may inflate 
reported earnings to achieve zero or positive earnings surprises (e.g. Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Brown, 2001; Matsumoto, 2002; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Brown 
and Pinello, 2007). Early evidence shows that firms with zero or positive earnings 
surprises enjoy higher market valuation (e.g. Bartov et al., 2002; Brown and Caylor, 2005; 
Bhojraj et al., 2009). Consequently, opportunistic managers may inflate reported earnings, 
leading to a discontinuity in the distribution of earnings surprises (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997). Many studies show that the number of firms with small negative earnings 
surprises is significantly higher than the number of firms with small non-negative 
earnings surprises (e.g. Degeorge et al., 1999; Bhojraj et al., 2009; Gilliam et al., 2015). 
Even sophisticated market participants such as analysts are not always able to 
determine whether earnings that meet or beat analysts’ expectations are the result of 
genuine operating strength or accounting manipulation (de Jong et al., 2014). That is, 
investors have limited ability to (perfectly) distinguish between manipulators and non-
manipulators. Consequently, starting from the 2000s, investors view small non-negative 
earnings surprises as a red flag for low accounting quality and managerial opportunism, 
and penalize all firms with such results accordingly based on rational expectations, even 
in the absence of hard evidence of earnings manipulation (Akerlof, 1970; Keung et al., 
2010). Firms that meet analysts’ expectations without the need for manipulation 
(hereinafter, non-manipulators) therefore become collateral damage and face a costly 




equilibrium during the corresponding earnings conference call and examine how market 
participants react to managers’ communication strategies. 
Manipulators and non-manipulators face different communication incentives in 
conference calls. Manipulators are expected to engage in opportunistic disclosures 
because they face incentives to delay incorporation of bad news into stock prices and thus 
preserve the pooling equilibrium. They are expected to withhold bad news to inflate 
investors’ perceptions of the firm (e.g. Kothari et al., 2009; Beyer and Dye, 2012; Kim 
and Zhang, 2016; Bao et al., 2019). They can attempt to mimic non-manipulators’ 
communication style to mislead investors. This mimicking strategy complements their 
earnings management behaviour as both are designed to delay revelation of bad news. 
Additionally, they have strong obfuscating incentives during the call to circumvent 
analysts’ questions about bad news and hence delay its revelation (Bushee et al., 2018).  
In contrast, non-manipulators are motivated to adopt credible communication 
policies to signal the strength of their underlying performance and avoid market 
underreaction to their earnings results. As credible disclosers, they are expected to engage 
in transparent disclosures and reveal bad news quickly for reputation and litigation 
concerns (e.g. Skinner, 1994; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Miller and Bahnson, 2002; 
Beyer and Dye, 2012). Moreover, because they are cognizant of manipulators’ incentives 
to mimic, non-manipulators are motivated to adopt signalling strategies that are costly 
for manipulators to imitate. An important difference between non-manipulators and 
manipulators is that results for the latter are expected to be less sustainable due to weaker 
underlying performance, coupled with reversal of income-increasing earnings 




et al., 2017).1 Thus, if non-manipulators design a communication strategy to convey 
forward-looking information in a credible and timely manner, such a strategy is costly 
for manipulators to mimic. 
Precisely how manipulators’ and non-manipulators’ communication strategies 
play out in practice, and how market participants respond to these strategies, are the 
empirical questions on which this chapter seeks evidence. The communication strategies 
of these two groups of firms are predicted to differ in two ways. First, negative forward-
looking discussion is expected to be a separating strategy adopted by non-manipulators. 
This strategy signals non-manipulators’ commitment to credible disclosures and is costly 
for manipulators to mimic. Second, it is predicted that obfuscation is used an intentional 
pooling strategy of manipulators to delay revelation of bad news.2  
The conference call setting is used to study non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ 
communication strategies for the following reasons. First, conference call disclosure is 
more likely to manifest intentional disclosure choices because it is more spontaneous and 
less scripted than other financial documents, which contain substantial boilerplate texts 
that tend not to vary over time (Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012; Lee, 2016; Bushee et al., 
2018). Second, conference calls are important disclosure events that are directly 
associated with earnings announcements and convey economically material information 
 
1 Alternatively, the signalling viewpoint argues that only high-quality firms manipulate earnings because 
they have the underlying performance strength to absorb reversals in future periods (e.g. Beaver and Engel, 
1996; Louis and Robinson, 2005; Fang and Fu, 2018). Thus, income-increasing earnings management can 
be a signal of fundamental strength. However, there is evidence against the signalling argument (e.g. Teoh 
et al., 1998; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Specifically, recent evidence shows that firms that meet or 
beat earnings benchmarks through accrual-based earning management have inferior future performance 
(Chen et al., 2017). 
2 I do not study how manipulators mimic non-manipulators’ communication style. Non-manipulators may 
exhibit linguistic characteristics of truthful communication that are unconscious in nature, such as the use 
of pronouns, lexical diversity and concrete language (e.g. ter Doest et al., 2002; Humpherys et al., 2011; 
Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012; Elliott et al., 2015; Burgoon et al., 2016). These characteristics represent 
unconscious behaviour and do not reflect non-manipulators’ intentional attempt to separate. As 
manipulators can strategically mimic these characteristics as cheap talk, there should be no systematic 




to market participants (e.g. Brown et al., 2004; Frankel et al., 2010; Hollander et al., 
2010). Importantly, managers are willing to devote time and efforts to discuss meeting 
and beating market expectations during these calls (Graham et al., 2005; Frankel et al., 
2010). Third, conference calls are a powerful setting to examine managers’ obfuscating 
behaviour (Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012; Bushee et al., 2018).  
Tests utilize a sample of conference call transcripts for 1,779 U.S. non-financial 
firm-quarters during the period 2010 to 2015 with quarterly earnings per share surprises 
in the zero-to-one cent range. Non-manipulators and manipulators are classified using an 
aggregate earnings manipulation indicator that combines three accounting-based 
earnings manipulation proxies: discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005), non-GAAP 
manipulation (Doyle et al., 2013) and classification shifting (Fan et al., 2010). As 
predicted, results show that non-manipulators provide a higher proportion of negatively 
toned forward-looking discussion than manipulators in both the presentation and Q&A 
sections of conference calls. Results also show that non-manipulators have a lower 
obfuscation component of management linguistic complexity than manipulators in the 
Q&A. Findings are robust to controlling for firm characteristics and performance, and 
other conference call characteristics including speech length and the use of positive and 
negative words. Additional tests using seasonally adjusted changes in communication 
strategies suggest that manipulators intentionally increase obfuscating behaviour to pool 
when they report small non-negative earnings surprises. However, there is no conclusive 
evidence that non-manipulators intentionally increase negative forward-looking 
discussion or decrease obfuscation. It appears that non-manipulators exhibit consistency 
in their communication policy rather than intentionally changing their behaviour in an 




Next, I assess the capital market consequences of non-manipulators’ and 
manipulators’ communication strategies. Results show no statistically significant 
difference between the market reaction to conference calls or communication strategies 
for the two firm types. Results suggest that non-manipulators are unable to credibly signal 
the absence of earnings manipulation and that manipulators successfully obfuscate on the 
earnings announcement date. The findings are consistent with prior evidence that market 
participants cannot fully distinguish between non-manipulators and manipulators in the 
small non-negative earnings surprise category (Keung et al., 2010; de Jong et al., 2014). 
Given that non-manipulators exhibit strong obfuscating behaviour and can mimic 
manipulators’ communication style to preserve the pooling equilibrium, it is not 
surprising that investors cannot understand non-manipulators’ signals. Further analysis 
reveals that non-manipulators experience higher market returns than manipulators 
starting from the second month after the conference call and in particular around the 
conference call of the subsequent quarter. These findings are consistent with market 
participants underreacting to non-manipulators’ initial earnings announcements and then 
gradually learning about firm type over the subsequent quarter. 
The study contributes to prior research on several dimensions. First, it contributes 
to the literature on earnings benchmark beating. Prior research typically focuses on the 
factors that motivate managers to opportunistically meet and beat earnings benchmarks 
and how investors react to this opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; Brown, 2001; Matsumoto, 2002; Brown and Pinello, 2007; Keung et al., 2010). 
Keung et al. (2010) document that investors view zero or small positive earnings surprises 
as a red flag and penalize both non-manipulators and manipulators even in the absence 
of hard evidence of earnings manipulation, indicating a communication friction. This 




strategies to signal the truthfulness of performance but fail to do so due to strong pooling 
effects; or if they do not seek to intentionally separate at all. Focusing on this 
communication friction, I show that although non-manipulators engage in credible and 
transparent disclosure, there is no conclusive evidence that they proactively separate. 
Consequently, they cannot successfully signal the truthfulness of earnings results or 
differentiate themselves from manipulators on the earnings announcement date. 
Second, I extend the literature on managers’ behaviour during conference calls. 
Many prior studies on conference calls focus on how managers use language to deceive 
or obfuscate (e.g. Hobson et al., 2012; Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012; Allee and 
DeAngelis, 2015). I explicitly examine whether and how firms with high-quality earnings 
adopt communication strategies to clarify the truthfulness of their results when they face 
strong pooling effects from opportunistic managers. I present evidence that high 
earnings-quality firms adopt credible and transparent communication strategies. 
Moreover, it appears that they do so as a consistent communication style, instead of 
designing communication strategies to intentionally separate when they report small non-
negative earnings surprises. 
I also contribute to the literature on the capital market effects of conference call 
communication. Prior studies document that conference calls provide information 
beyond earnings releases (e.g. Frankel et al., 1999; Kimbrough, 2005; Matsumoto et al., 
2011) and that specific communication strategies can also be incrementally informative 
(e.g. Davis et al., 2015; Lee, 2016; Frankel et al., 2018). Building on this view, this study 
investigates the informativeness of conference call communication where opportunistic 
disclosers have strong pooling incentives to delay market reactions to earnings news. The 
results show that in such cases, opportunistic disclosers are successful at pooling, while 




underreaction. Consequently, the informativeness of credible disclosers’ conference calls 
is compromised. My findings extend the understanding of how communication incentives 
and strategies can affect the information content of earnings news (e.g. Bushee et al., 
2003; Brochet et al., 2019).  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 explains 
hypotheses development. Section 2.3 describes empirical research design. Section 2.4 
provides sample selection process and descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 presents and 
discusses empirical results for the hypotheses. Section 2.6 performs market reaction tests. 
Section 2.7 summarises and concludes this chapter.  
 
2.2. Hypotheses development 
It has long been established that opportunistic managers can inflate reported 
earnings to meet or beat earnings benchmarks (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Brown, 
2001; Matsumoto, 2002). As investors have limited ability to unravel such opportunistic 
behaviour, they penalize all firms that report small non-negative earnings surprises even 
in the absence of hard evidence of earnings manipulation. Consequently, non-
manipulators become collateral damage and face a costly pooling problem. To protect 
their reputation and prevent their stocks from being under-priced, non-manipulators have 
incentives to credibly convey transparent information in a timely manner to signal the 
truthfulness of their earnings performance to market participants.  
Forward-looking discussion (hereinafter, FLD) is a major element of conference 
calls. The informativeness of FLD has been documented in various corporate disclosures 
(e.g. Bryan, 1997; Clarkson et al., 1999; Muslu et al., 2015). In the conference call setting, 




the presentation when firm performance is poor, indicating that managers attempt to 
focus on the future instead of discussing the poor performance in the past. Theoretically, 
it is unclear how the quantity of FLD in conference calls may be different for non-
manipulators and manipulators. Non-manipulators might discuss the future more to 
convince investors that their performance is sustainable. However, manipulators might 
also provide FLD as a mechanism for diverting attention away from artificially inflated 
past performance (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006; Matsumoto et al., 2011).  
Recent research examines the tone of FLD. Li (2010) reports that firms with better 
performance, lower accruals, lower market-to-book ratio, less return volatility, more 
readable MD&As, and a longer history have more positive FLD in their MD&A. He also 
finds that, on average, firms with better future performance have more positive FLD. 
However, it is important to note that, although the disclosure tone can be informative and 
the positive association between tone and firm performance is an empirical regularity (e.g. 
Feldman et al., 2010; Price et al., 2012; Henry and Leone, 2016; Brochet et al., 2019), 
tone is driven by both the truthful representation of economic fundamentals and 
opportunistic disclosure incentives (Huang et al., 2014). Thus, the positive association 
between future performance and FLD tone may not hold when opportunistic disclosers 
have strong incentives to withhold bad news about the future. Consistent with this notion, 
Schleicher and Walker (2010) hypothesise that FLD tone can be used as an impression 
management tool to conceal negative outlook. They document that firms with impending 
performance declines strategically bias FLD tone to hide bad news.  
Research suggests that optimistic future news can be less credible than negative 
future news (e.g. Hutton et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004; Baginski et al., 2016). Moreover, 
many studies show that credible disclosers release bad news quickly and provide 




disclosure credibility among investors, and mitigate litigation concerns (e.g. Skinner, 
1994; Miller and Bahnson, 2002; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Rogers et al., 2011; Beyer 
and Dye, 2012). Thus, non-manipulators are expected to be forthcoming about negative 
future prospects.  
Importantly, if non-manipulators are forthcoming about bad news and 
accordingly adopt a communication strategy designed to provide credible FLD, such a 
strategy is costly for manipulators to mimic. In the small non-negative earnings surprise 
setting, since manipulators opportunistically overstate earnings to achieve reported 
earnings results, their performance can reverse in the future and be less sustainable than 
that of non-manipulators (e.g. DeFond and Park, 2001; Dechow et al., 2012; Chen et al., 
2017). Prior research shows that opportunistic managers withhold bad news to boost 
stock prices and personal wealth (e.g. Kothari et al., 2009; Beyer and Dye, 2012; Kim 
and Zhang, 2016; Bao et al., 2019). Thus, manipulators are expected to withhold bad 
news about the future to inflate investors’ perceptions of firm performance.  
Based on the theory and evidence discussed above, I hypothesise that: 
H1. Non-manipulators provide a higher proportion of negative forward-looking 
discussion than manipulators in conference calls. 
It is well established in the literature that firms with poor performance and 
opportunistic incentives provide less transparent disclosures to reduce disclosure 
informativeness and increase information processing costs, so that bad news is not 
reflected in stock prices or conveyed with a delay (e.g. Bloomfield, 2002; Li, 2008; Lo 
et al., 2017; Bushee et al., 2018). Consistent with the obfuscation hypothesis, Li (2008) 
reports that 10-Ks of firms with lower earnings are harder to read and longer, and that 




results as evidence that firms with poor earnings performance attempt to obfuscate bad 
news by reducing annual report readability. More recently, Lo et al. (2017) show that 
firms that beat the prior year’s earnings through earnings management have less readable 
MD&As, suggesting a link between earnings manipulation and obfuscation. Meanwhile, 
Bushee et al. (2018) show that firms with higher obfuscating behaviour in conference 
calls have greater information asymmetry following earnings announcements, consistent 
with firms reducing the informativeness of disclosures through obfuscation. 
Opportunistic managers have strong incentives to obfuscate in conference calls, 
so that they can prevent analysts’ questions on bad news and hence delay the revelation 
of such information (Bushee et al., 2018). In the small non-negative earnings surprise 
setting, manipulators have strong obfuscating incentives because their earnings 
performance is artificial and potentially unsustainable. They need to reduce disclosure 
transparency and informativeness, so that investors cannot see through earnings 
manipulation behaviour or identify weak firm fundamentals. As a result, manipulators 
are expected to use obfuscation in conference calls as an intentional pooling strategy. 
Non-manipulators, on the other hand, have less obfuscating incentive. Since non-
manipulators are credible disclosers who have genuinely achieved their reported earnings 
results, they are expected to provide more transparent disclosure than manipulators and 
have less incentive to prevent the disclosure of bad news. I therefore hypothesise that: 






2.3. Research design 
2.3.1. Small non-negative earnings surprises 
This study focuses on non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ different conference 
call communication strategies in the small non-negative earnings surprises setting.3 In 
this setting, there are likely to be firms that have achieved earnings expectations through 
earnings manipulation and also firms whose benchmark beating is the results of 
fundamental economic performance (i.e. no earnings manipulation). Many prior studies 
use consensus analyst forecast as the earnings benchmark because anecdotal evidence 
suggests that managers consider analyst consensus an important benchmark to meet or 
exceed (e.g. Degeorge et al., 1999; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Doyle et al., 2006; Brown 
et al., 2009; Keung et al., 2010). Following this line of literature, quarterly earnings 
surprise is measured as firms’ actual earnings per share (hereinafter, EPS) minus the latest 
median consensus EPS forecast prior to the corresponding earnings announcement 
(Keung et al., 2010).4 A small non-negative earnings surprise firm-quarter is defined as 
one with quarterly earnings surprises between 0 and 1¢ (inclusive). 
 
2.3.2. Non-manipulators/manipulators classification 
In this study, manipulators are firms that report [0, 1¢] earnings surprises by 
inflating earnings. Non-manipulators are firms that achieve [0, 1¢] earnings surprises 
through fundamental economic performance and do not engage in earnings manipulation. 
 
3 I do not study expectation management because it is beyond the scope of this study. While expectation 
management has been studied in the literature of earnings benchmark beating (e.g. Bartov et al., 2002; 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2006), it is a separate issue from earnings manipulation. The earnings manipulation 
issue is that, conditional on what firms may have done in the past, they still need to manipulate earnings to 
achieve earnings benchmarks. Thus, this study takes expectation management as given because the research 
question focuses on how firms behave, condition on expectations. 
4 Results are robust to using the mean consensus EPS forecast as the benchmark. Results are also robust to 




As firms can manipulate earnings using different accounting methods, the non-
manipulators/manipulators classification scheme combines three accounting-based 
earnings manipulation proxies: discretionary accruals, non-GAAP manipulation and 
classification shifting.5 
Discretionary accruals are a widely-used proxy for earnings management. 
Performance-matched discretionary accruals are estimated following Kothari et al. 
(2005). 6  They show that previous commonly-used discretionary accruals estimation 
methods (e.g. the modified-Jones model) are biased towards rejecting the null hypothesis 
of no earnings manipulation when manipulation incentives are related to performance. 
Following their method, abnormal accruals is first estimated with the following cross-
sectional regression model: 
34567	9::;<67=>,@ = 	BC + BE(1 9HHI3H>,@JE⁄ ) + BM∆H9OIH>,@ + BPQQI>,@ + R>,@ 
(2.1) 
where, for firm S in quarter T, 34567	9::;<67= is the difference between income before 
extraordinary items and net cash flow from operating activities, scaled by opening total 
assets.	1 9HHI3H>,@JE⁄  is the inverse of opening total assets. ∆H9OIH>,@ is the one-period 
change in sales, scaled by opening total assets. QQI>,@  is gross property, plant and 
equipment, scaled by opening total assets. 
 
5 Some argue that academic researchers do not have superior ability in detecting earnings manipulation 
over market participants, such as analysts, auditors and short sellers (Ball, 2013). Thus, if researchers claim 
that they can classify manipulators and non-manipulators, market participants should also be able to do so. 
However, it is important to note that not all the information that this study uses is available to investors on 
the earnings announcement date. In some cases, when some of the data are available, they are likely 
unaudited. Consequently, market participants may not be able to distinguish between manipulators and 
non-manipulators on the earnings announcement date. This is also one of the reasons why non-manipulators 
have incentives to separate themselves during conference calls. Moreover, to mitigate the concern that this 
study cannot effectively classify manipulators and non-manipulators using the three accounting-based 
proxies, robustness tests incorporate restatements, which is an ex post measure, into the classification 
scheme in robustness tests. For details, please see Section 2.5.4. 
6 While Kothari et al. (2005) develop the estimation method using annual data, it can also be applied to 




Performance-matched discretionary accruals are then calculated by adjusting 
abnormal accruals estimated using Eq. (2.1) with the average abnormal accruals of a 
portfolio matched to industry and past operating performance. In each quarter, for each 
two-digit SIC-defined industry, four portfolios are created by sorting the data into 
quartiles of ROA in the same quarter of the previous year. Performance-matched 
discretionary accruals of a specific firm-quarter is the abnormal accruals of that firm 
minus the average abnormal accruals of the matched portfolio. A firm is considered as 
inflating accruals if it has positive performance-matched discretionary accruals.7 
The second earnings manipulation proxy is non-GAAP manipulation. Both 
regulators and researchers have expressed concerns that managers may opportunistically 
use non-GAAP earnings to inflate investors’ perceptions of firm performance (e.g. Heflin 
and Hsu, 2008; Kolev et al., 2008; Frankel et al., 2011; Doyle et al., 2013). Specifically, 
Doyle et al. (2013) provide evidence that managers opportunistically use non-GAAP 
earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts. Non-GAAP manipulation is measured 
following Doyle et al. (2013). A firm is considered to be involved in non-GAAP 
manipulation if it has non-GAAP EPS greater than GAAP EPS. GAAP EPS is defined 
as Compustat EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. Non-GAAP 
EPS is defined as I/B/E/S actual EPS. 
The third earnings manipulation proxy is classification shifting. Classification 
shifting involves opportunistic managers classifying negative recurring items as special 
items and positive non-recurring items as core earnings to inflate core profitability 
(McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010). Quarterly classification shifting is measured following 
 
7 Results are robust to estimating discretionary accruals using Dechow et al.’s (1995) modified Jones model 




Fan et al. (2010). Expected core earnings for firm S in quarter T is estimated using the 
following model within each industry-year-quarter excluding firm S: 
							UI@ = 	BC + BEUI@JV + BMUI@JE + BP93W@ + BV9UUXY9OH@JV+ BZ9UUXY9OH@JE + B[∆H9OIH@ + B\]I^_∆H9OIH@+ B`XI3YX]H@JE + BaXI3YX]H@ + R>,@ 
(2.2) 
where UI is core earnings, defined as sales minus cost of goods sold and SG&A expenses. 93W is asset turnover. 9UUXY9OH is net income before extraordinary items minus cash 
from operations. ∆H9OIH is percentage change in sales. ]I^_∆H9OIH equals ∆H9OIH 
if ∆H9OIH  is negative, and 0 otherwise. XI3YX]H  is three-month market-adjusted 
returns. Expected core earnings for firm S in quarter T are measured using the estimated 
coefficients in Eq. (2.2) multiplied by the actual values of the variables for firm S . 
Unexpected core earnings are then calculated as the difference between reported and 
expected core earnings. Since classifying core expenses as non-recurring items inflates 
core earnings, firms are identified as engaging in classification shifting if their 
unexpected core earnings are positive (Athanasakou et al., 2011).  
The classification of manipulators/non-manipulators is based on three conditions 
that suggest earnings inflation: positive performance-matched discretionary accruals; 
non-GAAP earnings higher than GAAP earnings; and positive unexpected core earnings. 
Small non-negative earnings surprise firms that meet at least two of the three conditions 
in the reporting quarter are classified as manipulators in that quarter. Small non-negative 
earnings surprise firms that meet none of the three conditions in the reporting and the 




It is important to note that the classification scheme is designed to minimize the 
possibility of mis-classification and to empirically distinguish between non-manipulators 
and manipulators as accurately as possible. Therefore, observations that appear 
ambiguous in terms of earnings manipulation are not classified as either non-
manipulators or manipulators, and hence excluded from the sample of this study. More 
specifically, to ensure I can accurately classify non-manipulators, I require non-
manipulators to not engage in earnings manipulation consistently for a sufficient amount 
of time. Thus, firms that meet none of the three conditions in the reporting quarter, but 
met one or more of them in the previous four quarters, are not classified as non-
manipulators in the reporting quarter. Additionally, firms that meet only one of the three 
conditions in the reporting quarter are not classified as either non-manipulators or 
manipulators.  
 
2.3.3. Measures of conference call communication strategies 
A typical conference call comprises two sections: the management presentation 
section and the Q&A section. In order to measure the communication strategies of interest 
in the management presentation and Q&A sections separately, a Python script is used to 
parse the two sections. The script then extracts words spoken by managers in the 
presentation and Q&A sections, and words spoken by analysts in the Q&A section. 
 
2.3.3.1. Negative FLD 
To measure the proportion of negative forward-looking disclosure (FLD), FLD 
sentences first need to be identified in management speech in the presentation section and 




sentences using the Python NLTK program. The identification of FLD sentences 
combines techniques from the accounting literature (Matsumoto et al., 2011; Muslu et al., 
2014) and computational linguistics (Bird et al., 2009). Python NLTK provides functions 
to classify forward-looking and non-forward-looking sentences. However, forward-
looking identification using NLTK contains measurement error because it is not 
specifically designed for financial reporting language. For example, the words ‘expect’ 
and ‘anticipate’ are routinely used to deliver management guidance and forecasts, but 
NLTK does not classify sentences containing these words as forward-looking in some 
instances. Therefore, this study follows Muslu et al. (2014) and Matsumoto et al. (2011) 
to develop wordlists to identify FLD in conference calls. Matsumoto et al. (2011) provide 
a wordlist to identify FLD in conference calls; Muslu et al. (2014) provide a more 
comprehensive FLD identification scheme based on 10-K filings. Since written 
documents are different from oral communication, the wordlist in this study combines 
and modifies the identification schemes in these two studies into a comprehensive FLD 
identification scheme specifically for conference calls. The classification scheme 
classifies a sentence as forward-looking if it: (1) contains words/phrases that indicate 
future time periods (e.g. “future”, “next quarter”, “next year”, etc.); (2) contains verbs or 
their conjugations that indicate future expectations, plans or actions (e.g. “anticipate”, 
“aim”, etc.); (3) contains a reference to a year after the year of the call; (4) contains other 
words/phrases that are typically used in management guidance (e.g. “guidance”, 
“projection”, etc.); or (5) is classified as forward-looking by Python NLTK. Further 
details are provided in Appendix 2.1. 
Negative FLD is captured using two methods: a sentence-based approach and a 




number of FLD sentences. Negative FLD sentences are defined as sentences that include 
at least one negative or negated positive word, and no positive or negated negative words. 
Under the word-based approach, the proxy for negative FLD (denoted as bOcdef_g4;h) 
is the percentage of negative and negated positive words relative to the total number of 
words of FLD. Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) wordlist is used to identify negative 
and negated positive words. Both bOcdef_=ed5ed:e and bOcdef_g4;h are measured 
separately for the presentation and Q&A sections.8 
I use both the sentence-based and the word-based measures for two reasons. First, 
they can both contain measurement error. Prior accounting and finance studies typically 
use the word-based approach (e.g. Frankel et al., 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011; 
Mayew et al., 2015). However, if a sentence contains several negative words, these words 
will contribute to a higher level of negativity under the word-based approach, although it 
is likely that they describe the same economic event. Thus, the sentence-based measure 
is complementary to the word-based measure by considering this potential bias of the 
word-based measure. Nonetheless, the sentence-based measure may also contain 
measurement error. Since management speech is tokenized into sentences using 
automated techniques, measurement error can be induced due to inaccurate sentence 
splits. Second, the two measures reflect different aspects of how managers provide 
negative FLD. The word-based measure may better reflect the intensity of negative words 
used in FLD as a whole. However, sentences as textual units provide context better than 
words to help investors understand the topic of interest. The sentence-based measure 
better captures the amount of negative news in FLD at the sentence level.  
 
8 I choose Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) wordlist because it contains a comprehensive set of negative 
words. Other wordlist used in accounting and finance research such as Henry’s (2006, 2008) wordlist do 
not include such a comprehensive list of negative words. Using Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) wordlist, 






Obfuscation is measured by estimating the obfuscation component of 
management linguistic complexity following Bushee et al. (2018).9 Bushee et al. (2018) 
show that theoretically there are two latent components of management linguistic 
complexity: obfuscation and information. For example, if analysts ask complex questions, 
managers are more likely to provide complex answers, which reflects disclosure 
informativeness instead of obfuscation.  
Bushee et al. (2018) develop and validate an empirical method to separate the 
obfuscation and information components of management linguistic complexity. 
Linguistic complexity is measured by the Gunning (1952) Fog index. A high Fog index 
indicates high linguistic complexity. The assumption of their method is that analysts have 
no obfuscating incentives. Thus, analysts’ linguistic complexity in the Q&A section can 
serve as a benchmark level of linguistic complexity in the absence of obfuscation. The 
obfuscation component of management linguistic complexity (denoted as Wij< ) is 
estimated using the following regression: 
b4f(k6d6fe;)>,@= 	BC + BEb4f(9d67l=5)>,@ + ∑n<=Sde==	U4op7eqS5l	Q;4qSe= + R>,@ 
(2.3) 
where the estimated value of R (i.e. the residual) is Wij<. Business complexity proxy 
variables are firm size, leverage, book-to-market ratio, stock returns, acquisitions, capital 
 
9 Early research tends to assume that good news is easy to read, and that obfuscation is conceptually 
equivalent to language complexity (Li, 2008). However, theory and evidence highlight that disclosure 
language can be complex for reasons other than obfuscation, such as the complexity of underlying 




intensity, capital expenditures, R&D, debt and equity issuance, cash flow volatility, 
goodwill impairments and restructuring charges. Wij< is estimated separately for the 
presentation and Q&A sections with management Fog index computed separately for 
each section.  
A higher value of Wij<  corresponds to a higher level of obfuscation. It is 
important to note that because the obfuscation component of linguistic complexity is 
regression residuals, its mean is zero by construction. Wij< = 0 does not suggest that 
obfuscation is zero (Bushee et al., 2018).  
 
2.3.4. Empirical model 
To test whether there are differences between non-manipulators’ and 
manipulators’ communication strategies, I estimate the following model: 
U4oo<dS:65S4d	H5;65efl>,@r= 	BC + BE]k_h<ool>,@ + BMHSse>,@ + BP^;4g5ℎ>,@ + BVXW9>,@+ BZI6;du47>,@ + B[Xe5>,@ + B\Xe5u47>,@ + B`Oeve;6fe>,@+ Bak3n>,@ + BEC9d67l=5>,@ + BEE9fe>,@+	∑BwU4dje;ed:e	U677	U4d5;47>,@ +	∑bS;o	bI+	∑xe6;y<6;5e;	bI	 + R>,@ 
 (2.4) 
The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. Subscripts S and T indicate firms and 
quarters, respectively. The dependent variable is conference call communication strategy, 
where the superscript z represents:	bOcdef_=ed5ed:e, bOcdef_g4;h, or Wij<. The 




a non-manipulator in a [0, 1¢] earnings surprises quarter, and zero if it is a manipulator. 
I expect a positive association between bOcdef_=ed5ed:e and ]k_h<ool, a positive 
association between bOcdef_g4;h  and ]k_h<ool , and a negative association 
between	Wij< and ]k_h<ool.  
I include additional firm-specific variables to control for factors likely to be 
associated with conference call communication and earnings manipulation. All variables 
are defined in Appendix 2.2. I first control for firm size (HSse) because it influences many 
aspects of a firm’s operations, business and information environment (Li, 2008; Brochet 
et al., 2019). I include the following contemporaneous quarterly firm performance 
variables to capture the effects of current performance on conference call communication: 
sales growth (^;4g5ℎ), ROA ratio (XW9>,@) and earnings volatility (I6;du47) (Li, 2008; 
Davis et al., 2015). I also control for leverage (Oeve;6fe) and market-to-book ratio 
(k3n) to proxy for the firm’s growth potential, complexity and uncertainty (Li, 2008; 
Brochet et al., 2019). I include analyst coverage (9d67l=5) to control for differences in 
firms’ information environment driven by the demand side (Brochet et al., 2019). I 
control for firm age (9fe) because older firms may face less information asymmetry and 
hence provide more transparent disclosure (Li, 2008). Additionally, I control for firm 
stock market performance using quarterly stock returns (Xe5 ) and return volatility 
(Xe5u47) (Li, 2008; Davis et al., 2015; Lee, 2016). I also include conference call-level 
variables, i.e. the total word count and the percentage of positive/negative/uncertain 
words, to proxy for the amount of information released and the overall sentiment of the 
call (Brochet et al., 2019). Additionally, when bOcdef_=ed5ed:e or bOcdef_g4;h 
( Wij< ) is the dependent variable, latent components of management linguistic 




Firm fixed effects are included to account for unobservable firm characteristics 
that affect communication style. Year-quarter fixed effects are included to control for 
time-specific determinants of communication strategies. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm because of likely serial correlation in dependent and independent variables (Petersen, 
2009).  
 
2.4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 Panel A describes the sample selection process. Data are drawn from 
multiple sources. Quarterly conference call transcripts are sourced from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. I obtain accounting data from Compustat, returns data from CRSP, and 
analyst data from I/B/E/S. The sample period is from January 2010 to December 2015.10 
Sample construction starts by matching firm-quarter observations for non-financial U.S. 
firms with available data on Compustat to conference call transcripts in English with 
managers speaking in both the presentation and Q&A sections and analysts speaking in 
the Q&A section. This leads to 25,071 transcripts. Requiring data from CRSP and I/B/E/S 
reduces the sample to 21,112 conference calls. After excluding observations outside the 
[0, 1¢] quarterly earnings surprises bin, 3,037 observations remain, of which 358 firm-
quarter observations are in the non-manipulator sub-sample, and 1,421 in the manipulator 
sub-sample. The final sample therefore comprises 1,779 quarterly conference call 
transcripts from 684 U.S. non-financial firms.11 Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the sample 
 
10 The sample only includes the post-crisis period from 2010 to 2015 to avoid potential confounding effects 
of the financial crisis. 
11 The decrease from 3,037 to 1,779 observations results from 1,258 observations being ambiguous to be 
classified as a non-manipulator and manipulator. For details, please see Section 2.3.2. Moreover, to gauge 
the accuracy of non-manipulator and manipulator classification, a comparison with the prior literature in 
terms of the proportion of non-manipulator/manipulator is made. Given that this study aggregates various 
earnings manipulation methods in the classification, there is no prior study that is directly comparable. 
Nonetheless, Koh et al. (2008) estimates that approximately 50% of firms with small positive earnings 




distribution by year. Later years of the sample contain more observations than earlier 
years because the number of firms using conference calls increases over time. 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics and univariate test results. Panel A lists 
descriptive statistics for communication strategy variables. H1 considers whether non-
manipulators provide a higher proportion of negative FLD than manipulators. Thus, 
univariate tests compare both the total amount of FLD and the proportion of negative 
FLD of non-manipulators and manipulators.12 The amount of FLD in the presentation 
(Q&A) section is the percentage of FLD sentences relative to the total number of 
sentences of management speech in the presentation (Q&A) section. On average, 25.3% 
(20.7%) of non-manipulators’ presentation (Q&A) is classified as FLD. As for 
manipulators, only 22.2% (18.2%) of their presentation (Q&A) is FLD. The differences 
are statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
In terms of the sentenced-based negative FLD proxy, a higher value of bOcdef_=ed5ed:e corresponds to more negative sentences in FLD. In the presentation 
section, results reveal that non-manipulators have a statistically significantly higher 
proportion of negative sentences within FLD (mean = 13.6%, median = 11.2%) than 
manipulators (mean = 12.4%, median = 11.1%). In the Q&A section, non-manipulators 
(mean = 9.8%, median = 8.3%) also provide a higher proportion of negative FLD 
sentences than manipulators (mean = 9.7%, median = 7.9%), but only the difference 
 





between the medians is statistically significant. These results provide some support for 
H1.13 
In terms of word-based negative FLD, a higher value of bOcdef_g4;h 
corresponds to more negative FLD. In the presentation section, non-manipulators’ FLD 
is more negative (mean = 0.84%, median = 0.72%) than that of manipulators (mean = 
0.78%, median = 0.68%). Both the mean and median are statistically significantly 
different. In the Q&A section, non-manipulators (mean = 0.56%, median = 0.49%) also 
provide more negative FLD than manipulators (mean = 0.56%, median = 0.48%), but the 
differences between means and medians are not statistically significant. These results 
provide some support for H1. 
H2 predicts that non-manipulators exhibit a lower level of obfuscation than 
manipulators. A higher value of Wij< corresponds to a higher level of obfuscation.  Non-
manipulators’ average obfuscation is 0.05 in the presentation and -0.07 in the Q&A, 
whereas manipulators’ average obfuscation is 0.51 in the presentation and 0.14 in the 
Q&A. The differences between non-manipulators and manipulators are statistically 
significant in both the presentation and Q&A sections, consistent with H2. Moreover, 
both groups of firms exhibit a lower level of obfuscation in the Q&A section, indicating 
that management’s ability to obfuscate may be limited due to interactions with analysts.  
Panel B of Table 2.2 lists descriptive statistics for firm characteristics and 
performance. Non-manipulators are on average statistically smaller (HSse = 6.85 vs 7.99), 
have higher sales growth (^;4g5ℎ = 0.25 vs 0.04), higher ROA (XW9 = 0.02 vs 0.01), 
 
13 Note that under the sentence-based approach, bOcdef_=ed5ed:e  is scaled by the number of FLD 
sentences. This could potentially be problematic because the number of FLD sentences differs across 
manipulators and non-manipulators. In the extreme, 100% bOcdef_=ed5ed:e for both manipulators and 
non-manipulators indicates both groups present the same proportion of negative FLD. However, the raw 
number of negative FLD content will be higher for non-manipulators because they provide more FLD in 
the first place. Thus, the sentence-based measure of negative FLD biases against my prediction and may 




lower earnings volatility (I6;du47 = 2.04 vs 2.88), higher return volatility (Xe5u47 = 
0.04 vs 0.03), lower leverage (Oeve;6fe = 0.18 vs 0.26), higher market-to-book ratio 
(k3n = 1.51 vs 1.34) and higher analyst coverage (9d67l=5 = 0.34 vs 0.31), and are 
younger (9fe = 2.57 vs 2.96). Collectively, results suggest that non-manipulators are 
firms with stronger fundamental performance, higher growth potential and better 
information environment, consistent with theory. 
Univariate findings in Table 2.2 are broadly consistent with H1 and H2. Overall, 
non-manipulators have not only a higher amount of FLD, but also a higher proportion of 
negative sentences and words within FLD than manipulators. In addition, non-
manipulators exhibit a lower level of obfuscating behaviour than manipulators. 
Table 2.3 presents correlations among ]k_h<ool , communication strategy 
variables and other control variables. Spearman (Pearson) correlations appear above 
(below) the diagonal. Both bOc(Q;e=ed5)  and bOc(y&9)  are significantly and 
positively correlated with ]k_h<ool, confirming that non-manipulators provide more 
forward-looking statements in conference calls. bOcdef_=ed5ed:e in the presentation 
section is positively correlated with ]k_h<ool, consistent with the univariate test 
result in Table 2.2 Panel A. bOcdef_g4;h  in both the presentation and Q&A is 
positively correlated with ]k_h<ool , suggesting that non-manipulators use more 
negative words in conference calls. Moreover, Wij< in both the presentation and Q&A 
is negatively correlated with ]k_h<ool, suggesting that manipulators exhibit a higher 
level of obfuscation than non-manipulators in conference calls.  






2.5.1. Differences in negative FLD between non-manipulators and manipulators 
Table 2.4 presents results from the OLS estimation of Eq. (2.4) with bOcdef_=ed5ed:e as the dependent variable to test H1. The coefficient on ]k_h<ool 
is expected to be positive. Columns (1) – (2) present results for the presentation section 
of conference calls. In column (1), the model fits well with an adjusted R 2 of 32%. The 
coefficient on ]k_h<ool is positive (7.373) and statistically different from zero at the 
10% level (5-stat = 1.67), which provides weak evidence that non-manipulators provide 
a higher proportion of negative sentences in FLD than manipulators. In column (2), 
conference call linguistic features (i.e. call sentiment, call length and latent components 
of management linguistic complexity) are included as control variables. The coefficient 
on ]k_h<ool remains positive (8.099) and statistically significant (5-stat = 1.91). This 
suggests that, all else being equal, non-manipulators provide 8% more negative FLD 
sentences than manipulators in the presentation section.  
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
Columns (3) – (4) report results for the Q&A section. In column (3), the 
coefficient on ]k_h<ool is positive (6.816) and statistically significant (5-stat = 1.70), 
indicating that non-manipulators exhibit a higher proportion of negative sentences in 
FLD than manipulators in the Q&A section. In column (4), after controlling for additional 
conference call linguistic characteristics, the coefficient on ]k_h<ool  is positive 




on average, non-manipulators have 7% more negative FLD sentences than manipulators 
in the Q&A section.14  
Other firm characteristics and performance variables exhibit statistically 
significant associations with bOcdef_=ed5ed:e. In the presentation section, larger firms, 
firms with sales decreases and firm with lower quarterly stock returns provide more 
negative FLD, on average. In the Q&A section, smaller firms, more levered firms and 
older firms use more negative sentences in FLD. The associations between bOcdef_=ed5ed:e and HSse in the presentation and Q&A sections have opposite signs. 
In the presentation section, larger firms give more negative FLD, consistent with prior 
evidence that large firms are subject to more strict scrutiny and higher political costs, and 
hence issue more cautious FLD (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Li, 2010). In the Q&A 
section, the negative association between firm size and negative FLD could be driven by 
analysts’ questions: as smaller firms do not provide as many negative FLD as larger firms 
in the presentation, analysts may ask smaller firms to provide more details on this topic. 
Table 2.5 presents the results from the estimation of Eq. (2.4) with bOcdef_g4;h as the dependent variable. The coefficient on ]k_h<ool is expected 
to be positive and statistically significant. The first two columns present results for the 
presentation section. In column (1), the coefficient on ]k_h<ool is positive (0.094) 
and statistically different from zero at the 5% level (5-stat = 2.21), indicating that non-
manipulators use more negative words in FLD than manipulators. Column (2) includes 
extra conference call linguistic features as control variables. The coefficient on ]k_h<ool  remains positive (0.103) and statistically significant ( 5 -stat = 2.39). 
 
14 As discussed in the univariate analysis results, non-manipulators have an overall higher amount of FLD 
in management speeches and a higher proportion of negative sentences in FLD than manipulators. 
Multivariate analysis results (untabulated) also show that non-manipulators have a higher proportion of 
FLD in management speeches than manipulators after controlling for firm characteristics, performance and 




Columns (3) – (4) report results for the Q&A section. In column (3), the coefficient on ]k_h<ool is positive (0.339) and statistically significant (5-stat = 6.30). In column (4), 
after controlling for additional call linguistic characteristics, the coefficient on ]k_h<ool remains positive (0.356) with increased statistical significance (5-stat = 
6.75).  
[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
Other firm characteristics and performance variables exhibit statistically 
significant associations with bOcdef_g4;h. In the presentation section, larger firms, 
firms with higher earnings volatility and longer presentation section provide more 
negative FLD, on average. In the Q&A section, firms with less volatile stock returns, 
higher leverage, longer Q&A section and more informative calls provide more negative 
FLD. The negative association between bOcdef_g4;h and call length is consistent with 
the prior finding that managers tend to hold longer calls when they have more negative 
news to discuss (Matsumoto et al., 2011). 
Taken together the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, it appears that non-manipulators 




15 The main tests examine negatively toned FLD because the focus is on whether non-manipulators tend to 
provide credible FLD and release bad news more quickly than manipulators. I also explore the difference 
in positive FLD between non-manipulators and manipulators (results untabulated). The findings are that 
non-manipulators’ amount of positive FLD is either statistically equivalent to or less than that of 
manipulators. This is consistent with the prediction that non-manipulators commit to credible and cautious 




2.5.2. Differences in obfuscation between non-manipulators and manipulators 
H2 predicts that non-manipulators exhibit a lower level of obfuscating behaviour 
than manipulators. Table 2.6 presents the results from the OLS estimation of Eq. (2.4) 
with Wij< as the dependent variable. The coefficient on ]k_h<ool is expected to be 
negative and statistically significant. Columns (1) – (2) provide results for the 
presentation section. In column (1), the coefficient on ]k_h<ool is negative (-0.668) 
but not statistically significant (5 -stat = -0.29). In column (2), after controlling for 
additional linguistic features, the coefficient on ]k_h<ool remains negative (-0.525) 
and insignificant (5-stat = -0.23). Results are consistent with Bushee et al. (2018), who 
also find that, in a firm fixed effects model, within-firm variation in obfuscation in the 
presentation section is limited because of scripting.16 Columns (3) – (4) provide results 
for the Q&A section. In column (3), the coefficient on ]k_h<ool is negative (-0.935) 
and statistically different from zero at the 5% level (5-stat = -1.92), suggesting that non-
manipulators display less obfuscation than manipulators. Column (4) further controls for 
additional conference call linguistic features. The coefficient on ]k_h<ool is still 
negative (-0.971) and marginally significant (5-stat = -1.87). 
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
Given that Wij<  is constructed from regression residuals, it is unintuitive to 
interpret economic significance directly from the raw results in Table 2.6. To calibrate 
economic effects, the rank of Wij< is used. The Wij< measure is ranked into percentiles 
from 0 to 99, where a higher rank indicates more severe obfuscating behaviour. The 
average percentile ranks of Wij<(Q;e=ed5) and Wij<(y&9) of non-manipulators are 
46 and 47, respectively. The average ranks of Wij<(Q;e=ed5)  and Wij<(y&9)  of 
 
16 Scripting refers to the disclosure behaviour that managers adhere to predetermined scripts in their 




manipulators are 52 and 51, respectively. Univariate tests show that the difference 
between the average ranks of non-manipulators and manipulators is statistically 
significant in both the presentation (p-value = 0.02) and Q&A (p-value = 0.07). The rank 
of Wij< is then used as the dependent variable to re-estimate the regressions in Table 
2.6. In the presentation section, regression results (untabulated) show that the coefficient 
on ]k_h<ool is negative but not statistically significant. In the Q&A section, the 
coefficient on ]k_h<ool  is –26 and statistically significant (5 -stat = -1.85). This 
suggests that non-manipulators rank lower than manipulators by 26 in terms of 
obfuscation in the Q&A section, all else being equal.  
Other firm characteristics also exhibit significant associations with Wij<. Firms 
with lower ROA and younger firms have a higher level of obfuscation in the presentation 
section. Firms with lower analyst following have higher obfuscation in both the 
presentation and Q&A, consistent with prior evidence that firms with higher disclosure 
quality have more analyst following (e.g. Bushman et al., 2004). Moreover, firms that 
use more positive words exhibit higher obfuscation in both the presentation and Q&A, 
consistent with prior evidence that positive tone can be used as an opportunistic 
disclosure tool (e.g. Huang et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2011). 
Collectively, results in Table 2.6 provide some support for H2 that manipulators 
exhibit a higher level of obfuscation than non-manipulators, although the difference is 
only statistically and economically meaningful in the Q&A section. Moreover, the 





2.5.3. Changes in communication strategies 
The results thus far indicate that non-manipulators and manipulators use different 
communication strategies in conference calls. However, it is empirically unclear if non-
manipulators and manipulators are intentionally designing their communication 
strategies to achieve their distinct communication goals when they report small non-
negative earnings surprises. One might argue that the differences in communication 
strategies are driven by firms’ general communication style or unobservable 
fundamentals, instead of disclosure incentives resulting from small non-negative 
earnings surprises. To address such potential concerns over endogeneity associated with 
omitted variables, I analyse the changes in non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ 
communication strategies to further assess whether non-manipulators (manipulators) 
adjust their communication strategies to proactively separate (pool) when they report 
small non-negative earnings surprises. 
Change analysis is conducted by comparing seasonally adjusted changes in non-
manipulators’ and manipulators’ communication strategies. I estimate the following 
model to perform change analysis: 
∆U4oo<dS:65S4d	H5;65efl>,@r= 	BC + BE]k_h<ool>,@ + BM∆HSse>,@ + BP∆^;4g5ℎ>,@ + BV∆XW9>,@+ BZ∆I6;du47>,@ + B[∆Xe5>,@ + B\∆Xe5u47>,@ + B`∆Oeve;6fe>,@+ Ba∆k3n>,@ + BEC∆9d67l=5>,@ + BEE∆9fe>,@+	∑Bw∆U4dje;ed:e	U677	U4d5;47>,@ +	∑xe6;y<6;5e;	bI	 + R>,@ 
 (2.5) 
The dependent variable is the seasonally adjusted change in conference call 




the difference between the communication strategy of the current quarter and that of the 
same quarter of the previous year.  
To construct the change analysis sample, the same quarter of the previous year is 
required not to be a [0, 1¢] earnings surprises quarter for both current-quarter non-
manipulators and manipulators. Thus, whether firms proactively change communication 
strategies when they report small non-negative earnings surprises can be examined. In 
addition, manipulators are also required to engage in earnings manipulation in the same 
quarter of the previous year to be included in the change analysis sample.17 In this way, 
I can ensure the change analysis results are driven by the communication incentives 
resulted from moving into a small non-negative earnings surprise quarter.  
H1 posits that non-manipulators commit to credible disclosure during conference 
calls and provide more negative FLD than manipulators. If non-manipulators adjust their 
communication strategies to proactively separate, then I expect them to increase the 
proportion of negative FLD when they move into a small non-negative earnings surprise 
quarter. Stated another way, ∆bOcdef_=ed5ed:e and ∆bOcdef_g4;h	are expected to 
be positive for non-manipulators. As for manipulators, as they have opportunistic 
incentives to withhold negative information, I expect them to have less negative FLD 
when moving into a small non-negative earnings surprise quarter (i.e. have negative ∆bOcdef_=ed5ed:e  and ∆bOcdef_g4;h ). I therefore expect BE  in Eq. (2.5) to be 
positive when the dependent variable is ∆bOcdef_=ed5ed:e or ∆bOcdef_g4;h. 
H2 predicts that as manipulators are opportunistic disclosers who aim to delay the 
revelation of bad news, they exhibit more obfuscating behaviour than non-manipulators. 
If manipulators adjust their communication strategies to proactively pool when they 
 
17 This requirement only applies to manipulators because non-manipulators by design do not engage in 




move into a small non-negative earnings surprise quarter, then I expect them to 
intentionally increase the level of obfuscation. That is, ∆Wij<  for manipulators is 
expected to be positive. I also expect non-manipulators’ ∆Wij< to be close to 0 because 
they have achieved the reported earnings genuinely and presumably have no significant 
extra incentives for obfuscation. As a result, I expect BE in Eq. (2.5) to be negative when 
the dependent variable is ∆Wij<. 
Table 2.7 provides results for change analysis. Panel A presents univariate 
analysis results. For changes in the overall amount of FLD in management speeches 
(∆bOc), on average, non-manipulators increase the proportion of FLD (mean ∆bOc in 
presentation = 1.801% and in Q&A = 1.721%), while manipulators decrease it (mean ∆bOc  in presentation = -0.774% and in Q&A = -0.625%). The differences are 
statistically significant. In terms of changes in negative FLD, non-manipulators increase 
the proportion of negative sentences in FLD (mean ∆bOcdef_=ed5ed:e in presentation 
= 0.837% and in Q&A = 0.478%), whereas manipulators show a decrease (mean ∆bOcdef_=ed5ed:e in presentation = -1.126% and in Q&A = -0.822%). The differences 
between non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ changes are statistically significant. In 
terms of ∆bOcdef_g4;h, non-manipulators increase the average proportion of negative 
words in FLD (mean ∆bOcdef_g4;h in presentation = 0.031% and in Q&A = 0.075%), 
whereas manipulators show a small increase in the presentation (0.001%) and a small 
decrease in the Q&A (-0.001%). The differences between non-manipulators’ and 
manipulators’ ∆bOcdef_g4;h are not statistically significant in either the presentation 
or Q&A section. Collectively, univariate analysis results provide no consistent evidence 
regarding whether non-manipulators intentionally adjust their FLD to be more negative 
as a separating strategy in a small non-negative earnings surprises quarter. 




H2 posits that manipulators intentionally use obfuscation as a pooling strategy. 
Consistent with H2, results show that manipulators increase obfuscation in both the 
presentation (mean ∆Wij< = 0.618) and Q&A (mean ∆Wij< = 0.379) sections. As for 
non-manipulators, while they exhibit a slight increase in obfuscation in the mean (mean ∆Wij< in presentation = 0.176 and in Q&A = 0.004), median changes are negative and 
indicate a decrease in obfuscation (median ∆Wij< in presentation = -0.010 and in Q&A 
= -0.019). Univariate tests show that the differences between manipulators’ and non-
manipulators’ ∆Wij<  are statistically significant for both the presentation and Q&A 
sections. Results are consistent with manipulators intentionally increasing obfuscation in 
conference calls when reporting small non-negative earnings surprises. 
Table 2.7 Panel B presents multivariate analysis results on estimating Eq. (2.5). ]k_h<ool is the explanatory variable of interest. Columns (1) – (2) report estimations 
for ∆bOcdef_=ed5ed:e  in the presentation and Q&A sections, respectively. The 
coefficient on ]k_h<ool  is positive and statistically significant in both columns, 
suggesting that the difference between non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ ∆bOcdef_=ed5ed:e is statistically significant after controlling for firm performance and 
characteristics changes. Columns (3) – (4) report estimations for ∆bOcdef_g4;h in the 
presentation and Q&A sections, respectively. The coefficient on ]k_h<ool  is not 
statistically significant in either column, consistent with the univariate test results.  
To summarise, there is mixed evidence for H1 regarding whether non-
manipulators adjust their FLD to be more negative as an intentional separating strategy. 
While results show that they increase the proportion of negative FLD sentences when 
they report small non-negative earnings surprises, there is no significant difference 




Columns (5) – (6) report estimations for ∆Wij< in the presentation and Q&A 
sections, respectively. In column (5), the coefficient on ]k_h<ool is negative but not 
statistically significant. In column (6), the coefficient on ]k_h<ool is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that the difference between non-manipulators’ and 
manipulators’ ∆Wij< is significant in the Q&A after controlling for firm performance 
and characteristics.  
Collectively, there is supporting evidence that manipulators use obfuscation as an 
intentional pooling strategy. They increase obfuscation when they report small non-
negative earnings surprises, indicating that they are driven by opportunistic disclosure 
incentives and do not mimic non-manipulators’ credible communication strategy.  
 
2.5.4. Robustness tests 
2.5.4.1. Alternative non-manipulator/manipulator classifications 
As the results of this study depend on the extent to which non-manipulators and 
manipulators can be accurately classified, several robustness checks are conducted with 
various alternative non-manipulator/manipulator classifications to confirm the main 
results in Tables 2.4 – 2.7. First, the classification scheme described in Section 2.3.2 is 
modified in four ways: (1) replacing the condition positive discretionary accruals with 
discretionary accruals higher than the median of all Compustat firms; (2) replacing the 
condition non-GAAP earnings higher than GAAP earnings with non-GAAP earnings 
converting negative GAAP earnings surprises to positive non-GAAP earnings surprises; 
(3) replacing the condition positive unexpected core earnings with unexpected core 




manipulators to meet none of the conditions in both the reporting and the previous eight 
quarters. Results (untabulated) are consistent with those reported in Tables 2.4 – 2.7. 
Next, I modify the non-manipulator/manipulator classification scheme in Section 
2.3.2 to include ex post restatements as an extra earnings manipulation criterion to 
replicate the main results. I measure restatements using the financial fraud data from 
Audit Analytics. An alternative non-manipulator dummy, ]k_Xe=, is defined. ]k_Xe= 
takes the value of one if a firm has ]k_h<ool = 1 and does not engage in financial 
fraud for the reporting and the previous four quarters; and zero if a firm has ]k_h<ool = 0 or committed financial fraud for the reporting quarter. 
Table 2.8 presents the results on re-estimating regressions in Tables 2.4 – 2.6 
using ]k_Xe=  as the test variable. Columns (1) – (2) report the estimation for bOcdef_=ed5ed:e in the presentation and the Q&A, respectively. In both columns, the 
economic and statistical significance of the coefficient on ]k_Xe= are comparable to the 
results in Table 2.4. Columns (3) – (4) report the estimation for bOcdef_g4;h in the 
presentation and the Q&A, respectively. In both columns, the economic and statistical 
significance of the coefficient on ]k_Xe= are comparable to the results in Table 2.5. 
Columns (5) – (6) list the estimations for Wij<. Results are consistent with those in Table 
2.6. Additionally, I also re-estimate the change analysis results in Table 2.7 using ]k_Xe= as the test variable instead of ]k_h<ool. Results (untabulated) are consistent 
with those in Table 2.7. 
[Insert Table 2.8 here] 
A limitation of ]k_Xe= is that it measures restatements using financial fraud, 
which represents the most severe type of restatements and the most extreme case of poor 




restatements (Hribar et al., 2014). To mitigate such a concern, I further expand the 
definition of restatements to include both financial fraud and accounting issues to take 
account of less severe restatements. Data on restatements related to accounting issues are 
obtained from Audit Analytics. Results estimated using the non-manipulator/manipulator 
classification with this expanded definition of restatements (untabulated) are consistent 
with those reported in Tables 2.4 – 2.7, with statistically more significant results for the 
estimation for Wij< in the Q&A section in Table 2.6.  
 
2.5.4.2. Alternative obfuscation measures 
The main analysis uses the raw regression residuals of Eq. (2.3) as the empirical 
proxy for obfuscation (i.e. Wij<). This implies a level of precision in the measurement 
of obfuscation, which is likely not justified. The measure is likely to contain measurement 
error since it is estimated using regression residuals. Therefore, two less granular 
obfuscation proxies are considered to assess the robustness of the results. First, the 
percentile ranking of Wij< is used as the dependent variable. Second, a dummy variable 
is created. It takes the value of 1 if a firm-quarter observation has Wij< ≥ 0; and 0 if a 
firm-quarter observation has Wij< < 0. The regressions in Table 2.6 are re-estimated by 
using both the percentile ranked variable (OLS regressions) and the dummy variable 
(logistic regressions) as the dependent variable. The results (untabulated) are consistent 
with those in Table 2.6.  
 
2.5.4.3. Entropy balancing for the non-manipulator and manipulator sub-samples 
The non-manipulator and manipulator sub-samples have unbalanced sample sizes 




B, observations in the two sub-samples exhibit different characteristics. Thus, a potential 
concern is that differences in non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ communication 
strategies might be driven by confounding factors. To mitigate such a concern, this sub-
section conducts robustness analysis that applies entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012) 
to assemble a manipulator sub-sample that exhibits covariate balance with the non-
manipulator sub-sample. 
Entropy balancing weights control sample units to achieve covariate balance and 
exactly matches the covariate moments for the treatment and control groups, adjusting to 
inequalities in the variable distributions between the two groups (Hainmueller, 2012; 
Zhao and Percival, 2017). It achieves covariate balance between the treatment and control 
groups along the first, second and third moments of the control variable distributions, and 
does not require researchers to make subjective design choices that affect the composition 
of the control group (Hainmueller, 2012). It is a newly-developed matching technique 
that has recently been introduced and used in the accounting literature (Wilde, 2017; 
McMullin and Schonberger, 2018). It is more flexible than nearest-neighbour techniques 
(e.g. propensity score matching) because while propensity score adjustments typically 
lead to low levels of covariate balance in practice, entropy balancing tackles this problem 
by using a reweighting scheme where covariate balance is directly built into the weight 
function that is used to adjust the control sample units (Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller 
and Xu, 2013).  
Specifically, I attempt to apply propensity score matching (PSM) but fail to 
achieve covariate balance along some dimensions. I therefore do not use PSM in the 
robustness checks because differences in covariates represent poor matching quality and 
lead to biased tests (Shipman et al., 2017). Using entropy balancing, my non-manipulator 




without design choices that affect the composition of the manipulator sub-sample and, 
hence, the results of the analysis. I use the non-manipulator and entropy-balanced 
manipulator sub-samples to perform the robustness checks. Results (untabulated) are 
consistent with those in Tables 2.4 – 2.7. 
 
2.6. Market reaction tests  
Having established that manipulators design communication strategies to 
intentionally preserve the pooling equilibrium, the study next investigates how listeners 
of conference calls, i.e. investors, respond by examining stock returns to conference calls 
and specific communication strategies. If non-manipulators are successful at signalling 
the absence of earnings manipulation, investors should react more positively to their calls 
and/or communication strategies. If manipulators are successful at pooling, there should 
be no significant difference between the market reactions across the two groups of firms.  
Empirically, it is unclear if market participants can distinguish between non-
manipulators and manipulators. On the one hand, prior evidence suggests that market 
participants cannot fully separate non-manipulators and manipulators and discount 
earnings results of all firms with small non-negative earnings surprises (Keung et al., 
2010). As my results suggest that manipulators exhibit strong obfuscating behaviour, it 
is possible that investors cannot observe the differences between these two groups of 
firms. On the other hand, investors might be able to distinguish between non-
manipulators and manipulators because there is some evidence that non-manipulators 
attempt to differentiate themselves by engaging in credible disclosure during conference 




manipulators’ credible disclosure, then they may be able to separate non-manipulators 
from manipulators. 
To empirically test market reactions to non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ 
conference calls and communication strategies, I specify the following OLS regression 
models: 
U9X[0, +1] = 	BC + BE]k_h<ool>,@ + BMHSse>,@ + BP^;4g5ℎ>,@ + BVXW9>,@+ BZI6;du47>,@ + B[Xe5>,@ + B\Xe5u47>,@ + B`Oeve;6fe>,@+ Bak3n>,@ + BEC9d67l=5>,@ + BEE9fe>,@ +	∑bS;o	bI+	∑xe6;y<6;5e;	bI	 + R>,@ 
(2.6) 
U9X[0, +1] = 	BC + BEU4oo<dS:65S4d	H5;65efl>,@r + BMHSse>,@ + BP^;4g5ℎ>,@+ BVXW9>,@ + BZI6;du47>,@ + B[Xe5>,@ + B\Xe5u47>,@+ B`Oeve;6fe>,@ + Bak3n>,@ + BEC9d67l=5>,@ + BEE9fe>,@+	∑BwU4dje;ed:e	U677	U4d5;47>,@ +	∑bS;o	bI+	∑xe6;y<6;5e;	bI	 + R>,@ 
(2.7) 
where U9X[0, +1] is the empirical proxy for market reaction. It is measured as the value-
weighted market-adjusted return for the two-day window [0, +1] surrounding the 
conference call date.  
 Eq. (2.6) tests whether investors react differently to non-manipulators’ and 
manipulators’ conference calls. ]k_h<ool>,@  is the test variable. If investors can 
distinguish between non-manipulators and manipulators due to conference calls, then 




case, BE  is expected to be positive and statistically significant. On the other hand, if 
investors cannot separate the two firm types using information from conference calls, 
then BE is expected to be not statistically significant. 
Eq. (2.7) tests whether investors react differently to non-manipulators’ and 
manipulators’ specific conference call communication strategies. The test variable, U4oo<dS:65S4d	H5;65efl>,@r , represents the following communication strategies: bOcdef_=ed5ed:e , bOcdef_g4;h , or Wij< . If investors can separate non-
manipulators from manipulators because they understand the information in non-
manipulators’ credible communication strategy, then BE is expected to be positive when 
the test variable is bOcdef_=ed5ed:e or bOcdef_g4;h. That is, investors react more 
positively to non-manipulators’ separating communication strategy. However, if 
investors cannot process the information in non-manipulators’ credible communication 
strategy, then BE is expected to be not statistically significant when the test variable is bOcdef_=ed5ed:e  or bOcdef_g4;h . As for when Wij<  is the test variable, if 
manipulators are successful at obfuscating, then investors will not be able to distinguish 
between non-manipulators and manipulators. In this case, BE  is expected to be not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, if manipulators cannot obfuscate successfully, 
then BE is expected to be negative because investors are expected to react negatively to 
such an opportunistic communication strategy. 
Table 2.9 presents results for the market reaction tests. Panel A reports univariate 
tests for the difference in U9X[0, +1] between non-manipulators and manipulators. On 
average, non-manipulators’ U9X[0, +1]  is 0.8%, while the comparable value for 
manipulators is 0.1%. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Non-
manipulators’ median U9X[0, +1] is 0.3%, while the comparable value for manipulators 




univariate tests show that non-manipulators have more positive returns around 
conference calls than manipulators.  
[Insert Table 2.9 here] 
Table 2.9 Panel B reports multivariate analysis results.18 Column (1) estimates Eq. 
(2.6) to investigate if there are different market reactions to non-manipulators’ and 
manipulators’ conference calls after controlling for other factors. The coefficient on ]k_h<ool is positive (0.015), but not statistically significant (5-stat = 1.60). This 
suggests that after controlling for firm characteristics and performance, market reactions 
to conference calls of non-manipulators and manipulators are statistically equivalent. 
Thus, the more positive market reaction to non-manipulators’ conference calls shown in 
univariate tests in Table 2.9 Panel A appears to be driven by other firm characteristics 
and economic fundamentals, but not the conference call disclosure per se.  
 Columns (2) – (7) estimate Eq. (2.7) to examine if there are different market 
reactions to specific conference call communication strategies. Columns (2) – (5) focus 
on non-manipulators’ separating communication strategy, i.e. negative forward-looking 
discussion. In columns (2) – (5), the test variables are bOcdef_=ed5ed:e(Q;e=ed5), bOcdef_=ed5ed:e(y&9) , bOcdef_g4;h(Q;e=ed5) , bOcdef_g4;h(y&9) , 
respectively. The coefficient on the test variable is not statistically significant in any of 
the columns, indicating that non-manipulators’ separating communication strategy does 
not lead to more positive market reaction. That is, non-manipulators cannot successfully 
separate themselves from manipulators using credible communication in conference calls. 
Columns (6) – (7) examine whether manipulators can successfully pool and use Wij<(Q;e=ed5) and Wij<(y&9) as the test variable, respectively. If manipulators can 
 





successfully pool, then the coefficient on the test variable is expected to be not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, if investors can see through manipulators’ 
obfuscating behaviour, then the coefficient on the test variable is expected to be negative 
and statistically significant. Results show that the coefficients on Wij<(Q;e=ed5) and Wij<(y&9)  are both not statistically significant, indicating that manipulators are 
successful at pooling on the conference call date using obfuscation. 
To further understand if communication strategies have incremental effects over 
a firm being a non-manipulator or a manipulator, regressions are estimated using U9X[0, +1] as the dependent variable and the interaction term of ]k_h<ool and each 
communication strategy as the main independent variable of interest. Results 
(untabulated) show that the coefficients on the interaction terms are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that investors do not react differently to non-manipulators with 
more negative FLD or manipulators with higher obfuscation. 
Collectively, the results in Table 2.9 show that the market reactions to non-
manipulators’ and manipulators’ conference calls and specific communication strategies 
are statistically equivalent. This indicates that non-manipulators cannot credibly signal 
the absence of earnings management and that manipulators are successful at preserving 
the pooling equilibrium at the earnings announcement date. To the extent that 
manipulators’ obfuscation strategy is designed to fool the market, it is not surprising that 
investors cannot understand non-manipulators’ signals during conference calls.19 
 
19 I also perform market reaction tests using the abnormal trading volume for the two-day window [0, +1] 
around the conference call date and Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity for the two-day window [0, 
+1] around the conference call date as the empirical proxies for market reaction. The abnormal trading 
volume is calculated as the percentile ranks of the average retail share volume for the two-day window [0, 
+1] surrounding the reporting quarter earnings conference call date scaled by the average retail share 
volume for the window [-54, -5] before the call (Israeli et al., 2019). Illiquidity is the percentile ranks of 
the average value of the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity for the two-day window [0, +1] surrounding 
the reporting quarter earnings. The Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity is calculated as the absolute value 




If investors fail to understand non-manipulators’ signals at the earnings 
announcement and underreact, they are expected to gradually learn about firm type and 
correct the underreaction afterwards. I therefore test for reversal in market reactions to 
non-manipulators after the current-quarter conference calls (e.g. Cox and Peterson, 1994; 
Benou, 2003; Savor, 2012). I test for reversal throughout the quarter after the conference 
call by estimating the following regression: 
9j5e;	U677	Xe5<;d>,@= 	BC + BE]k_h<ool>,@ + BMHSse>,@ + BP^;4g5ℎ>,@ + BVXW9>,@+ BZI6;du47>,@ + B[Xe5>,@ + B\Xe5u47>,@ + B`Oeve;6fe>,@+ Bak3n>,@ + BEC9d67l=5>,@ + BEE9fe>,@ +	∑bS;o	bI+	∑xe6;y<6;5e;	bI	 + R>,@ 
(2.8) 
where 9j5e;	U677	Xe5<;d>,@  is the value-weighted market-adjusted return for the one-
month, two-month or three-month windows (i.e. U9X[+2,+30] , U9X[+2,+60]  or U9X[+2,+90]) after the current-quarter conference call date. The test variable in Eq. 
(2.8) is ]k_h<ool. If investors learn about firm type during the subsequent quarter 
and correct the previous underreaction, then BE is expected to be positive. 
I also test for whether the reversal happens around the conference call of the 
subsequent quarter by estimating the following regression: 
 
show that both abnormal trading volume and illiquidity are statistically equivalent for non-manipulators 




]eq5U677_U9X[0, +1]= 	BC + BE]k_h<ool>,@ + BMHSse>,@ÑE + BP^;4g5ℎ>,@ÑE+ BVXW9>,@ÑE + BZI6;du47>,@ÑE + B[Xe5>,@ÑE + B\Xe5u47>,@ÑE+ B`Oeve;6fe>,@ÑE + Bak3n>,@ÑE + BEC9d67l=5>,@ÑE + BEE9fe>,@ÑE+ BEM]k_h<ool>,@ÑE +	∑bS;o	bI +	∑xe6;y<6;5e;	bI	 + R>,@ÑE 
(2.9) 
where ]eq5U677_U9X[0, +1] is the value-weighted market-adjusted return for the two-
day window surrounding the conference call date of the subsequent quarter. The test 
variable in Eq. (2.9) is ]k_h<ool>,@. If investors learn about firm type and distinguish 
between current-quarter non-manipulators and manipulators around earnings 
announcement of the subsequent quarter, then BE is expected to be positive.  
Table 2.10 presents the results on testing market reaction reversal. Panel A reports 
univariate analysis results. Non-manipulators have statistically significant higher U9X[+2,+30] , U9X[+2,+60] , U9X[+2,+90]  and ]eq5U677_U9X[0, +1]  than 
manipulators. This indicates that non-manipulators have significantly more positive 
returns than manipulators throughout the subsequent quarter after the current earnings 
announcement date, supporting the prediction that investors gradually learn about firm 
type and correct previous underreaction afterwards. 
[Insert Table 2.10 here] 
Table 2.10 Panel B reports multivariate regression results. Columns (1) – (3) 
estimate Eq. (2.8) with the dependent variables being U9X[+2,+30], U9X[+2,+60] 
and U9X[+2,+90] , respectively. If investors start to distinguish between non-




expected to be positive and statistically significant. In column (1), the coefficient on ]k_h<ool is positive (0.004) but not statistically significant. In both columns (2) – 
(3), the coefficient on ]k_h<ool is positive and marginally significant at the 10% 
level, indicating that non-manipulators have more positive U9X[+2,+60]  and U9X[+2,+90] than manipulators, all else being equal. Column (4) estimates Eq. (2.9) 
with the dependent variable being ]eq5U677_U9X[0, +1] . The coefficient on ]k_h<ool  is positive (0.008) and statistically significant at the 10% level. This 
suggests that investors react more positively to non-manipulators’ subsequent-quarter 
conference calls. 
 Collectively, results in Table 2.10 indicate that non-manipulators experience 
incrementally more positive returns than manipulators starting from the second month 
after the current-quarter conference call and around the call of the subsequent quarter. 
The evidence supports the prediction that investors underreact to non-manipulators’ 
current-quarter conference calls initially and gradually learn about firm type and correct 
prices afterwards. 
 
2.7. Summary and conclusion 
Prior research shows that investors penalize all firms with small non-negative 
earnings surprises, including those that genuinely achieve this performance (Keung et al., 
2010). This leads to the question of whether non-manipulators intentionally attempt to 
separate by designing communication strategies that strongly signal the truthfulness of 
performance but fail, or if they do not proactively separate. This chapter uses the 
conference call setting to study whether and how non-manipulators use communication 




pool through obfuscation. The results show that non-manipulators provide more negative 
forward-looking discussion than manipulators in both the presentation and the Q&A. The 
results also show that non-manipulators exhibit a lower level of obfuscation in the Q&A 
section than manipulators. By examining seasonally adjusted changes in communication 
strategies, the study finds that manipulators significantly increase the level of obfuscation 
when they report [0, 1¢] earnings surprises, suggesting that they intentionally adjust 
communication strategies to achieve the pooling equilibrium. As for non-manipulators, 
results suggest that they do not proactively change communication strategies to 
distinguish themselves from manipulators. Instead, their communication strategies 
appear to be relatively consistent over time.  
Market reaction analysis shows that investors cannot distinguish between non-
manipulators and manipulators based on conference call communication strategies. This 
indicates that non-manipulators cannot credibly signal the absence of earnings 
manipulation and manipulators are successful at pooling at the earnings announcement 
date. To the extent that manipulators engage in opportunistic communication strategies 
to fool the market, it is not surprising that investors cannot understand non-manipulators’ 
signals during conference calls. Additionally, the results suggest that while market 
participants underreact to non-manipulators earnings announcements, they gradually 
learn about firm type and correct prices throughout the subsequent quarter. 
The empirical results and interpretations of this study are limited to the extent to 
which the study can accurately classify non-manipulators and manipulators in the 
research design. In addition, this study cannot speak to the generalizability of the 
communication strategies outside of the conference call setting (e.g. 10-K, 10-Q and 




communication strategies of non-manipulators and manipulators and their capital market 
consequences, regression results sometimes reveal marginal statistical significance. 
The study adds to and brings together strands of literature that investigate earnings 
benchmark beating, the role of earnings manipulation in explaining corporate disclosures, 
and the textual content of disclosures and their capital market consequences. Collectively, 
the results speak to the pooling equilibrium in the small non-negative earnings surprises 
setting. Even though non-manipulators engage in transparent and credible 
communication, they fail to successfully distinguish themselves from manipulators at the 
earnings announcement date. Since firms that manipulate earnings have strong pooling 
incentives and tailor their conference call communication to proactively prevent the 
revelation of bad news, the informativeness of conference calls of firms with truthful 






Appendix 2.1. Classification of Forward-looking Discussion 
The classification of forward-looking discussion combines three tools: Python 
NLKT (Natural Language Toolkit) program, forward-looking wordlist in Matsumoto et 
al. (2011) and forward-looking identification scheme in Muslu et al. (2014). The 
identification follows two steps: 
1. NLTK is used to tokenize management speeches in conference calls into 
sentences. NLTK has an advantage in performing this task because it does not misclassify 
punctuations in numbers or abbreviations (e.g. “24.3” and “U.S.”) as sentence breaks. 
Many methods used in the prior literature, for example the Perl routine 
Lingua::EN::Fathom in Li (2008), suffer from such a misclassification problem. 
2. A sentence is classified as forward-looking discussion if it meets at least one 
of the following criteria: 
(1) It contains words/phrases that indicate future time periods: “future”, “next 
fiscal”, “next month”, “next period”, “next quarter”, “next year”, “next week”, “incoming 
fiscal”, “incoming month”, “incoming period”, “incoming quarter”, “incoming year”, 
“incoming week”, “coming fiscal”, “coming month”, “coming period”, “coming quarter”, 
“coming year”, “coming week”, “upcoming fiscal”, “upcoming month”, “upcoming 
period”, “upcoming quarter”, “upcoming year”, “upcoming week”, “subsequent fiscal”, 
“subsequent month”, “subsequent period”, “subsequent quarter”, “subsequent year”, 
“subsequent week”, “following fiscal”, “following month”, “following period”, 
“following quarter”, “following year”, “following week”. 
(2) It contains words/phrases that indicate expectations, plans or actions for the 




“foresee”, “hope”, “intend”, “plan”, “seek” and “target”. For each verb, the following 
conjugations are included (“anticipate” is used as an example for brevity of explanation): 
“anticipates”, “anticipated”, “anticipating”, ““anticipation”, “anticipations”. 
(3) It contains a reference to a year that comes after the year of the call (such as 
“2014” when call year is 2013). Any use of characters (“$”, “£”, “%”, “,”) in between or 
before or after the digits disqualifies the number from being tagged as year. 
(4) It contains the following words/phrases: “guidance”, “projection”, 
“projections”, “outlook”, “going to”, “prospect”. 






Appendix 2.2. Variable Definitions 
Non-manipulator Dummy 
 Variables Definitions 
 
 ]k_h<ool An indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is identified as a non-
manipulator in a small non-negative earnings surprises fiscal quarter; and 0 if 
identified as a manipulator. Non-manipulator/manipulator classification is based 
on three conditions: positive performance-matched discretionary accruals 
(Kothari et al., 2005); non-GAAP earnings higher than GAAP earnings (Doyle et 
al., 2013); and positive unexpected core earnings (Fan et al., 2010). Firms that 
meet none of the three conditions in the reporting and the previous four quarters 
are classified as non-manipulators in the reporting quarter. Firms that meet at least 
two of the three conditions in the reporting quarter are classified as manipulators 
in that quarter. 
 
Conference Call Communication Strategy Variables 
 Variables Definitions 
 
 bOc  Forward-looking discussion measured at the sentence-level in management speeches, calculated as the number of forward-looking sentences scaled by the 
total number of sentences, times 100. The variable is calculated for the 
presentation and Q&A sections of a conference call separately. 
 
 bOcdef_=ed5ed:e  Negative forward-looking discussion measured at the sentence-level in management speeches, calculated as the number of negative forward-looking 
sentences scaled by the number of forward-looking sentences, times 100. A 
sentence is classified as negative if it contains at least one negative or negated 
positive word from the Loughran and McDonald’s word lists. The variable is 
calculated for the presentation and Q&A sections of a conference call separately. 
 
 bOcdef_g4;h Negative forward-looking discussion measured at the word-level in management 
speeches, calculated as the number of negative or negated positive words in 
forward-looking discussion scaled by the total number of words of forward-
looking discussion, times 100. Negative and positive words are from the 
Loughran and McDonald’s word lists. The variable is calculated for the 
presentation and Q&A sections of a conference call separately. 
 
 Wij< Estimated latent obfuscation component of management linguistic complexity in 
conference calls, following Bushee et al. (2018). The variable is calculated for 
the presentation and Q&A sections of a conference call separately. 
 
 ∆bOc Seasonally adjusted changes in the number of forward-looking sentences in 
management speeches. It is calculated bOc in the current quarter conference call 
minus bOc in the call of the same quarter of the previous year. The variable is 




Seasonally adjusted changes in negative forward-looking discussion (sentence-
level). It is calculated as bOcdef_=ed5ed:e in the current quarter conference 
call minus bOcdef_=ed5ed:e in the call of the same quarter of the previous year. 
The variable is calculated for the presentation and Q&A sections of a conference 
call separately. 
 
 ∆bOcdef_g4;h Seasonally adjusted changes in negative forward-looking discussion (word-
level). It is calculated as bOcdef_g4;h in the current quarter conference call 
minus bOcdef_g4;h in the call of the same quarter of the previous year. The 
variable is calculated for the presentation and Q&A sections of a conference call 
separately. 
 
 ∆Wij< Seasonally adjusted changes in the estimated latent obfuscation component of 
management linguistic complexity in conference calls. It is calculated as Wij< 
in the current quarter conference call minus Wij< in the call of the same quarter 
of the previous year. The variable is calculated for the presentation and Q&A 




Appendix 2.2 (Continued.) 
Firm Characteristics and Performance Variables 
 Variables Definitions 
 
 HSse The log of total assets (Compustat item: ATQ). 
 
 ^;4g5ℎ Sales growth, calculated as the change in total sales (Compustat item: SALEQ) 
relative to the same quarter last year, scaled by the total sales of the same quarter 
last year. 
 
 XW9 Return on assets ratio, calculated as earnings before extraordinary times 
(Compustat item: IBQ) scaled by total assets (Compustat item: ATQ). 
 
 I6;du47 Earnings volatility in the prior year, calculated as the log of the standard deviation 
of earnings (Compustat item: IBQ) during the prior four fiscal quarters. 
  Xe5 The value-weighted market-adjusted stock return during the fiscal quarter. 
 
 Xe5u47 Stock return volatility in the prior year, calculated as the log of the standard 
deviation of the monthly stock returns in the prior year. 
 
 Oeve;6fe Total debt (Compustat items: DLCQ + DLTTQ) scaled by the market value of 
assets (Compustat items: (PRCCQ * CSHOQ) + DLTTQ). 
 
 k3n The log of the market-to-book ratio. The market-to-book ratio is calculated as the 
market value of equity (Compustat items: PRCCQ * CSHOQ) scaled by book 
value of equity (Compustat item: TEQQ). 
 
 9fe The log of the number of years since a firm’s first appearance in the CRSP 
monthly stock return files. 
 9d67l=5  The log of the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for any horizon 
during the fiscal quarter, scaled by the log of total assets. 
 
Conference Call Control Variables 
 Variables Definitions 
 
 Q4= The percentage of positive and negated negative words in management speech. 
Negative and positive words are from the Loughran and McDonald’s word lists. 
The variable is calculated for the presentation and Q&A sections of a conference 
call separately. 
 
 ]ef The percentage of negative and negated positive words in management speech. 
Negative and positive words are from the Loughran and McDonald’s word lists. 
The variable is calculated for the presentation and Q&A sections of a conference 
call separately. 
 
 Yd: The percentage of uncertain words in management speech. Uncertain words are 
from the Loughran and McDonald’s word lists. The variable is calculated for the 
presentation and Q&A sections of a conference call separately. 
 
 Oed The log of the total number of words of management speech. The variable is 
calculated for the presentation and Q&A sections of a conference call separately. 
 
 
 Ödj4 Estimated latent information component of management linguistic complexity in 
conference calls, following Bushee et al. (2018). The variable is calculated for 
the presentation and Q&A sections of a conference call separately. 
 
Market Reaction Variables 
 Variables Definitions 
 
 U9X[0,+1] The value-weighted market-adjusted return for the two-day window [0, +1] 
surrounding the reporting quarter earnings conference call date.  
 
 U9X[+2,+30] The value-weighted market-adjusted return for the window [+2, +30] following 




Appendix 2.2 (Continued.) 
 
 U9X[+2,+60] The value-weighted market-adjusted return for the window [+2, +60] following 
the reporting quarter earnings conference call date.  
 
 U9X[+2,+90] The value-weighted market-adjusted return for the window [+2, +90] following 
the reporting quarter earnings conference call date.  
 
 ]eq5U677_U9X[0,+1] The value-weighted market-adjusted return for the two-day window [0, +1] 
surrounding the subsequent quarter earnings conference call date. 








Table 2.1. Sample 






Non-financial firm-quarters with available Compustat data between 2010-2015         37,823  
After excluding firm-quarters with missing conference call data         28,010  
After excluding firm-quarters with missing CRSP data         25,071  
After excluding firm-quarters with missing IBES data         21,112  
After excluding firm-quarters outside of [0, 1¢] bin 3,037 
After excluding firm-quarters do not meet non-manipulator or manipulator criteria 1,779 
Of which: Non-manipulators   358 
  Manipulators     1,421 
     
Panel B. sample distribution by year 
Year   Non-manipulators Manipulators Total 
2010  58 176 234 
2011  97 183 280 
2012  49 208 257 
2013  63 294 357 
2014  52 280 332 
2015   39 280 319 
Total   358 1,421 1,779 
This table presents sample selection and distribution. The sample is constructed from the intersection of 
Thomson Reuters Eikon, Compustat, I/B/E/S and CRSP. The sample spans the time period January 2010 to 
December 2015 and covers a total of 1,779 firm-quarter observations with [0, 1¢] earnings surprises. Panel A 






Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Communication Strategy Variables 
 Non-manipulators (N = 358) Manipulators (N = 1,421)   p-value for difference 
 Mean     sd   p1 Median       p99   Mean     sd   p1 Median  p99   Mean Median 
 !"#(%&'(')*) (%) 25.30 9.34 9.41 25.24 51.41  22.19 9.06 5.13 21.54 45.46  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 !"#(,&.) (%) 20.66 7.87 7.26 19.42 46.21  18.24 7.59 5.42 17.09 39.29  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 !"#)'/_(')*')1'(%&'(')*) (%) 13.63 9.99 1.20 11.20 46.66  12.44 10.17 0.00 11.11 50.00  0.05** 0.02** 	!"#)'/_(')*')1'(,&.) (%) 9.81 8.62 1.20 8.34 38.70  9.66 9.12 0.00 7.90 40.00  0.78 0.09* 
 !"#)'/_34&5(%&'(')*) (%) 0.84 0.50 0.00 0.72 2.55  0.78 0.56 0.00 0.68   2.68  0.09* 0.02** 
 !"#)'/_34&5(,&.) (%) 0.56 0.42 0.00 0.49 2.32  0.56 0.44 0.00 0.48   2.25  0.79 0.37 
 6789(%&'(')*) 0.05 2.89 -4.64 -0.60 8.85  0.51 3.01 -4.34 -0.12   9.44  0.02** 0.01** 
 6789(,&.) -0.07 1.54 -2.79 -0.16 4.75   0.14 1.58 -2.92 -0.09   4.75   0.05** 0.07* 
                 
Panel B. Firm-level Control Variables 
 Non-manipulators (N = 358) Manipulators (N = 1,421)   p-value for difference 
 Mean     sd   p1 Median       p99   Mean     sd   p1 Median p99   Mean Median 
 :;<' 6.85 1.55 3.30 6.88 10.45  7.99 1.64 4.85 7.96    11.81  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 =&43*ℎ 0.25 0.39 -0.02 0.15 1.66  0.04 0.18 -0.46 0.03  0.58  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 ?6. 0.02 0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.08  0.01 0.03 -0.10 0.01  0.05  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 @A&)B4C 2.04 1.27 0.23 1.82 5.48  2.88 1.56 0.35 2.66  6.98  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 ?'* 1.02 0.08 0.84 1.05 1.13  1.02 0.07 0.84 1.02  1.12  0.90 0.23 
 ?'*B4C 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03  0.06  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 "'D'&A/' 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.97  0.26 0.18 0.00 0.23  0.85  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 EFG 1.51 0.63 0.46 1.38 3.07  1.34 0.65 0.39 1.22  3.69  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 .)ACH(* 0.34 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.52  0.31 0.08 0.09 0.31  0.46  0.00*** 0.01*** 
 ./' 2.57 0.91 0.00 2.77 4.47   2.96 0.89 0.69 3.00  4.49   0.00*** 0.01*** 
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables for non-manipulators and manipulators, respectively. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of communication strategy 
variables. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of control variables. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for t-test of means and 






Table 2.3. Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 (1)JE_59KKH  1.00  0.13***  0.15***  0.06***  0.04*  0.07***  0.28*** -0.06** -0.04*  0.41***  0.22*** -0.26***  0.01  0.13*** -0.26***  0.13***  0.15*** -0.16*** 
 (2)!"#(%&'(')*)  0.14***  1.00  0.32***  0.09***  0.07***  0.05**  0.02  0.00 -0.01  0.10***  0.07*** -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09***  0.06**  0.09***  0.03 
 (3)!"#(,&.)  0.13***  0.31***  1.00  0.03  0.10***  0.00  0.05**  0.04 -0.01  0.05** -0.02 -0.05** -0.07***  0.00 -0.02  0.04*  0.06*** -0.01 
 (4)!"#)'/_(')*')1' 
 (%&'(')*)  0.05**  0.01  0.02  1.00  0.06**  0.73***  0.23***  0.03  0.00 -0.06**  0.03 -0.04 -0.03  0.02 -0.03  0.02  0.00  0.02 
 (5)!"#)'/_(')*')1' 
 (,&.)  0.01  0.05**  0.10***  0.05*  1.00  0.12***  0.64*** -0.02  0.03 0.06** -0.09***  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.04 
 (6)!"#)'/_34&5 
 (%&'(')*)  0.05**  0.00 -0.02  0.70***  0.12***  1.00  0.35***  0.01  0.00 -0.01 -0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02 -0.02  0.02  0.01  0.00 
 (7)!"#)'/_34&5 
 (,&.)  0.27***  0.02  0.03  0.28***  0.55***  0.41***  1.00 -0.02 -0.02  0.09*** -0.04 -0.05**  0.05*  0.08*** -0.04  0.03  0.02 -0.03 
 (8)6789(%&'(')*) -0.06** -0.01  0.03  0.06** -0.03  0.03 -0.02  1.00  0.37*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.04* -0.06** -0.19*** -0.02  0.05** -0.05** -0.02 
 (9)6789(,&.) -0.05** -0.01 -0.02 -0.01  0.03  0.00 -0.03  0.39***  1.00 -0.04 -0.05*  0.05* -0.06** -0.04  0.02  0.01 -0.04*  0.00 
 (10)=&43*ℎ  0.30***  0.07***  0.01 -0.03  0.03 -0.01  0.05* -0.03  0.00  1.00  0.20*** -0.19*** -0.02  0.09*** -0.25***  0.20***  0.17*** -0.18*** 
 (11)?6.  0.11***  0.03 -0.03  0.01 -0.02  0.00  0.01 -0.03 -0.03  0.05**  1.00  0.03  0.04*  0.00 -0.46***  0.39***  0.04  0.15*** 
 (12)@A&)B4C -0.25*** -0.01 -0.04* -0.03  0.01  0.02 -0.04 -0.06**  0.05* -0.14***  0.00  1.00  0.06*** -0.10***  0.12***  0.06**  0.00  0.31*** 
 (13)?'* -0.02 -0.02 -0.09***  0.00  0.05*  0.06**  0.04 -0.03 -0.06** -0.02  0.05** 0.09***  1.00  0.05**  0.00 -0.04 -0.05** -0.01 
 (14)?'*B4C  0.15***  0.00 -0.03  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.08*** -0.19*** -0.06**  0.04  0.05** -0.08***  0.03  1.00  0.09*** -0.22*** -0.07*** -0.12*** 
 (15)"'D'&A/' -0.17*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.04  0.05** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03  0.02 -0.13*** -0.22***  0.10*** -0.02  0.08***  1.00 -0.45*** -0.31*** -0.11*** 
 (16)EFG  0.10***  0.06**  0.05**  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.05*  0.00  0.01  0.10***  0.12***  0.06** -0.01 -0.20*** -0.37***  1.00  0.26***  0.01 
 (17).)ACH(*  0.15***  0.07***  0.07***  0.02 -0.02  0.01  0.02 -0.06** -0.06**  0.11*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.05** -0.09*** -0.27***  0.26***  1.00 -0.20*** 
 (18)./' -0.17***  0.04 -0.01 -0.01  0.05**  0.00 -0.02 -0.05** -0.01 -0.11***  0.07***  0.32***  0.01 -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.03 -0.17***  1.00 
This table presents the correlations among earnings manipulation, call communication strategies and firm-level variables. Spearman (Pearson) correlations appear above (below) the diagonal. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ 




Table 2.4. Earnings Manipulation and Negative Forward-looking Discussion (Sentence-level) 
 Presentation Q&A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 !"#$%&_(%$)%$*% !"#$%&_(%$)%$*% !"#$%&_(%$)%$*% !"#$%&_(%$)%$*% 
 +,_-.//0   7.373*   8.099*   6.816*    7.179** 
  (1.67)  (1.91)  (1.70)  (2.09) 
      123%    5.433**    4.539** -3.489* -3.838* 
  (2.44)  (2.07) (-1.69) (-1.94) 
      4567)ℎ -3.221  -4.114* 2.372  1.490 
 (-1.54) (-1.93) (0.99)  (0.65) 
      9:; -9.647 -8.039         -10.978 -9.861 
 (-0.65) (-0.56)           (-0.96) (-0.88) 
      <=5$>6? -0.178 -0.245 0.171  0.193 
 (-0.32) (-0.45) (0.40)  (0.46) 
      9%) -8.898  -9.584* 5.856  6.767 
 (-1.64) (-1.76) (0.90)  (1.07) 
      9%)>6?  9.602 33.871         -26.221          -30.093 
  (0.13)  (0.45)           (-0.45) (-0.50) 
      "%@%5=&% -0.486 -2.870   3.831*   3.945* 
 (-0.08) (-0.50)  (1.78)  (1.78) 
      ,AB  0.133  0.720 0.667  0.487 
  (0.10)  (0.48) (0.48)  (0.35) 
      ;$=?0()           11.962 10.275          13.132           11.055 
 (1.26) (1.10) (1.39)  (1.16) 
      ;&%  0.319  0.832   0.777**     0.843** 
  (0.09)  (0.22) (2.21)  (2.35) 
      C6((. )  -1.284   1.227 
  (-1.11)   (1.37) 
      +%&(. )   1.285            -0.747 
   (0.81)  (-0.41) 
      G$*(. )  0.144 1.705 
   (0.08)  (1.39) 
      "%$(. )   2.406  0.598 
   (1.33)  (0.50) 
      H$I6(. )   0.952  0.266 
   (1.28)  (0.53) 
      :JI.(. )   0.120  0.014 
    (0.79)  (0.05) 
      Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
 Yr-Qtr FE YES YES YES YES 
 N 1,779 1,779 1,779 1,779 
 Adjusted 9K 0.32 0.31 0.17 0.18      
This table presents results from estimating the relation between earnings manipulation and sentence-level 
negative forward-looking discussion in conference calls when firms report quarterly earnings surprises 
between [0, 1¢] (i.e. Eq. (2.4)). Columns (1) and (2) list results for the presentation section of conference 
calls, in which C6((. ) , +%&(. ) , G$*(. ) , "%$(. ) , H$I6(. ) , :JI.(. )  denote C6((C5%(%$)) , +%&(C5%(%$)) , G$*(C5%(%$)), "%$(C5%(%$)), H$I6(C5%(%$)), :JI.(C5%(%$)), respectively. Columns (3) and (4) list results 
for the Q&A section of conference calls, in which C6((. ), +%&(. ), G$*(. ), "%$(. ), H$I6(. ), :JI.(. ) denote C6((L&;), +%&(L&;), G$*(L&;), "%$(L&;), H$I6(L&;), :JI.(L&;), respectively. All variables are as 






Table 2.5. Earnings Manipulation and Negative Forward-looking Discussion (Word-level) 
 Presentation Q&A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 !"#$%&_765- !"#$%&_765- !"#$%&_765- !"#$%&_765- 
 +,_-.//0    0.094**     0.103**      0.339***      0.356*** 
  (2.21)  (2.39)  (6.30)  (6.75) 
      123%     0.310***      0.293*** -0.016 -0.024 
  (3.05)  (2.83) (-0.85) (-1.29) 
      4567)ℎ -0.065 -0.080 -0.063 -0.082 
 (-1.07) (-1.30) (-0.89) (-1.22) 
      9:; -0.275 -0.129 -0.363 -0.210 
 (-0.64) (-0.30) (-1.05) (-0.67) 
      <=5$>6?   0.047*   0.046*  0.019  0.016 
  (1.93)  (1.86)  (1.22)  (1.05) 
      9%)    0.494**  0.374  0.264  0.189 
  (2.00)  (1.49)  (1.00)  (0.75) 
      9%)>6? -2.619 -1.733   -7.184**   -6.941** 
 (-0.87) (-0.57) (-2.06) (-1.97) 
      "%@%5=&% -0.056 -0.047   0.443*   0.417* 
 (-0.57) (-0.45)  (1.95)  (1.73) 
      ,AB  0.011  0.016  0.035  0.034 
  (0.40)  (0.58)  (1.32)  (1.19) 
      ;$=?0()  0.037  0.033 -0.117 -0.162 
  (0.18)  (0.15) (-0.43) (-0.58) 
      ;&% -0.228 -0.233  0.013  0.014 
 (-1.60) (-1.62)  (0.64)  (0.69) 
      C6((. )  -0.003   0.079 
  (-0.11)   (1.56) 
      +%&(. )  -0.027   0.085 
  (-0.58)   (1.08) 
      G$*(. ) -0.058 -0.036 
  (-1.24)  (-0.89) 
      "%$(. )      0.102**    0.088* 
    (2.37)   (1.74) 
      H$I6(. )  -0.013    0.034* 
  (-0.52)   (1.82) 
      :JI.(. )   0.007  -0.001 
    (1.31)  (-0.12) 
      Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
 Yr-Qtr FE YES YES YES YES 
 N 1,779 1,779 1,779 1,779 
 Adjusted 9K 0.31 0.31 0.23 0.24      
This table presents results from estimating the relation between earnings manipulation and word-level 
negative forward-looking discussion in conference calls when firms report quarterly earnings surprises 
between [0, 1¢] (i.e. Eq. (2.4)). Columns (1) and (2) list results for the presentation section of conference 
calls, in which C6((. ), +%&(. ), G$*(. ), "%$(. ), H$I6(. ), :JI.(. ) denote C6((C5%(%$)), +%&(C5%(%$)), G$*(C5%(%$)), "%$(C5%(%$)), H$I6(C5%(%$)), :JI.(C5%(%$)), respectively. Columns (3) and (4) list 
results for the Q&A section of conference calls, in which C6((. ) , +%&(. ) , G$*(. ) , "%$(. ) , H$I6(. ) , :JI.(. ) denote C6((L&;), +%&(L&;), G$*(L&;), "%$(L&;), H$I6(L&;), :JI.(L&;), respectively. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix 2.2. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard 






Table 2.6. Earnings Manipulation and Obfuscation 
 Presentation Q&A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 :JI. :JI. :JI. :JI. 
 +,_-.//0          -0.668 -0.525  -0.935*  -0.971* 
 (-0.29) (-0.23) (-1.92) (-1.87) 
      123%  0.240  0.350 -0.200 -0.225 
  (0.50)  (0.72) (-0.93) (-1.03) 
      4567)ℎ  0.648  0.581  0.394  0.390 
  (1.14)  (1.05)  (1.31)  (1.33) 
      9:;   -3.806**    -4.012*** -0.265 -0.376 
 (-2.51)  (-2.73) (-0.32) (-0.45) 
      <=5$>6? -0.187*           -0.163 -0.009 -0.007 
 (-1.80) (-1.60) (-0.17) (-0.14) 
      9%)          -0.672           -0.766 -1.030 -0.957 
 (-0.53) (-0.61) (-1.44) (-1.34) 
      9%)>6?        -12.834         -11.840  9.877  9.985 
 (-0.84) (-0.79)  (1.17)  (1.20) 
      "%@%5=&% -0.840           -0.809 -0.125 -0.167 
 (-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.15) (-0.19) 
      ,AB -0.404           -0.445 -0.184 -0.190 
 (-1.18) (-1.30) (-1.08) (-1.12) 
      ;$=?0()   -3.902**    -4.383***   -1.595**    -2.083*** 
 (-2.39) (-2.71) (-2.12) (-2.76) 
      ;&%    -0.425***    -0.434*** -0.096 -0.097 
 (-2.69) (-2.80) (-1.07) (-1.09) 
      C6((. )     0.367**      0.442*** 
   (2.02)  (4.26) 
      +%&(. )            -0.332         -0.017 
  (-0.94)  (-0.08) 
      G$*(. ) 0.141  0.022 
  (0.36)   (0.13) 
      "%$(. )  0.245   0.077 
  (0.52)   (0.46) 
      !"#(. )  0.006  -0.001 
   (1.38)  (-0.60) 
      Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
 Yr-Qtr FE YES YES YES YES 
 N 1,779 1,779 1,779 1,779 
 Adjusted 9K 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51 
This table presents results from estimating the relation between earnings manipulation and obfuscation in 
conference calls when firms report quarterly earnings surprises between [0, 1¢] (i.e. Eq. (2.4)).  Columns 
(1) and (2) list results for the presentation section of conference calls, in which C6((. ), +%&(. ), G$*(. ), "%$(. ) , !"#(. )  denote C6((C5%(%$)) , +%&(C5%(%$)) , G$*(C5%(%$)) , "%$(C5%(%$)) , !"#(C5%(%$)) , 
respectively. Columns (3) and (4) list results for the Q&A section of conference calls, in which C6((. ), +%&(. ) , G$*(. ) , "%$(. ) , !"#(. )  denote C6((L&;) , +%&(L&;) , G$*(L&;) , "%$(L&;) , !"#(L&;) , 
respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix 2.2. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based 






Table 2.7. Earnings Manipulation and Communication Strategies: Change Analysis 
Panel A. Univariate Analysis 




p-value for median  




 ∆"#$(&'()(*+) 1.801    -0.744     0.000***    0.623     -0.561   0.000*** 
 ∆"#$(-&/) 1.721    -0.625     0.000***    1.102      0.275   0.000*** 
 ∆"#$*(0_)(*+(*2((&'()(*+) 0.837    -1.126     0.001***    0.048     -0.167   0.004*** 
 ∆"#$*(0_)(*+(*2((-&/) 0.478    -0.822     0.046**    0.102     -0.583   0.025** 
 ∆"#$*(0_34'5(&'()(*+) 0.031     0.001     0.712    0.016      0.000   0.955 
 ∆"#$*(0_34'5(-&/) 0.075   - 0.001     0.415    0.000     -0.012   0.504 
 ∆6789(&'()(*+) 0.176     0.618     0.034**   -0.010      0.062   0.098* 
 ∆6789(-&/) 0.004     0.379     0.001***   -0.019      0.312   0.001*** 
 
Panel B. Multivariate Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆"#$_)(*+(*2( (&'()(*+)  ∆"#$_)(*+(*2(	(-&/) ∆"#$_34'5 (&'()(*+) ∆"#$_34'5 (-&/) ∆6789 (&'()(*+) ∆6789 (-&/) 
 ;<_59==>     2.389***    2.068** -0.044 0.108 -0.252     -0.333** 
 (2.61)  (2.16) (-0.51) (0.96) (-1.15) (-2.54)     
     
    
 Control Variables YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
 Yr-Qtr FE YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
 N 1,127  1,127 1,127 1,127 1,127 1,127 
 Adjusted ?@ 0.02  0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 
This table presents results of comparing the seasonally adjusted changes in communication strategies between non-manipulators and manipulators. Panel A presents 
univariate test results. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for t-test of means and Wilcoxon test of medians. Panel B 
presents multivariate test results (i.e. Eq. (2.5)). See Appendix 2.2 for variable definitions. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered 




Table 2.8. Earnings Manipulation and Communication Strategies:  
Including Financial Fraud Restatements as An Additional Criterion in Non-manipulator/Manipulator Classification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 !"#$%&_(%$)%$*% (,-%(%$)) !"#$%&_(%$)%$*% (/&1) !"#$%&_23-4 (,-%(%$)) !"#$%&_23-4 (/&1) 5678 (,-%(%$)) 5678 (/&1) 
 9:_;%(   8.054*   7.182*    0.102**     0.356***        -0.370  -1.789** 
  (1.90) (1.88) (2.36) (6.76) (-0.24) (-2.06)        
 <=>%     4.667**   -3.972**      0.294***        -0.023 0.417       -0.231 
  (2.13) (-2.00) (2.84) (-1.27) (0.86) (-1.06)        
 ?-32)ℎ  -3.808*  1.672 -0.080        -0.081 0.596 0.419 
 (-1.79) (0.73) (-1.31) (-1.21) (1.08) (1.44)        
 ;51 -8.665         -10.511 -0.109        -0.199    -3.999***       -0.375 
 (-0.61) (-0.94) (-0.25) (-0.63) (-2.71) (-0.44)        
 AB-$C3D -0.434  0.212    0.041* 0.014        -0.158 0.005 
 (-0.84) (0.50) (1.67) (0.93) (-1.57) (0.10)        
 ;%) -8.524  5.952  0.381 0.182 -0.622 -1.195* 
 (-1.36) (0.93) (1.51) (0.72) (-0.50) (-1.82)        
 ;%)C3D 41.090         -26.608 -1.847   -6.960** -9.533      12.322 
 (0.54) (-0.44) (-0.60) (-2.02) (-0.62) (1.54)        
 "%E%-B&% -2.218   3.949* -0.029  0.457* -0.798       -0.100 
 (-0.39) (1.77) (-0.28) (1.89) (-0.55) (-0.12)        
 :FG  0.574  0.373  0.018 0.033 -0.429       -0.197 
 (0.38) (0.27) (0.64) (1.15) (-1.25) (-1.15)        
 1$BDH()  9.340          11.628  0.051        -0.094    -4.279***    -1.911*** 
 (1.00) (1.21) (0.23) (-0.33) (-2.66) (-2.61)        
 1&%  0.646    0.868**  -0.266* 0.017    -0.430*** -0.151 
 (0.17) (2.42) (-1.76) (0.83) (-2.75) (-0.30)        
 Linguistics    
 Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Yr-Qtr FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 N 1,763 1,763 1,763 1,763 1,763 1,763 
 Adjusted ;I 0.31 0.18 0.29 0.23 0.53 0.50 
This table presents robustness test results from estimating the relation between earnings manipulation and conference call 
communication strategies with including financial fraud restatements as an additional criterion in the non-manipulator/manipulator 
classification. The test variable, 9:_;%(, equals 1 if a firm: (1) has 9:_48JJH = 1 in a quarter; and (2) does not have restatements 
(financial fraud) in the same quarter and the previous four quarters. 9:_;%( equals 0 if a firm has: (1) 9:_48JJH = 0 in a quarter; 
or (2) restatements (financial fraud) in the same quarter. In columns (1) and (3), linguistics controls include ,3((,-%(%$)), 9%&(,-%(%$)), K$*(,-%(%$)), "%$(,-%(%$)), L$73(,-%(%$)), 5678(,-%(%$)). In columns (2) and (4), linguistics controls include ,3((/&1), 9%&(/&1), K$*(/&1), "%$(/&1), L$73(/&1), 5678(/&1). In column (5), linguistics controls include ,3((,-%(%$)), 9%&(,-%(%$)), K$*(,-%(%$)), "%$(,-%(%$)), !"#(,-%(%$)). In column (6), linguistics controls include ,3((/&1), 9%&(/&1), K$*(/&1), "%$(/&1), !"#(/&1). All 
variables are as defined in Appendix 2.2. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ∗, ∗∗, 







Table 2.9. Earnings Manipulation and Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Conference Calls 
Panel A. Univariate tests  
  Mean p-value for 
mean 
difference 







 N1;[0,+1] 0.008 0.001 0.006*** 0.003 -0.000 0.021** 
        
Panel B. Multivariate tests  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 N1; [0, +1] N1; [0, +1] N1; [0, +1] N1; [0, +1] N1; [0, +1] N1; [0, +1] N1; [0, +1] 
 9:_48JJH 0.015       
 (1.60)       
        
 !"#$%&_(%$)%$*% 
 (,-%(%$))  0.000      
  (0.75)      
        !"#$%&_(%$)%$*% 
 (/&1)   0.000     
   (0.69)     
        
 !"#$%&_23-4 
 (,-%(%$))    0.001    
    (0.39)    
        
 !"#$%&_23-4 
 (/&1)     -0.002        (-0.75)   
        
 5678(,-%(%$))      -0.000  
      (-0.26)  
        
 5678(/&1)       -0.001 
 
      (-1.33) 
        
 Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Yr-Qtr FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 N 1,779 1,779 1,779 1,779 1,779 1,779 1,779 
 Adjusted ;I 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52 
This table presents results on the difference in market reactions to non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ conference calls 
and communication strategies. Market reaction, N1;[0,+1], is the cumulative abnormal returns for the two-day window 
[0, +1] around the conference call date. Panel A presents univariate analysis results. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for t-test of means and Wilcoxon test of medians. Panel B presents 
multivariate analysis results (i.e. Eq. (2.6) in column (1) and Eq. (2.7) in columns (2) – (7)). All variables are as defined 
in Appendix 2.2. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ 








Table 2.10. Earnings Manipulation and Future Cumulative Abnormal Returns 













 N1;[+2,+30] 0.016 0.009  0.035** 0.030 0.007       0.043** 
 N1;[+2,+60] 0.051 0.003   0.000*** 0.051 0.005       0.000*** 
 N1;[+2,+90] 0.077 0.011   0.000*** 0.089 0.014       0.000*** 9%Y)NBDD_N1;[0,+1] 0.006 0.001  0.026** 0.002 0.000       0.086* 
 
Panel B. Multivariate tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 N1; [+2,+30] N1; [+2,+60] N1; [+2,+90] 9%Y)NBDD_N1; [0, +1] 
 9:_48JJH 0.004   0.045*   0.050*   0.008* 
 (0.39) (1.90) (1.94) (1.93) 
      Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
 Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
 Yr-Qtr FE YES YES YES YES 
 N 1,779 1,779 1,779 1,779 
 Adjusted ;I 0.22 0.38 0.35 0.20 
This table presents results on the difference in market reactions subsequent to non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ 
conference calls (i.e. Eq. (2.8)), and on the difference in market reactions to non-manipulators’ and manipulators’ 
conference calls of the subsequent quarter results (i.e. Eq. (2.9)). Market reactions subsequent to conference calls are 
proxied by N1;[+2,+30], N1;[+2,+60] and N1;[+2,+90]. Market reactions to conference calls of the subsequent 
quarter is proxied by 9%Y)NBDD_N1;[0,+1]. Panel A presents univariate analysis results. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for t-test of means and Wilcoxon test of medians. Panel B 
presents multivariate analysis results. All variables are as defined in Appendix 2.2. t-statistics appear in parentheses 








Chapter 3. People Skills and Analyst Outcomes 
“My first year as Chief Risk Officer was an enlightening experience, because the biggest 
challenge of the job turned out to be communication. And as you become more senior, you 
realize that everything comes down to the soft skills.” 
— Keishi Hotsuki (2017), Chief Risk Officer of Morgan Stanley 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the role of people skills in the sell-side analyst labour 
market. People skills represent one’s ability to get along with, to communicate effectively 
with, and to develop and maintain trusting relationships with others (Morand, 2001, 
p.21).20 This chapter specifically investigates whether analysts with better people skills 
possess and benefit from better management relationships. The study is motivated by 
research showing the importance of people skills in daily social interactions, as well as 
in the labour market. It has long been established in psychology and sociolinguistics 
research that people skills are an essential factor in shaping social interactions, 
interpersonal relationships and workplace performance (e.g. Gardner, 1983; Sternberg, 
1984; Gist et al., 1991; Goleman, 1996; Morand, 2001; Lievens and Sackett, 2012).  
Over the past four decades, people skills have become increasingly vital in the 
labour market because, unlike technical and computing skills, people skills cannot be 
substituted by machines (Borghans et al., 2014; Deming, 2017). In the U.S., the 
 
20 The term “people skills” is often used loosely and as an umbrella term that covers various skills, such as 
communication skills and teamwork skills. Moreover, the terms “people skills”, “social skills”, 
“socioemotional skills” “interpersonal skills” and “emotional intelligence” are sometimes used 




Secretary’s Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills (SCANS) report (1991) 
identifies interpersonal skills as one of five main competencies that are needed for 
success in the world of work. A number of recent studies in economics identify people 
skills as an important determinant of labour market outcomes, such as teamwork 
productivity, occupational choices and wages (Borghans et al., 2008, 2014; Deming, 
2017; Deming and Kahn, 2018). Practitioners and the financial press also recognize 
people skills as one of the most fundamental qualities in business and financial 
professions (e.g. Hayes, 2013; Loten, 2017; Goldman Sachs, 2017; Morgan Stanley, 
2017). Nevertheless, despite the importance of people skills, there is insufficient evidence 
on the effects of people skills in the financial market.  
The nature of analysts’ work requires people skills. Analysts seek to maintain a 
close relationship with managers to obtain superior access to firm-specific information 
(e.g. Lim, 2001; Chen and Matsumoto, 2006; Westphal and Clement, 2008; Mayew et 
al., 2013; Soltes, 2014; Brown et al., 2015). The analyst-management relationship is a 
type of interpersonal relationship that consists of interactions between the two parties. It 
is therefore predicted that analysts with good people skills can get along with and handle 
interaction and communication with managers effectively, leading to a close analyst-
management relationship.  
The limited evidence on the effects of analysts’ people skills results partly from 
the difficulty in operationalizing the construct. I therefore begin by proposing and 
validating an empirical proxy for people skills, guided by psychology, economics and 
sociolinguistics research. This empirical measure is the first principal component of three 
ethnic cultural traits: individualism, trust and power distance. Analysts’ people skills are 




generations and significantly influence how individuals behave in interpersonal 
relationships in both personal and professional settings (e.g. Triandis, 1994; Bisin and 
Verdier, 2000; Hofstede, 2001; Guiso et al., 2006; Nguyen et al., 2017). Moreover, 
research shows that people skills are developed early in life and that early childhood 
experience has a persistent long-term impact on adult outcomes (e.g. Flinn and Ward, 
2004; Flinn et al., 2005; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Deming, 2009; Howie et al., 2010; 
Chetty et al., 2011). 
Research in cross-cultural psychology suggests that individuals with more 
individualistic, more trusting, and lower power distance cultural backgrounds have better 
people skills. Individuals from a high individualistic culture are more confident and more 
charismatic in social interactions, and are more skilled in initiating social relationships 
than those from a low individualistic culture (e.g. Ellis, 1991; den Hartog et al., 1999; 
Triandis, 2001). Individuals with a more trusting cultural background are more friendly, 
reliable and honest, and better at interpersonal reciprocity and workplace cooperation (e.g. 
Rotter, 1971; Kramer, 1999; Stolle et al., 2008; Williams and Bargh, 2008). Individuals 
from lower power distance cultures exhibit greater proactivity in social interactions and 
are better at establishing personal relationships (e.g. Tyler et al., 2000; Sagie and Aycan, 
2003; Hsiung and Tsai, 2017). Therefore, it is expected that analysts from more 
individualistic, more trusting, and lower power distance cultures are better at establishing 
and maintaining both professional and personal relationships with managers. 
Relying on the recently developed epidemiological approach for ancestry 
identification, analyst ethnicity is identified based on their names that are obtained from 
quarterly earnings conference call transcripts and I/B/E/S. The empirical analysis is 




provides an identification strategy that separates the effects of people skills on analyst 
outcomes from potential confounding factors such as the legal and institutional 
environment of different countries. 
My sample consists of 2,955 analysts and 31,980 U.S. firms’ quarterly earnings 
conference call transcripts between 2011 – 2015. Individualism, trust and power distance 
scores for each ethnic group are calculated according to Hofstede (2001, 2011) culture 
index and the World Value Survey (Inglehart et al., 2014). The first principal component 
of an analyst’s ethnic individualism, trust and power distance culture scores is the 
operational measure for people skills that I use in the empirical analysis. 
A concern with the research design is that the study does not directly observe an 
analyst’s people skills but rather infers it based on the analyst’s ethnic cultural 
background. To mitigate this concern, the operational measure for people skills is 
validated using analysts’ linguistic behaviour during conference calls because how 
analysts interact with managers provides direct evidence on their people skills. 
Computational linguistic methods are utilized on conference call transcripts to extract 
analysts’ linguistic features that are conceptually linked to people skills. Following 
psychology and sociolinguistics research, the validation tests focus on analysts’ 
ingratiation behaviour during conference calls.  
Ingratiation is the attempt by an individual to form a positive impression and 
increase liking in the eyes of others in social interactions (Liden and Mitchell, 1988; 
Vonk, 2002). Therefore, ingratiation can reflect a person’s people skills. Research shows 
that analysts have incentives to compliment managers in conference calls (Milian and 
Smith, 2017; Milian et al., 2017), which is evidence of analysts’ ingratiation behaviour 




of ingratiation is the most effective at producing positive interpersonal relation outcomes. 
A high level may arouse suspicions of the ingratiator's ulterior motives and, hence, 
backfire, while a low level may go unnoticed (e.g. Jones, 1964; Jones and Wortman, 1973; 
Gordon, 1996; Brodsky and Cannon, 2006). Thus, a U-shaped relation between analysts’ 
people skills and ingratiation behaviour during conference calls is predicted. Analysts 
with poor people skills are expected to exhibit a high level of ingratiation, while those 
with good people skills exhibit a moderate level. Analysts with medium people skills are 
expected to exhibit a lower level of ingratiation than those with good people skills. 
Supportive evidence is reported for those predictions. 
The study then proceeds to examine the effects of people skills on analyst 
outcomes. I predict that analysts with better people skills can establish closer 
relationships with managers because they can handle interpersonal interaction and 
communication more effectively. Conference calls provide a powerful social setting to 
observe analyst-management relationships. Academic research and anecdotal evidence 
suggest that managers screen conference call participants and prioritize some participants 
over the others, and that analysts with better management relationships have a higher 
probability of both participating in calls and, conditional on participating, asking earlier 
questions in the Q&A section (e.g. Mayew, 2008; NIRI, 2014; Cen et al., 2019).  
Therefore, my analysis uses conference call participation and the order of questions as 
the empirical proxies of analyst-manager relationships. Results show that analysts with 
better people skills have a higher probability of participating in conference calls and ask 





Finally, I investigate whether analysts with better people skills benefit from their 
advanced management relationships by testing whether they possess superior firm-
specific information. Results show that analysts with better people skills issue more 
accurate earnings forecasts. Mediation analysis shows that their possession of superior 
private information partly stems from their close relationships with firm management. I 
also find that analysts’ people skills are not associated with All-Star status or re-
employment after brokerage closures, indicating that although analysts with better people 
skills enjoy informational benefits from better relationships with firm management, the 
effects are not significant enough to generate better career outcomes. 
 This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it contributes to the 
emerging literature on the importance of people skills in the labour market. Recent 
developments in economics research show that people skills influence labour market 
outcomes such as productivity, occupational choices and wages (Borghans et al., 2008, 
2014; Deming, 2017; Deming and Kahn, 2018). However, the impact of people skills on 
specific financial market participants has not been studied in the prior literature. Financial 
analysts are essential market participants because they serve as important information 
intermediaries between firms and investors. Adding to the literature on the value of 
people skills, this study sheds light on why and how such skills matter in the financial 
analyst labour market.  
 Second, the study adds to the literature on financial analysts. While analysts play 
an important role in financial markets, regulators have long been concerned about 
analysts’ conflicts of interest (e.g. Richards, 2002; SEC, 2010), including analyst 
incentives to foster close management relationships in order to access firm-specific 




Westphal and Clement, 2008; Mayew et al., 2019). Thus, understanding the factors that 
underpin the development of analyst-management relationships is essential for both 
investors and regulators. Prior literature shows that, in addition to economic incentives, 
gender (Kumar, 2010) and certain cultural traits (Bhagwat and Liu, 2018) can influence 
analyst outcomes. In this study, I provide evidence that analysts with better people skills 
have better management relationships and benefit from superior private information. My 
work extends the existing literature by documenting the first evidence of the impacts of 
people skills on analyst outcomes.  
My results also have implications for practitioners. While childhood experience 
heavily influences skills development, workplace-based programs can also facilitate 
skills improvements (Kautz et al., 2017). People skills are becoming more and more 
fundamental in financial markets because they cannot be replaced by automation. 
Recently, both investment banking professionals and the financial press have drawn 
attention to the development of people skills for employees and business school students 
(e.g. Hayes, 2013; Loten, 2017; Goldman Sachs, 2017; Morgan Stanley, 2017). 
Consistent with this trend, the results speak to the value of people skills in the financial 
profession.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 explains the 
prior literature and hypotheses development. Section 3.3 describes research design, 
including developing empirical construct of people skills. Section 3.4 provides 
descriptive statistics of the sample and results on validating the empirical construct of 
people skills. Section 3.5 presents empirical results on the hypotheses. Section 3.6 
assesses the implications of people skills on analysts’ access to firm-specific information. 





3.2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses development 
I examine the effects of people skills on sell-side analysts’ outcomes. The 
importance of people skills in social interactions and interpersonal relationships has long 
been recognized in psychology research (e.g. Gardner, 1983; Sternberg, 1984; Gist et al., 
1991; Goleman, 1996; Morand, 2001; Lievens and Sackett, 2012). The value of people 
skills has been examined in various professions. Duffy et al. (2004) examine the role of 
people skills in the medical profession. They report that doctors’ people skills are 
important in fostering doctor-patient relationships, shaping diagnoses and initiating 
therapies. Anderson et al. (2009) investigate whether people skills affect therapeutic 
outcomes. They show that therapists’ ability to respond to challenging interpersonal 
situations has a significant influence over therapist-patient interactions and clinical 
outcomes. 
A number of recent economics studies examine the influence of people skills on 
labour market outcomes. Borghans et al. (2014) report a rapid increase in the importance 
of people skills in the labour market from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. They show 
that people skills are important determinants of labour-market outcomes, such as 
occupational choices and wages, and that the increasing demand for people skills explains 
gender and racial wage gaps to some extent. Deming (2017) investigates the increasing 
importance of social skills in the U.S. labour market. He reports that between 1980 and 
2012, there were large increases in both social skill-intensive occupations and the wages 
for these occupations in the U.S. He also finds that the labour market return on social 
skill-intensive occupations is significantly greater than on other occupations, especially 




advertisements to investigate whether variations in the demand for social skills can 
explain labour market outcomes and firm performance. They find that the level of people 
skills required by a job can positively predict occupational wages and that the demand 
for people skills can positively predict firm performance. 
Despite the importance of people skills in social interactions generally and 
specifically in the labour market, there is insufficient evidence on the role of people skills 
in the financial market. Apart from professional expertise and technical abilities, analysts’ 
professional tasks also require people skills because they need to establish and maintain 
good management relationships to obtain firm-specific information. Analysts with good 
people skills are expected to be effective in establishing and maintaining relationships 
with managers in both professional and personal settings. Conversely, analysts with 
poorer people skills face greater interpersonal and communication barriers with managers 
than those with better people skills. 
While analyst-management relationships are unobservable in the cross-section, 
conference calls as a public disclosure event provide a powerful setting to empirically 
gauge such relationships. As a public disclosure event, researchers can observe which 
analysts among those following the firm are selected to publicly engage with firm 
management. Managers have discretion to choose which analysts participate in the calls 
(Mayew, 2008; Mayew et al., 2013). The probability of participating in conference calls 
reflects the strength of an analyst’s relationship with firm management (Mayew, 2008; 
Cen et al., 2019). I therefore hypothesise that: 
H1. Analysts with better people skills are more likely to participate in conference calls. 
Conference call participation is driven jointly by managers selecting analysts with 




while call participation can indicate analysts who have a relationship with firm 
management, it is possible that participating analysts make more effort to participate and 
do not necessarily have a strong relationship with management per se. To mitigate this 
potential threat to the construct validity of call participation, I also use the order in which 
analysts ask questions in the Q&A section to proxy for management relationships. 
Conditional on having already make the effort to participate in conference calls, the order 
in which analysts ask questions reflects their management relationships. Early conference 
call questioning reflects stronger management relationships because prior research and 
anecdotal evidence reveal that managers are likely to pick analysts with “friendly” 
questions as early participants (Cen et al., 2019). I therefore hypothesise that: 
H2. Analysts with better people skills ask earlier questions in the Q&A section of 
conference calls. 
 
3.3. Research design 
3.3.1. Empirical models 
 To investigate how analysts’ people skills affect their conference call 
participation as predicted by H1, I use Mayew’s (2008) specification as the baseline 
model for conference call participation. The following logistic regression model is 




Pr	(,B-)=*=^B)%_,`,a)= 	cd + ce,%3^D%<f=DD(_ + cI<68H_,`,a + cgG8H_,`,a + ch<%DD_,`,a+ ci<(%DD_,`,a + cj/1J=$_,`,a + ck98J1$BDH()_,`,a + cl1DD()B-_,`,a+ cm,-=3-1**_,`,a + ced!=-JAY^_,`,a + cee?%$AY^_,`,a + ceIL$4(_,`,a+ ceg!3-!-%Z_,`,a + cehG-3f%-<=>%_,`,a + ceiN3J^B$=%(_,`,a+ cejNN8(%-_,`,a + cek,-=3-,B-)=*=^B)%_,`,a + cel;%*n3-=>3$_,`,a+ cem:1<_ + cIdK1L_ + cIe"F5oC<_ + cIILC;_ + p_,`,a 
(3.1) 
The dependent variable ,B-)=*=^B)%_,`,a is an indicator variable that captures conference 
call participation at the analyst-firm-quarter level. It equals 1 if analyst B participates in 
the call of firm =  in the quarter Z ; and 0 otherwise. For analysts who participate in 
conference calls, their full names are extracted from the transcripts. The last name and 
first name initial of all analysts in I/B/E/S are also obtained. Analysts’ conference call 
participation is identified by merging analysts’ names from I/B/E/S and those extracted 
from call transcripts. The test variable is ,%3^D%<f=DD(_, the measure of analysts’ people 
skills. H1 posits that analysts with better people skills have a higher probability of 
participating in conference calls. If H1 holds, then the coefficient ce is expected to be 
positive.  
Eq. (3.1) controls for analyst characteristics that are known to affect conference 
call participation probability. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. Analyst 
characteristics include recommendation levels (<68H, G8H, <%DD and <(%DD) and All-Star 
status ( 1DD<)B- ) because managers prefer analysts with more favourable 




the following proxies for analyst characteristics (ibid.): forecast accuracy and frequency 
( ,-=3-1**  and !3-!-%Z ), firm-specific and general experiences ( !=-JAY^  and ?%$AY^), number of industries and firms following (L$4( and N3J^B$=%(), and broker 
size (G-3f%-<=>%). These variables are constructed using data from I/B/E/S. For these 
variables, following standard procedure in the analyst literature, I calculate analyst peer-
adjusted variables, which remove the need to control for firm-level characteristics and 
time fixed effects in regressions when working with a sample on all analysts that are 
actively following the sample firm (e.g. Clement and Tse, 2005; Mayew, 2008; Kumar, 
2010; Clement and Law, 2014; He et al., 2019). These analyst characteristics variables 
are peer-adjusted using the following equation:21 
NℎB-B*)%-=()=*_,`,a = NℎB-B*)%-=()=*_-B2_,`,a − min	(NℎB-B*)%-=()=*_-B2`,a)maxwNℎB-B*)%-=()=*_-B2`,ax − min	(NℎB-B*)%-=()=*_-B2`,a) 
(3.2) 
By construction, all peer-adjusted analyst characteristics variables range from 0 – 1. 
I also control for whether an analyst is a frequent conference call participant using 
the following proxies: the number of other conference calls that the analyst participates 
in during the same quarter (NN8(%-) and whether the analyst has participated in the firm’s 
past conference calls ( ,-=3-,B-)=*=^B)% ). Moreover, I control for an analyst’ 
recommendation horizon (;%*n3-=>3$) to proxy for the analyst’s interest in the firm. It 
is also important to control for conference call characteristics that might influence the 
probability of participation. I include control variables for Q&A length (/1J=$) and the 
 
21 Calculating analyst prior earnings forecast accuracy using this equation implies that larger values capture 
less accurate analysts. Following Mayew (2008), to allow conference call participation probability to 





number of participating analysts (98J1$BDH()). Additionally, to control for cultural 
traits that might affect analyst behaviour and hence their relationships with firm 
management, Eq. (3.1) includes culture variables that are not used to construct the people 
skills variable: masculinity (:1<), uncertainty avoidance (K1L), long-term orientation 
("F5oC<), and indulgence (LC;). 
To test the relation between analysts’ people skills and conference call question 
order as predicted by H2, the following OLS regression model is specified: 
5-4%-_,`,a = 	cd + ce,%3^D%<f=DD(_ + cI<68H_,`,a + cgG8H_,`,a + ch<%DD_,`,a+ ci<(%DD_,`,a + cj1DD()B-_,`,a + ck,-=3-1**_,`,a + cl!=-JAY^_,`,a+ cm?%$AY^_,`,a + cedL$4(_,`,a + cee!3-!-%Z_,`,a+ ceIG-3f%-<=>%_,`,a + cegN3J^B$=%(_,`,a + cehNN8(%-_,`,a+ cei,-=3-,B-)=*=^B)%_,`,a + cej;%*n3-=>3$_,`,a + cek:1<_+ celK1L_ + cem"F5oC<_ + cIdLC;_ + Σ!=-J	!A + Σ{-/)-	!A+ p_,`,a 
(3.3) 
The dependent variable 5-4%-_,`,| captures the order in which participating analysts ask 
questions in the Q&A section of a conference call. 5-4%- equals 1 if the analyst is the 
first to ask question(s) in the Q&A section; 2 if the second; etc. A low value of 5-4%- 
corresponds to earlier questions. H2 posits that analysts with better people skills ask 
earlier questions in the Q&A section. Thus, if H2 holds, ce is expected to be negative. 
Eq. (3.3) is estimated with the sub-sample of analysts who participate in 




the number of participating analysts (98J1$BDH()) because these call characteristics 
only affect the probability of participating in a call, but not the order of questions within 
a call. Moreover, as Eq. (3.3) is not estimated with all analyst-firm-quarter observations 
in the full sample, I include firm and year-quarter fixed effects to control for unobservable 
firm- and year-quarter-related factors that affects analysts participating in conference 
calls.  
 
3.3.2. Sample  
Individual analyst data is obtained from the following two sources: I/B/E/S 
detailed recommendation files and U.S. firms’ quarterly earnings conference call 
transcripts. The sample period is 2011 – 2015. Conference call transcripts are 
downloaded from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Table 3.1 presents the sample construction 
process. The initial sample contains 54,644 transcripts. I then limit the sample to U.S. 
firms and excludes cross-listed foreign firms. This mitigates endogeneity concerns that 
the results might be driven by unobserved country and institutional characteristics. After 
excluding transcripts of cross-listed foreign firms, 40,418 transcripts remain.  
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
A critical issue in the empirical design is that analysts’ conference call 
participation is driven jointly by managers’ discretionary choices and analysts seeking 
participation. As the hypotheses assume managers choose analysts with good 
relationships to participate in the call, it is essential to rule out the competing explanation 
that analysts differentially seek conference call participation. Analysts who are not 




participation, I therefore follow Mayew’s (2008) sample construction choices and 
exclude analysts who may not be actively following a firm. The details are listed in Table 
3.1. I require each analyst-firm-quarter observation to have an outstanding stock 
recommendation and an outstanding earnings forecast issued during the year preceding 
the fiscal quarter end date to ensure that the analyst is actively covering the firm. Sample 
construction also requires each analyst to have all analyst characteristics variables in Eq. 
(3.1) and Eq. (3.3) measurable. These sample screening choices lead to a final sample of 
31,980 conference call transcripts and 239,153 analyst-firm-quarter observations.  
 
3.3.3. Conceptual measurement of people skills 
I use information on analysts’ ethnic cultural traits to measure their people skills. 
It has long been established that ethnic cultural background affects personality, 
interpersonal behaviour and social relationships (e.g. Triandis et al., 1988; Triandis, 1994; 
Dawar et al., 1996; Diener et al., 2003; Hofstede and McCrae, 2004). More recently, the 
accounting and finance literature has provided evidence that cultural traits affect how 
individuals behave in social interactions and perform professional tasks in the financial 
market. Brochet et al. (2019) find that managers from ethnic groups with higher levels of 
individualism use more optimistic language and more self-references and make fewer 
apologies during earnings conference calls. Bhagwat and Liu (2018) report that analysts 
from a more trusting ethnic background react faster to management guidance than less 
trusting analysts. 
As previously defined, people skills represent individuals’ ability to get along 
with, communicate effectively with, and develop trusting relationships with others 




economics, I argue that analysts whose ethnicity is associated with more individualistic, 
more trusting, and lower power distance culture have better people skills. It is well 
documented that these ethnic cultural traits shape how people behave in interpersonal 
relationships.  
Individualism reflects a society’s attitude towards the self and the emphasis on 
self-fulfilment (Hofstede, 2001). Cultures that are high in individualism encourage and 
reward individual initiative, while those low in individualism tend to subjugate 
individuals to the group (Dawar et al., 1996). People from a high individualistic culture 
are skilled in initiating social interactions, while those from a low individualistic culture 
are more reserved (Triandis, 2001). Moreover, individuals from a high individualistic 
culture are more confident, more active, more charismatic and more likely to emphasize 
the bright side of things in social interactions than those from a low individualistic culture 
(e.g. Ellis, 1991; den Hartog et al., 1999; Sims et al. 2015). Accordingly, analysts from a 
high individualistic culture are expected to be effective at establishing and maintaining 
relationships with management.  
Trust represents the expectancy that words, promises and statements of others can 
be relied upon (Rotter, 1971). It embodies cultural meanings, social relations and 
individual personality (Fine and Holyfield, 1996; Doney et al., 1998). Trust is essential 
for establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships in both professional and 
personal settings (Fukuyama, 1995; McAllister, 1995; Kramer, 1999). Trust can be 
viewed as “interpersonal warmth” in social interactions (Williams and Bargh, 2008, p. 
606). Individuals with a more trusting cultural background are more friendly, reliable and 
honest. They are better at sincerity and relationship building, interpersonal reciprocity 




2008). Thus, analysts from a more trusting culture are expected to be better at building 
relationships with managers.  
Power distance is related to the power distribution in society. Low power distance 
culture values equality and equal communication, while high power distance culture 
emphasizes hierarchy and inequality as the basis of society (Hofstede, 2001). Power 
distance therefore reflects individuals’ beliefs about equality, power and authority and is 
an important factor in shaping interpersonal behaviour and relationships (Kirkman et al., 
2009; Tyler et al., 2000). Low power distance culture encourages open discussions and 
equal communication (Tyler et al., 2000; Hofstede, 2001). All else equal, individuals 
from a low power distance culture are more proactive at initiating communication and 
better at maintaining personal relationships on both professional and informal occasions 
(e.g. Newman and Nollen, 1996; Begley et al., 2002; Sagie and Aycan, 2003; Botero and 
Van Dyne, 2009; Hsiung and Tsai, 2017). Analysts from a low power distance culture 
are therefore expected to be good at establishing both professional and personal 
relationships with managers.  
Having established that more individualistic, more trusting and lower power 
distance cultures contribute to better people skills, it is also important to clarify the 
assumptions underlying the proposed empirical proxy. There are two main assumptions. 
First, an individual’s people skills are largely developed early in life and the effects are 
persistent over time. Childhood is crucial in skill development because it lays the 
foundation for later years (Kautz et al., 2017). The family plays a crucial role in shaping 
behaviour and abilities through parental inputs and the choice of child environments 
(Black et al., 2005; Cunha et al., 2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; 2008). Economics 




impacts on adult outcomes (e.g. Garces et al., 2002; Case et al., 2005; Deming, 2009; 
Chetty et al., 2011). Specifically, childhood is a key stage when people skills are 
developed (Flinn and Ward, 2004; Flinn et al., 2005; Howie et al., 2010; King and 
Bjorklund, 2010).22 People skills are learned early in life and affect adult outcomes such 
as occupations and earnings (Deming, 2017). Recent research finds strong correlations 
between socioemotional skills of children and adult outcomes including employment, 
work competence, earnings, and criminal activities (Masten et al., 2010; Harrist et al., 
2014; Jones et al., 2015). There is also evidence that youths’ interpersonal style and skills 
significantly affects their occupational choices and job performance in adulthood 
(Borghans et al., 2008; Lievens and Sackett, 2012). 
Second, the effects of ethnic cultural traits endure over time. This is supported by 
both analytical and empirical evidence. Culture consists of the “customary beliefs and 
values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation 
to generation” (Guiso et al., 2006, p. 23). Bisin and Verdier (2000) develop a model to 
study why ethnic and religious traits can be resilient for generations. They show that the 
intergenerational transmission of ethnic and religious traits is facilitated by family 
socialization and marital segregation decisions, and that the dynamics of the distribution 
of ethnic and religious traits in a population converge to a heterogeneous limit 
distribution in which ethnic and religious minorities can never be assimilated. 
Empirically, many recent studies investigate the effects of ethnic cultural traits in 
financial markets. For example, Bhagwat and Liu (2018) report that the trust culture of 
different ethnic groups affects sell-side analysts’ information processing and forecast 
 
22 For example, Howie et al. (2010) find that children of different ethnicities participate in activities outside 
of school hours at different levels, leading to differences in people skills development, because those 
activities improve children’s social skills. Burchinal et al. (2000) show that children of colour are more 




accuracy. In a corporate finance setting, Nguyen et al. (2017) find that the CEO’s cultural 
heritage affects firm performance under competitive pressure.  
It is nevertheless important to note that skill development can be a dynamic 
process and that people skills can also be learned during other stages in life. The proposed 
empirical construct does not capture the time-varying component of people skills. 
Therefore, Section 3.4 of this chapter provides evidence on construct validity and shows 
that as predicted the measure captures analyst people skills on average. 
 
3.3.4. Operational measurement of people skills 
 The empirical measure of analysts’ people skills is the first principal component 
of the following three ethnic cultural traits: individualism, trust and power distance. To 
capture analysts’ ethnicity, I follow recent developments in the literature and map 
analysts’ names into the geographic regions that are likely to represent their country of 
ancestry (e.g. Pool et al., 2015; Bhagwat and Liu, 2018; Brochet et al., 2019; Lourie et 
al., 2018; Merkley et al., 2019). This method is superior to using a sample of international 
analysts (i.e. a cross-country sample) because it isolates the effects of personal traits on 
analyst outcomes from other confounding institutional factors such as the economic, legal 
and political environment of different countries.  
More specifically, ethnicity associated with analysts’ names is measured using 
the recently developed epidemiological approach for ancestry identification by computer 
science research (Fernández, 2011; Liu, 2016; Merkley et al., 2019). Following prior 
literature (Pool et al., 2015; Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016; Lourie et al., 2018), I utilise 




classifier is trained using name-ethnicity pairs data extracted from Wikipedia and uses 
hidden Markov models and decision trees to predict the ethnicity of any given name. 
Using this classifier, analysts’ names are mapped into one of the following ethnic groups: 
African, British, East Asian, East European, French, German, Hispanic, Indian, Italian, 
Japanese, Jewish, Muslim and Nordic.  
As ancestry has continuous cultural and behavioural effects that can be 
transmitted from generation to generation (Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Guiso et al., 2006; 
Nguyen et al., 2017), I assume that analysts from the same ethnic group share similar 
individualism, trust and power distance values. To empirically measure the cultural 
values of analysts with a given ethnicity, I follow prior research and rely on Hofstede 
cultural index and the World Value Survey (e.g. Bhagwat and Liu, 2018; Brochet et al., 
2019). Using Hofstede (2001, 2011) cultural index, the individualism (power distance) 
score for each ethnic group is calculated as the average individualism (power distance) 
score of countries/regions belonging to that ethnic group. The trust score for a given 
ethnicity is measured by the responses to the trust-related question in the 2016 World 
Value Survey (Inglehart et al., 2014): “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The 
mean value from the responses for each ethnic group is used as the trust score.  
Appendix 3.2 lists countries/regions included in each ethnic group for the 
calculation of the culture scores. I require all countries/regions included to have data on 
all culture variables for the empirical analysis. Note that although the name-ethnicity 
classifier by Ambekar et al. (2009) assigns names into 13 ethnic groups, there are only 
10 ethnic groups in my sample. The reason is that the French and Italian ethnic groups 




trust culture data. Due to the data unavailability, those 3 ethnic groups are excluded from 
the sample. 
I then perform principal component analysis and compute the people skills 
variable as the first principal component of an analyst’s individualism, trust and power 
distance scores. Table 3.2 presents the details. Panel A lists the principal components 
from the principal component analysis. Component 1 has the eigenvalue of 2.77 and 
explains 0.92 of the total variance. Component 2 (3) has the eigenvalue of 0.16 (0.06) 
and explains only 0.06 (0.02) of the total variance. Panel B reports component loadings. 
Component 1 has statistically and economically significant correlations with all three of 
the culture variables (i.e. individualism, power distance and trust) as predicted by theory, 
whereas the rest of the components do not. Based on these principal component analysis 
results, only one meaningful principal component (i.e. the first principal component) 
emerges. Therefore, I use this first principal component to proxy for analyst people skills 
(denoted as ,%3^D%<f=DD().  
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
Table 3.2 Panel C lists the value of ,%3^D%<f=DD( and the distribution of sample 
observations by ethnicity. 60% (65%) of sample analysts (analyst-firm-quarter 
observations) cluster in the British ethnic group. This is consistent with non-Hispanic 
White ethnic group making up more than 60% of the U.S. population between 2010 and 





3.4. Descriptive statistics and validity of }~ÄÅ~ÇÉÑÅÅÖ 
3.4.1. Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics 
Table 3.3 presents the correlations among ,%3^D%<f=DD(, analyst-management 
relationship variables, and analyst characteristics variables. Spearman (Pearson) 
correlations appear above (below) the diagonal. Both the Spearman and Pearson 
correlations between ,%3^D%<f=DD(  and ,B-)=*=^B)%  are positive (0.02 and 0.02, 
respectively) and statistically significant at the 1% level, consistent with H1 that analysts 
with better people skills are more likely to participate in conference calls. Both the 
Spearman and Pearson correlations between ,%3^D%<f=DD( and 5-4%- are negative (-
0.01 and -0.02, respectively) and statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent 
with H2 that analysts with better people skills ask earlier questions in conference calls.  
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
In terms of other analysts’ characteristics, !=-JAY^ is positively correlated with ,%3^D%<f=DD(, indicating that analysts with better people skills follow firms for longer. 
This might be because those analysts can more effectively sustain relationships with the 
firm. ?%$AY^ is also positively correlated with ,%3^D%<f=DD(, suggesting that analysts 
with better people skills have longer experience in the profession. L$4(, !3-!-%Z and N3J^B$=%( are all positively correlated with ,%3^D%<f=DD(. That is, analysts with better 
people skills tend to cover more industries and firms, and issue earnings forecasts more 
frequently.  
Table 3.4 presents the means of analyst-management relationship variables and 
analyst characteristics variables according to people skills, as well as univariate analysis 




people skills analysts, respectively. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The mean of 5-4%- is 5.18 for low people skills analysts and 5.02 for high people 
skills analysts, respectively, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
These results support that analysts with better people skills are more likely to participate 
in conference calls and ask earlier questions in the Q&A section.  
 [Insert Table 3.4 here] 
In terms of other analyst characteristics, the mean of !=-JAY^ is 0.41 for low 
people skills analysts and 0.44 for high people skills analysts, respectively, and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. The mean of ?%$AY^ is 0.40 for low 
people skills analysts and 0.44 for high people skills analysts, respectively, and the 
difference is significant at the 1% level. The mean of L$4( is 0.34 for low people skills 
analysts and 0.37 for high people skills analysts, respectively, and the difference is 
significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that analysts with high people skills 
have higher firm-specific and general experiences and follow more industries. Moreover, 
the mean of NN8(%- is 4.18 for low people skills analysts and 4.78 for high people skills 
analysts, respectively, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
indicates that analysts with better people skills are more frequent conference call 
participants, consistent with the prediction of H1. 
 
3.4.2. Validity of }~ÄÅ~ÇÉÑÅÅÖ 
A concern is that the empirical measure cannot directly capture an analyst’s 
people skills, but rather infers it based on the analyst’s ethnic cultural traits. It is possible, 




skills. To address such a concern, this sub-section provides evidence on the validity of ,%3^D%<f=DD( as the empirical proxy of people skills. Conference calls provide a unique 
setting for researchers to observe analysts’ language in social interactions. If ,%3^D%<f=DD( can sufficiently capture analysts’ people skills, it should exhibit significant 
relations with analyst linguistic features that reflect such qualities. Following psychology 
and sociolinguistics research, the validity of ,%3^D%<f=DD( is assessed using analysts’ 
ingratiation behaviour during conference calls.  
Ingratiation refers to the attempt in social interactions by an individual to form a 
favourable impression and increase liking in the eyes of others (Liden and Mitchell, 1988; 
Vonk, 2002). It can take the form of complimentary, flattery, conformity and providing 
favour (Jones, 1964; Tedeschi and Melburg, 1984; Ellis et al., 2002). Prior accounting 
research finds that analysts have incentives to use favourable language towards 
management (e.g. praise, complimentary and positive tone) during conference calls to 
establish management relationships (Milian and Smith, 2017; Milian et al., 2017). This 
suggests that ingratiation is a common method that analysts use to achieve close 
management relationships. 
Psychology and organizational behaviour research provide ample evidence that, 
when successfully implemented, ingratiation can positively affect interpersonal 
relationships (e.g. Vonk, 2002; Varma et al., 2006; Harvey et al., 2007; Seiter, 2007). 
Importantly, psychology researchers have attempted to decide how much ingratiation can 
effectively increase the likeability of the ingratiator and elicit positive interpersonal 
outcomes. A high level of ingratiation can backfire as it may come across as insincere, 
self-serving, and manipulative, while a low level of ingratiation is likely to be 




Ingratiation attempts can only be successful when the target deems it to be sincere 
(Appelbaum and Hughes, 1998). When the target is more powerful than the ingratiator, 
the ingratiator’s likeability would increase between the low and moderate level of 
ingratiation but decrease with a high level of ingratiation (e.g. Jones, 1964; Jones and 
Wortman, 1973; Gordon, 1996; Brodsky and Cannon, 2006). A moderate level is less 
likely to evoke suspicions of the ingratiator's ulterior motives, while still ensuring the 
message is visible (Brodsky and Cannon, 2006). 
I therefore predict a U-shaped relation between analysts’ people skills and 
ingratiation behaviour during conference calls. Analysts with poor people skills are 
expected to exhibit a high level of ingratiation during conference calls because while they 
may intend to establish close management relationships, the lack of people skills leads to 
over-use of ingratiation. On the other hand, analysts with good people skills are expected 
to exhibit a moderate level of ingratiation. They are also expected to exhibit a higher level 
of ingratiation than those with medium people skills because they have better people 
skills.  
To empirically test the validity of the empirical construct of people skills by 
assessing its association with analysts’ ingratiation behaviour during conference calls, I 




L$&-B)=B)=3$_,`,a= 	cd + ce,%3^D%<f=DD(_ + cI,%3^D%<f=DD(_I + cg<68H_,`,a+ chG8H_,`,a + ci<%DD_,`,a + cj<(%DD_,`,a + ck1DD()B-_,`,a+ cl,-=3-1**_,`,a + cm!=-JAY^_,`,a + ced?%$AY^_,`,a + ceeL$4(_,`,a+ ceI!3-!-%Z_,`,a + cegG-3f%-<=>%_,`,a + cehN3J^B$=%(_,`,a+ ceiNN8(%-_,`,a + cej,-=3-,B-)=*=^B)%_,`,a + cek;%*n3-=>3$_,`,a+ cel:1<_ + cemK1L_ + cId"F5oC<_ + cIeLC;_ + Σ!=-J	!A+ Σ{-/)-	!A + p_,`,a 
(3.4) 
where L$&-B)=B)=3$_,`,a  denotes the ingratiation behaviour of analyst B  in the 
conference call of firm = in quarter Z. It is calculated as the number of ingratiation words 
scaled by the total number of words by that analyst. To count the number of ingratiation 
words, I develop an ingratiation dictionary by extensive reading of conference calls 
transcripts and following psychology research (e.g. Ellis et al., 2002; Vonk, 2002; Seiter, 
2007) and prior literature on analysts’ complimentary behaviour during conference calls 
(Milian and Smith, 2017). The dictionary contains six categories of ingratiation words: 
(1) praises (e.g. “great quarter”, “nice quarter”), (2) greetings (e.g. “hello”, “hi”), (3) 
congratulations (e.g. “congratulations”, “congratulate”), (4) thanks (e.g. “thank”, 
“gratitude”), (5) laughter (e.g. “laughter”, “joke”)23, and (6) the word “please”. The 
details of the dictionary are explained in Appendix 3.3.  
The theory predicts a U-shaped relation between analysts’ people skills and 
ingratiation. Analysts with poor people skills are expected to exhibit a high level of 
 




ingratiation, whereas those with good people skills are expected to exhibit a moderate 
level. Analysts with medium people skills are expected to exhibit a lower level of 
ingratiation than those with good people skills. According to this prediction, the 
coefficient ce in Eq. (3.4) is expected to be negative, while the coefficient cI is expected 
to be positive. The magnitude of ce is expected to be larger than cI. 
The mean value of L$&-B)=B)=3$ is 4.52%. The minimum and maximum values 
are 0% and 10.27%, respectively. The median is 4.31%. Figure 1 presents the scatterplot 
of the mean value of L$&-B)=B)=3$ according to the value of ,%3^D%<f=DD( to illustrate 
their relation. As predicted, ethnic groups with poor people skills have the highest mean 
values of L$&-B)=B)=3$. Ethnic groups with medium people skills have low values of L$&-B)=B)=3$ . Ethnic groups with high people skills exhibit a moderate level of L$&-B)=B)=3$. 
To formally test the predicted U-shaped relation, Table 3.5 presents the results on 
estimating Eq. (3.4). To mitigate the effects of extreme values on regression estimates, L$&-B)=B)=3$  is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels for estimating Eq. (3.4).24 In 
column (1), ,%3^D%<f=DD(  and ,%3^D%<f=DD(I  are regressed on L$&-B)=B)=3$  without 
any control variables. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(  is -0.116 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(I is 0.010 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Column (2) estimates the relation after controlling for analyst 
characteristics variables. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(  is -0.116 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(I is 0.010 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Column (3) estimates the relation after controlling for analyst 
characteristics and cultural traits. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(  is -0.549 and is 
 




statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(I is 0.053 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level.25 These results are consistent with prediction. 
[Insert Table 3.5 here] 
To test the validity of the U-shaped relation, I assess whether there are sufficient 
observations above the implied turning point (i.e. the point at which the curve attains its 
minimum). Based on the coefficient estimates for ce and cI in column (3), the implied 
turning point is when ,%3^D%<f=DD(  equals − Üd.ihmI∗d.dig = 5.179 . Among the 80,160 
observations used to estimate the regression, 25,519 observations have the value of ,%3^D%<f=DD( above 5.179. That is, 31.84% of the sample observations are above the 
implied turning point, exceeding the benchmark of 10%. Therefore, the U-shaped relation 
is valid. 
Collectively, the results support the prediction that analysts’ people skills have a 
U-shaped relation with ingratiation behaviour in conference calls. Taken together, the 




25 The Adjusted ;I of regressions in Table 3.5 is 0.05 in column (1) and 0.06 in columns (2) and (3). The 
low Adjusted ;I is consistent with results reported by the prior literature on predicting analysts’ linguistic 
behaviour during conference calls. For example, Milian et al. (2017) use analyst characteristics to predict 





3.5. Empirical results 
3.5.1. People skills and management relationships 
To assess H1 formally in multivariate analysis, estimation of Eq. (3.1) is 
presented in Table 3.6. H1 predicts that analysts with better people skills have a higher 
probability of participating in conference calls. If H1 holds, the coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( is expected to be positive.  
Column (1) replicates the baseline model of conference call participation reported 
by Mayew (2008). Despite the different sample periods, my results are consistent with 
those by Mayew (2008). For example, analysts’ favourable (unfavourable) 
recommendation increases (decreases) conference call participation probability. The only 
notable difference between my results and Mayew’s (2008) is that the coefficient on !=-JAY^ in my regression is unexpectedly negative (-0.116) and significant at the 1% 
level, while Mayew (2008) reports a significant and positive coefficient estimate. My 
result suggests that analysts with relatively longer firm-specific experience have a lower 
probability of participating in conference calls. A possible reason is that analysts with 
sufficiently long experience following a firm have presumably already established 
relationships with firm management and can engage in private communication with 
managers (Soltes, 2014), therefore do not necessarily need to participate in a public 
disclosure event. 
[Insert Table 3.6 here] 
Column (2) estimates the relation between analysts’ people skills and the 




estimates the relation between people skills and participation probability after controlling 
for the baseline model. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( remains positive (0.009) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Column (4) estimates the relation after controlling 
for the baseline model as well as analyst cultural traits. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( 
is positive (0.071) and remains statistically significant at the 1% level. These results 
support H1, which predicts a positive relation between analysts’ people skills and the 
probability of conference call participation. 
In terms of the economic significance, since ,%3^D%<f=DD( is constructed using 
the first principal component of ethnicity-level individualism, trust and power distance 
culture scores, it is unintuitive to interpret directly from the coefficient estimates in Table 
3.6. I therefore assess the marginal probability effects of ethnicity on the predicted 
probability of conference call participation because ,%3^D%<f=DD(  is measured at the 
ethnicity level. Analysts from ethnic groups with high ,%3^D%<f=DD( are expected to have 
higher probability of participating in conference calls. I code ethnicities into a categorical 
variable and estimate the probability of participation for each ethnic group after 
controlling for individual analyst characteristics. The indicated participation probability 
for an analyst from the ethnic group with the lowest ,%3^D%<f=DD( is 31%.26 The implied 
probability of participation increases by 14 percentage points to 45% for an analyst from 
the ethnic group with the highest ,%3^D%<f=DD( , indicating a substantial economic 
increase in implied participation probability. Collectively, the results are consistent with 
H1, which predicts that analysts with better people skills are more likely to participate in 
conference calls. 
 
26 Predicted probabilities are calculated as %(äãåç)/(1 + %(äãèê)), where ëí  is the vector of fitted values from 
regression estimates for coefficients on ethnicities and Yì is the vector of values equal to the sample mean 




Table 3.7 presents the results of estimating the relation between analysts’ people 
skills and the order of questions in the Q&A section (i.e. Eq. (3.3)) to test H2. The 
analysis is performed using the sub-sample of analysts who participate in conference calls. 
If H2 holds, the estimated coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(  is expected to be negative. 
Column (1) estimates the relation without controlling for other analysts’ attributes. The 
coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(  is -0.020 and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Column (2) estimates the relation with controlling for analyst characteristics. The 
coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(  is -0.024 and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Column (3) estimates the relation with including additional ethnic cultural traits. The 
coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( is -0.037 and statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
terms of the economic significance, an increase in ,%3^D%<f=DD( by 1 indicates asking 
0.037 question earlier, all other things being equal. To put this in context, an analyst from 
the highest ,%3^D%<f=DD( ethnic group asks 0.19 question earlier than an analyst from the 
lowest ,%3^D%<f=DD(  ethnic group on average, indicating marginal economic 
significance of the effects of people skills on the order of questions. Collectively, results 
in Table 3.7 suggest that analysts with better people skills ask earlier questions in 
conference calls, consistent with H2. 
 [Insert Table 3.7 here] 
Other analyst characteristics variables also exhibit significant associations with 5-4%-  as suggested by the prior literature. For example, analysts with favourable 
(unfavourable) stock recommendations ask earlier (later) questions, consistent with 
analysts with favourable views have stronger relationships with firm management 
(Mayew, 2008). Star analysts ask earlier questions, indicating that managers prefer high-




more general experience and follow more industries ask later questions. This might be 
because these analysts focus more on macro-level industry trends thereby diverting their 
attention from any particular firm (Mayew, 2008). 
 
3.5.2. Robustness tests 
3.5.2.1. Downsizing the British ethnic group 
This sub-section summarises a series of robustness tests. I start by dealing with 
the unbalanced sample size. Table 3.2 Panel C shows that 60% (65%) of sample analysts 
(analyst-firm-quarter observations) are in the British ethnic group, leading to the concern 
that the results might be driven by its outnumbered size. To mitigate such a concern, 
robustness checks are performed by randomly choosing 6% of the observations from the 
British ethnic group so that each of the groups has similar density. After the random 
downsizing, the British group has 9,388 observations. Using the downsized sample, I re-
estimate the regressions in Tables 3.5 – 3.7. Results are presented in Table 3.8. 
[Insert Table 3.8 here] 
Column (1) re-estimates results in Table 3.5 to assess the relation between 
analysts’ people skills and ingratiation behaviour during conference calls (i.e. Eq. (3.4) 
to test the construct validity of ,%3^D%<f=DD( ). The coefficient on 	,%3^D%<f=DD( 
(,%3^D%<f=DD(I) is -0.500 (0.048) and statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of 
sign, magnitude, and statistical significance, the coefficients on ,%3^D%<f=DD(  and ,%3^D%<f=DD(I are consistent with the results in Table 3.5.27 Column (2) re-estimates Eq. 
 
27 Note that the regressions in Table 3.8 columns (1) and (3) are estimated using the sub-sample of analysts 
that participate in conference calls. Therefore, the sample size is smaller than in column (2). In columns (1) 




(3.1) to examine the relation between analysts’ people skills and conference call 
participation probability. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(  is positive (0.082) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, consistent with the results in Table 3.6. Column 
(3) re-estimates Eq. (3.3) to test H2 which posits that analysts with better people skills 
ask earlier questions during conference calls. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD(  is 
negative (-0.046) and statistically significant at the 1% level, supporting the results in 
Table 3.7. 
Collectively, results in Table 3.8 show that the findings on the association 
between analysts’ people skills and ingratiation behaviour and the association between 
people skills and management relationships are not driven by the outnumbered size of 
the British ethnic group. 
 
3.5.2.2. Additional controls 
Next, I re-estimate the main results by considering whether managers’ ethnicity 
and analyst name fluency affect the relation between analysts’ people skills and analyst-
manager relationships. Prior economics studies show that commonalities in ethnic origins 
and cultural background promote interaction and communication (e.g. Lazear, 1999; 
Guiso et al. 2009; Fisman et al., 2017). Therefore, analysts who share a common ethnicity 
with members in the management team may have an advantage in establishing a superior 
management relationship. This is a particularly important factor because the ,%3^D%<f=DD( measure is constructed based on analysts’ ethnic cultural traits. To measure 
analyst-manager common ethnicity, the variable <BJ%A)ℎ$=*=)H is constructed. It takes 
the value of 1 if the analyst shares common ethnicity with at least one manager in the 




In terms of analyst name fluency, psychology research shows that fluency 
increases cognitive operations and information processing (Hertwig et al., 2008; 
Oppenheimer, 2008). Easy-to-pronounce names (and their bearers) are judged more 
positively than difficult-to-pronounce names in social interactions (Laham et al., 2012). 
Finance research provides evidence that investors judge firms and stocks with more fluent 
names more positively than those with less fluent names (e.g. Green and Jame, 2013; 
Anderson and Larkin, 2019). According to this line of research, one may expect analyst 
name fluency to affect how they are perceived by managers and, hence, their management 
relationships. Therefore, I follow Green and Jame (2013) to construct the measure !D8%$*H to control for the potential effects of analyst name fluency. !D8%$*H is the 
aggregate fluency score of an analyst’s last name based on three dimensions: "%$&)ℎ, A$&D=(ℎ$%((  and #=*)=3$B-H . Details of these three dimensions are explained in 
Appendix 3.1. A higher value of !D8%$*H denotes that the analyst has a more fluent name.  
In Table 3.9 Panel A, Eq. (3.1) is re-estimated by controlling for <BJ%A)ℎ$=*=)H 
and !D8%$*H. The dependent variable is the probability of conference call participation. 
Column (1) controls for <BJ%A)ℎ$=*=)H. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( is positive 
(0.067) and statistically significant at the 1% level. That is, in terms of sign, magnitude, 
and statistical significance, the coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( is consistent with the results 
in Table 3.6. The coefficient on <BJ%A)ℎ$=*=)H  is positive (0.046) and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This suggests that analysts who share common ethnic 
backgrounds with managers are more likely to get conference call participation. Column 
(2) further adds in !D8%$*H  as a control variable. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( 
remains positive (0.068) and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on <BJ%A)ℎ$=*=)H remains positive (0.045) and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient 




that analysts with more fluent names have a higher probability of participating in 
conference calls.  
[Insert Table 3.9 here] 
In Table 3.9 Panel B, Eq. (3.3) is re-estimated with controlling for <BJ%A)ℎ$=*=)H and !D8%$*H. The dependent variable is the order of questions in the 
Q&A section of conference calls. In column (1), after controlling for <BJ%A)ℎ$=*=)H, 
the coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( is negative (-0.043) and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficient on <BJ%A)ℎ$=*=)H  is positive (0.067), but not statistically 
significant. Column (2) further controls for !D8%$*H. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( 
remains negative (-0.041) and statistically significant at the 1% level, consistent with the 
results in Table 3.7. The coefficient on !D8%$*H is positive (0.015), but not statistically 
significant, indicating that analyst name fluency does not significantly affect the order of 
questions. These results suggest that analysts with better people skills ask earlier 
questions during conference calls after controlling for same ethnicity with managers and 
name fluency. 
Collectively, results in Table 3.9 further support the main findings that analysts 
with better people skills have closer relationships with firm management.  
 
3.5.2.3. Heckman two-stage procedure for estimating the order of questions 
My final robustness test considers the selection bias in estimating the order of 
analyst questions in Eq. (3.3). To estimate Eq. (3.3), the regressions in Table 3.7 are 
performed using the sub-sample of analysts who participate in conference calls. This sub-




selection bias may confound my results. To address this concern, I perform a robustness 
check that controls for potential self-selection bias (Heckman, 1979) to assess whether 
my results are sensitive to conditioning the sample on conference call participation.  
The Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure uses the inverse Mills ratio to correct 
for the selection bias. Specifically, in the first stage, I re-estimate Eq. (3.1) using a probit 
model specification to estimate the inverse Mills ratio. The first-stage regression needs 
to be estimated using probit, which assumes a normal distributed error term (Lennox et 
al., 2011). In the second stage, I test the relation between analysts’ people skills and 
conference call question order by re-estimating Eq. (3.3) with including the inverse Mills 
ratio as an additional control variable. Results (untabulated) are consistent with those in 
Table 3.7, suggesting the finding that analysts with better people skills ask earlier 
questions in conference calls is robust to controlling for the first-stage selection bias. 
 
3.6. Implications: Do analysts benefit from better people skills? 
Findings to this point have established that analysts with better people skills have 
closer relationships with firm management. An unsolved issue is whether analysts with 
better people skills benefit from their closer relationships with managers in the form of 
acquiring superior firm-specific information. Understanding the extent to which analysts 
benefit from better people skills is crucial for practitioners. If some analysts suffer from 
an information disadvantage due to their lack of people skills, people skills training may 
represent a valuable component of financial analysts’ career development. 
Empirically, one might expect analysts with better people skills to possess 




There is evidence that analysts with better management relationships have access to 
superior private information and, hence, produce more accurate earnings forecasts (e.g. 
Mayew et al. 2013; Soltes, 2014; Brown et al., 2015). To investigate this issue, it would 
be ideal to measure the extent of private information exchange between different analysts 
and managers. Unfortunately, such events are unobservable. Therefore, I focus on 
whether analyst-management relationship (proxied by conference call participation) has 
mediation effects on the relation between analysts’ people skills and forecast accuracy. 
The assumption is that analysts who possess more superior private information produce 
more accurate earnings forecasts. I perform mediation analysis using the following 
regressions: 
!3-1**_,`,a = 	cd + ce,%3^D%<f=DD(_ + cI<68H_,`,a + cgG8H_,`,a + ch<%DD_,`,a+ ci<(%DD_,`,a + cj1DD()B-_,`,a + ck,-=3-1**_,`,a + cl!=-JAY^_,`,a+ cm?%$AY^_,`,a + cedL$4(_,`,a + cee!3-!-%Z_,`,a+ ceIG-3f%-<=>%_,`,a + cegN3J^B$=%(_,`,a + ceh;%*n3-=>3$_,`,a+ cei:1<_ + cejK1L_ + cek"F5oC<_ + celLC;_ + Σ!=-J	!A+ Σ{-/)-	!A + p_,`,a 
(3.5) 





where !3-1** is defined as peer-adjusted forecast accuracy of an analyst’s quarterly 
earnings forecast issues during the fiscal quarter after the current-quarter conference call. 
It is calculated as the largest after-call quarter absolute forecast error by an analyst 
following ﬁrm =  minus the after-call quarter absolute forecast error for analyst B 
following ﬁrm =, with this difference scaled by the range in the after-call quarter absolute 
forecast error for all analysts following ﬁrm =. The earnings forecast is required to be 
issued after the call because conference call participation (,B-)=*=^B)%) is the empirical 
proxy for analyst-management relationships (Mayew et al., 2013). If superior private 
information stems from strong management relationships, access to superior private 
information should be measured after the conference call (i.e. after participation/non-
participation happens).  
If analysts with better people skills possess superior private information, the 
coefficient cein Eq. (3.5) and the coefficient ce in Eq. (3.6) are expected to be positive. 
If these analysts obtain superior private information through their close relationships with 
managers, the coefficient cI in Eq. (3.6) is expected to be positive and the magnitude of 
coefficient cein Eq. (3.5) is expected to be greater than that in Eq. (3.6). 
Mediation analysis results are presented in Table 3.10. Panel A estimates stepwise 
by first examining the effects of people skills on forecast accuracy without controlling 
for conference call participation (i.e. Eq. (3.5)) in column (1). The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( is positive (0.842) and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that analysts with better people skills issue more accurate earnings forecasts. Having 
established that analysts’ people skills are positively associated with forecast accuracy, 




estimate Eq. (3.6). The coefficient on ,B-)=*=^B)% is positive (0.510) and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( remains positive (0.836) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The slight decrease in the magnitude of the 
coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( compared with column (1) (0.836 vs 0.842) suggests some 
mediating effects of ,B-)=*=^B)% , consistent with prediction. Nonetheless, it is not 
perfect mediation since the coefficient on ,%3^D%<f=DD( remains statistically different 
from zero. 
[Insert Table 3.10 here] 
To formally test whether the mediation effect of ,B-)=*=^B)%  is statistically 
significant, the Sobel’s (1982) test, Aroian’s (1944) test, and Goodman’s (1960) test are 
conducted (MacKinnon and Dwyer, 1993; MacKinnon et al., 1995). The intention of 
these tests is to assess whether the reduction in the effect of ,%3^D%<f=DD( on !3-1** is 
statistically significant after including the mediator (i.e. ,B-)=*=^B)%) in the regression 
model. The test statistics are calculated using the coefficient and standard error for the 
association between ,%3^D%<f=DD( and ,B-)=*=^B)% as well as those for the association 
between ,B-)=*=^B)% and !3-1**.28 Results are presented in Table 3.10 Panel B. All 
three mediation tests yield a ^-value below 0.05, indicating that the mediating effects of ,B-)=*=^B)% is statistically different from zero. 
Collectively, the mediation analysis suggests that analysts with better people 
skills possess superior private information, which partly stems from their close 
relationships with firm management.  
 




Furthermore, I consider whether analysts with better people skills benefit from 
better career outcomes. Two types of career outcomes are considered, i.e. the probability 
of being rated as an All-Star analyst and the probability of being re-employed after 
brokerage house closures. Results (untabulated) show no statistically significant 
association between people skills and either career outcomes. This indicates that, 
although analysts with better people skills enjoy informational benefits, the effects are 
not sufficient enough to generate better career outcomes.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter provides evidence on whether and how people skills affect sell-side 
analysts’ outcomes. The investigation is motivated by the recent development in the 
economics literature that identifies the value of people skills in the labour market (e.g. 
Borghans et al., 2014; Deming, 2017; Deming and Kahn, 2018). Empirically assessing 
the effects of analysts’ people skills is important because analysts’ work requires them to 
maintain good management relationships. However, operationalizing people skills is 
difficult. I rely on psychology and sociolinguistics research to conceptualize and validate 
an operational proxy for the construct. Empirically, analysts’ people skills are measured 
by combining three ethnic cultural traits: individualism, trust and power distance. The 
empirical proxy is validated by tests that link it to analysts’ linguistic behaviour during 
conference calls.  
Collectively, the results speak to the role of people skills in the analyst labour 
market. Using the earnings conference call setting to observe analysts-management 




participate in conference calls and ask earlier questions in the Q&A section. This supports 
the notion that analysts with better people skills are able to establish and maintain closer 
management relationships. The analysis then assesses whether analysts with better people 
skills benefit from their close management relationships and possess superior private 
information. Empirically, I model analyst forecast accuracy as a function of people skills 
and conference call participation and tests for the mediation effects of call participation. 
Mediation analysis suggests that analysts with better people skills possess superior 
private information, which is partly facilitated by their closer relationships with firm 
management.  
The inferences are subject to the caveat that analysts’ people skills are measured 
indirectly using their ethnic cultural traits. This assumes that on average analysts do not 
experience significant variations in people skills throughout their lifetime. The inferences 
are also limited by the extent to which the empirical proxies can accurately capture 
analyst-manager relationships, which is unobservable in nature. For example, analysts’ 
conference call participation is affected by both management’s preferences for friendly 
analysts and analysts’ willingness to seek participation. The inferences are only as valid 
as the effectiveness of controlling for analysts’ willingness to participate.  
With these caveats in mind, the results add to the existing literature by providing 
the first evidence on the effects of people skills in the sell-side analyst labour market. In 
addition, given the recent growing attention on the value of people skills for financial 





FIGURE 1. Scatterplot of Mean Values of Ingratiation (î~ïñ_óñòôïöÑïöÑñ) by 
Analysts’ People Skills (}~ÄÅ~ÇÉÑÅÅÖ) 
 
This figure plots the relation between the mean value of L$&-B)=B)=3$ and ,%3^D%<f=DD(. All 







Appendix 3.1. Variable Definitions 
People skills variable 
 Variables Definitions 
 
 ,%3^D%<f=DD( Analysts’ people skills measured as the first principal component of 
an analyst’s three ethnic cultural traits: individualism, trust and 
power distance.  
Analyst-level variables 
 Variables Definitions 
 
 ,B-)=*=^B)% Analyst participation on the conference call measured as 1 if the 
analyst asked a question during the call, and 0 otherwise.  
 
 5-4%- The order of which analysts ask questions in a conference call. It is 
measured as 1 if the analyst asks the first question, 2 if the second, 
etc. 
 
 L$&-B)=B)=3$ Analysts’ ingratiation behaviour in a conference call measured as 
the total number of ingratiation words scaled by the total number of 
words by that analyst (expressed as a percentage). 
 
 <68H Strong buy recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent 
outstanding stock recommendation prior to the conference call is a 
strong buy, and 0 otherwise.  
 
 G8H Buy recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent 
outstanding stock recommendation prior to the conference call is a 
buy, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 n3D4 Hold recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent 
outstanding stock recommendation prior to the conference call is a 
hold, and 0 otherwise.  
 
 <%DD Sell recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent 
outstanding stock recommendation prior to the conference call is a 
sell, and 0 otherwise.  
 
 <(%DD Strong sell recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent 
outstanding stock recommendation prior to the conference call is a 
strong sell, and 0 otherwise.  
 
 1DD<)B- All-star research analyst measured as 1 if the analyst made any of 
the Institutional Investor Research All-American teams at least once 








Appendix 3.1. (Continued) 
 
 ,-=3-1** Prior earnings forecast accuracy, measured as the relative absolute 
forecast accuracy of the analyst’s prior quarter earnings forecast. 
Relative absolute forecast accuracy is calculated as the largest prior 
quarter forecast error by an analyst following ﬁrm =  in quarter ) 
minus the prior quarter absolute forecast error for analyst B 
following ﬁrm = in quarter Z, with this difference scaled by the range 
in the prior quarter absolute forecast error for all analysts following 
ﬁrm = in quarter Z.  
 
 
 !=-JAY^ Firm experience measured as the relative time the analyst has 
covered the ﬁrm, where ﬁrm coverage is measured as the number of 
days between the conference call date and the analyst’s ﬁrst earnings 
forecast estimate date on I/B/E/S for the ﬁrm. Relative ﬁrm 
experience is calculated as the ﬁrm experience for analyst B 
following ﬁrm = in quarter Z minus the smallest ﬁrm experience by 
any analyst following ﬁrm = in quarter Z, with this difference scaled 
by the range in the ﬁrm experience for all analysts following ﬁrm = 
in quarter Z.  
 
 ?%$AY^ General experience measured as the relative time the analyst has 
been on I/B/E/S where time on I/B/E/S is measured as the number 
of days between the conference call date and the analyst’s ﬁrst 
earnings forecast estimate date on I/B/E/S for any ﬁrm. Relative 
general experience is calculated as the general experience for 
analyst B following ﬁrm = in quarter Z minus the smallest general 
experience by any analyst following ﬁrm = in quarter Z, with this 
difference scaled by the range in the general experience for all 
analysts following ﬁrm = in quarter Z.  
 
 L$4( Industry coverage measured as the relative number of industries 
covered by the analyst over the most recently completed calendar 
year prior to the conference call date. Relative industry coverage is 
calculated as the industry coverage of analyst B following ﬁrm = in 
quarter Z  minus the smallest industry coverage by any analyst 
following ﬁrm = in quarter Z, with this difference scaled by the range 
in industry coverage for all analysts following ﬁrm = in quarter Z.  
 
 !3-!-%Z Forecast frequency measured as the relative number of quarterly 
earnings forecasts issued by the analyst for the ﬁrm over the most 
recently completed calendar year prior to the conference call date. 
Relative forecast frequency is calculated as the forecast frequency 
for analyst B following ﬁrm = in quarter Z minus the lowest forecast 
frequency by any analyst following ﬁrm = in quarter Z, with this 
difference scaled by the range in the forecast frequency for all 







Appendix 3.1. (Continued) 
 
 G-3f%-<=>% Broker size measured as the relative number of analysts employed 
by the brokerage ﬁrm employing the analyst during the most recent 
calendar year prior to the conference call date. Relative broker size 
is calculated as the broker size for analyst B  following ﬁrm =  in 
quarter Z minus the smallest broker size of any analyst following 
ﬁrm = in quarter Z, with this difference scaled by the range in broker 
size for all analysts following ﬁrm = in quarter Z.  
 
 N3J^B$=%( Number of companies covered by the analyst during the most 
recently completed calendar year prior to the conference call date.  
 
 NN8(%- For analyst B following ﬁrm = at ﬁscal quarter Z, equals the total 
number of conference calls (excluding ﬁrm =) in which analyst B 
participated during the calendar quarter containing ﬁscal quarter for 
ﬁrm =.  
  ,-=3-,B-)=*=^B)% Prior conference call participation measured as 1 if the analyst was 
identiﬁed as asking a question on any of the ﬁrm’s prior conference 
calls in the sample, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 ;%*n3-=>3$ Recommendation horizon measured as the number of days between 
the conference call date and the date of the analyst’s most recent 
stock recommendation. 
 
 <BJ%A)ℎ$=*=)H Analyst-management ethnicity match measured as 1 if the analyst 
has the same ethnicity with at least one manager in call; 0 if the 
analyst has same ethnicity with no manager in call. 
 
 !D8%$*H Analyst last name aggregate fluency score measured as the sum of 
the "%$&)ℎ , A$&D=(ℎ$%((  and #=*)=3$B-H  scores, following 
Green and Jame (2013). 
 
 "%$&)ℎ Analyst last name length score. Analyst names fall into the top, 
middle and bottom tercile of length measured by number of letters 
are assigned a "%$&)ℎ score of 3, 2 and 1, respectively. 
 
 A$&D=(ℎ$%(( Analyst last name Englishness score measured following Green and 
Jame (2013) and Travers and Olivier (1978). Analyst names fall into 
the bottom quintile of length-adjusted Englishness are assigned an A$&D=(ℎ$%(( score of 0, and all others are assigned an Englishness 
score of 1. 
 
 #=*)=3$B-H Analyst last name fluency measured by ease of pronunciation 
following Green and Jame (2013). Analyst names pass Microsoft 
Word spell check in all lowercases are assigned a #=*)=3$B-H score 







Appendix 3.1. (Continued) 
 
 !3-1** Forecast accuracy for the quarter after the conference call, measured 
as the relative absolute forecast accuracy of the analyst’s quarterly 
earnings forecast for the quarter after the call. Relative absolute 
forecast accuracy is calculated as the largest after-call quarter 
forecast error by an analyst following ﬁrm = in quarter Z minus the 
after-call quarter absolute forecast error for analyst B following ﬁrm = in quarter Z, with this difference scaled by the range in the after-
call quarter absolute forecast error for all analysts following ﬁrm = 
in quarter Z. 
 
 
Conference call-level variables 
 Variables Definitions 
 /1J=$ Length of the Q&A section of the conference call in minutes (where 
minutes are derived from total word count of transcript at 150 words 
per minute). 
   98J1$BDH() Number of sample analysts providing earnings forecasts and 
recommendations on I/B/E/S for the current quarter. 
 
 
Ethnicity-level cultural variables 
 Variables Definitions 
 :1< Masculinity culture score in Hofstede cultural index. 
 
 K1L  Uncertainty avoidance culture score in Hofstede cultural index. 
      "F5oC<  Long- vs. short-term orientation culture score in Hofstede cultural 
index. 
 
 LC; Indulgence vs. Restraint culture score in Hofstede cultural index. 






Appendix 3.2. Ethnicity and Countries/Regions 
Ethnicity Countries / Regions   
Greater European, British U.S.A.; Great Britain; Australia; 
Canada; Ireland; New Zealand   
Greater European, West European, Hispanic Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; 
Costa Rica; Ecuador; El Salvador; 
Guatemala; Panama; Peru; Uruguay; 
Mexico; Venezuela; Spain; Portugal   
Greater European, West European, Nordic Belgium Netherland; Denmark; Finland; 
Norway; Sweden   
Greater European, West European, Germanic Germany; Switzerland German   
Greater European, East European Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep; Estonia; 
Hungary; Poland; Romania; Russia; 
Slovak Rep; Slovenia   
Greater African, Africans Africa East; Africa West; Jamaica; 
Morocco   
Greater African, Muslim Arab countries; Turkey; Iran; Iraq   
Asian, Greater East Asian, Japanese Japan   
Asian, Greater East Asian, East Asian Taiwan; Thailand; Vietnam; Singapore; 
Philippines; South Korea; Malaysia; 
China; Hong Kong; Indonesia   
Asian, Indian Sub-Continent India 






Appendix 3.3. Ingratiation dictionary 
To empirically measure analysts’ ingratiation in conference calls, an ingratiation 
dictionary is developed through an extensive reading of conference calls transcripts and 
following prior literature on analysts’ complimentary behaviour during the calls (Milian 
and Smith, 2017) and psychology research (e.g. Ellis et al., 2002; Vonk, 2002; Seiter, 
2007). The dictionary contains six categories of words that captures different aspects of 
ingratiation:  
1. Praises. Following Milian and Smith’s (2017) method, the wordlist of praise 
phrases contains a positive adjective precedes a noun related to firm performance. The 
wordlist contains all potential pairing of 18 adjectives and 10 nouns. The adjectives are: 
“great”, “good”, “excellent”, “nice”, “fantastic”, “remarkable”, “incredible”, 
“impressive”, “tremendous”, “solid”, “outstanding”, “terrific”, “amazing”, 
“phenomenal”, “strong”, “superb”, “super” and “stellar”. The nouns are: “quarter”, 
“year”, “fiscal year”, “job”, “work”, “execution”, “results”, “print” and “number”. The 
measure allows the noun “quarter” to be preceded by the words “first”, “second”, “third”, 
or “fourth”. Moreover, a praise phrase is not counted if one of the six negation words (i.e. 
“no”, “not”, “none”, “neither”, “never”, or “nobody”) occur within the three words 
preceding the phrase. 
2. Greetings. This category contains the following words/phrases: “hello”, “hi”, 
“hey”, “greeting”, “greetings”, “good day”, “good morning”, “good afternoon”, “good 
evening”, “good night”, “how are you”, “how have you been”. 
3. Congratulations. This category contains the following words: “congrat”, 




4. Thanks. This category contains the following words: “thank”, “thanks”, 
“thankful”, “appreciate”, “appreciated”, “appreciation”, “cheers”, “appreciative”, 
“gratitude”, “grateful”. 
5. Laughter. This category contains the following words: “laugh”, “laughter”, 
“laughing”, “joke”, “joking”, “kidding”. 







Table 3.1. Sample 
Number of transcripts in English of Compustat firms between 2011-2015 from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon 54,644 
Number of transcripts after excluding: Transcripts of non-U.S. firms 40,418 
Number of transcripts after excluding: Transcripts with no I/B/E/S outstanding stock 
recommendation 39,040 
Number of transcripts after excluding: Transcripts with no I/B/E/S analysts having current 
quarterly earnings forecast or earnings estimates outstanding for less than 365 days 
38,271 
Number of transcripts after excluding: Transcripts with no I/B/E/S analysts having data 
available to calculate analyst attributes 31,980 
Number of analyst-firm-quarter observations in the final sample 239,153 
 
This table presents the process of sample construction. The sample spans the time period January 2011 
to December 2015 and covers a total of 31,980 quarterly earnings conference call transcripts and 
















Table 3.2. Construction of People Skills Variable: Principal Component Analysis 
Panel A. Components 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Component 1 2.77 2.61 0.92 0.92 
Component 2 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.98 
Component 3 0.06 . 0.02 1.00 
       
Panel B. Component loadings 
Variable Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Unexplained 
Individualism  0.58 -0.60 0.55 0 
Power distance -0.59  0.17 0.79 0 
Trust  0.57  0.78 0.26 0 
 
Panel C. ,%3^D%<f=DD( and sample distribution by ethnicity 
Ethnicity  ,%3^D%<f=DD( (Component 1) Number of Analysts %  Analyst-firm-quarter observations  % 
Hispanic  -3.37 122 
 4.13  7,555   3.16 
African  -2.78 70 
 2.37  4,826   2.02 
East Asian  -2.51 233 
 7.88  13,982   5.85 
Indian Sub-continent  -2.47 289 
 9.78  21,747   9.09 
Muslim  -2.46 116 
 3.93  8,653   3.62 
East European  -2.26 149 
 5.04  11,684   4.89 
Japanese  -0.96 60 
 2.03  4,389   1.84 
Germanic   0.58 87 
 2.94  6,329   2.65 
British   1.09 1,762 
 59.63  156,462   65.42 
Nordic    1.69 67  2.27  3,526   1.47 
Total   . 2,955  100.00  239,153   100.00 
This table presents the construction of the people skills variable (denoted as ,%3^D%<f=DD(), which is measured as the 
first principal component of the following three culture traits: individualism, power distance and trust. Panel A reports 








  Table 3.3. Correlation Matrix 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 (1)-./01.234115   1.00  0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01***   0.00  0.01*** -0.01***  0.01*** -0.01***  0.05***  0.08***  0.02*** -0.01***  0.02*** -0.06***  0.04***  0.05***  0.00 
 (2)-678494068.  0.02***   1.00  0.01***  0.07***  0.06*** -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.03***  0.00  0.02*** -0.01***  0.00  0.07***  0.08***  0.09***  0.03***  0.39***  0.34*** 
 (3):7;.7 -0.02*** 0.01**   1.00 -0.05*** -0.07***  0.09***  0.05***  0.03***  0.02*** -0.10*** -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 
 (4)2<=> -0.01***  0.07*** -0.05***      1.00 -0.33*** -0.46*** -0.11*** -0.05***  0.00  0.02***  0.00  0.01*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***  0.00***  0.05*** 
 (5)?=>   0.00  0.06*** -0.07*** -0.33***  1.00 -0.57*** -0.14*** -0.06***  0.00***  0.01***  0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02***  0.05*** -0.05*** -0.01*** -0.02***  0.01*** 
 (6)@/1;  0.01*** -0.09***  0.09*** -0.46*** -0.57***  1.00 -0.19*** -0.09***  0.00 -0.03*** -0.01***  0.00  0.02*** -0.01***  0.02***  0.02***  0.02*** -0.04*** 
 (7)2.11 -0.01*** -0.04***  0.04*** -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.19***  1.00 -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01***  0.02***  0.07***  0.00  0.11***  0.03***  0.01*** -0.02*** 
 (8)25.11  0.01*** -0.03***  0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.02***  1.00  0.00**  0.01***  0.01***  0.00***  0.01*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** 
 (9)-74/7A99 -0.01*** -0.01***  0.04*** -0.01***  0.01*** 0.00** -0.01***  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00 -0.02***  0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00**   0.00 
 (10)B47CDE0  0.05***  0.02*** -0.11***  0.03***  0.01*** -0.03*** -0.02***  0.01*** -0.01***  1.00  0.44***  0.05***  0.09***  0.12***  0.00*  0.14***  0.07***  0.13*** 
 (11)F.GDE0  0.07*** -0.01*** -0.03***      0.00  0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***  0.00* -0.01***  0.42***  1.00  0.12***  0.13***  0.00 -0.04***  0.24***  0.10***  0.03*** 
 (12)HG;5  0.02***   0.00 -0.07***  0.01*** -0.01***  0.00***  0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02***  0.05***  0.12***  1.00  0.08***  0.02***  0.01***  0.42***  0.14***  0.01*** 
 (13)A112867   0.00  0.07*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02***  0.02***  0.07***  0.01***  0.01***  0.09***  0.12***  0.07***  1.00 -0.04***  0.27***  0.18***  0.18***  0.07*** 
 (14)B/7B7.I  0.02***  0.08*** -0.08*** -0.03***  0.05*** -0.02***  0.00 -0.02*** -0.02***  0.09*** -0.01***  0.01*** -0.04***  1.00  0.07***  0.06***  0.09***  0.12*** 
 (15)?7/3.724J. -0.06***  0.08*** -0.08*** -0.02*** -0.04***  0.02***  0.12*** -0.03*** -0.01***  0.00 -0.04***  0.01***  0.28***  0.07***  1.00  0.14***  0.15***  0.11*** 
 (16)K/C06G4.5  0.03***  0.02*** -0.09*** -0.03*** 0.00**  0.01***  0.03*** -0.01*** -0.01***  0.14***  0.23***  0.43***  0.18***  0.05***  0.14***   1.00  0.32***  0.05*** 
 (17)KK=5.7  0.05***  0.35*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.01***  0.02***  0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***  0.06***  0.08***  0.14***  0.19***  0.08***  0.14***  0.33***  1.00  0.37*** (18)-74/7-678494068.   0.00  0.34*** -0.06***  0.05***  0.01*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01***  0.12***  0.03***  0.01***  0.07***  0.12***  0.11***  0.04***  0.33***  1.00 




























 !*+,(-($*," 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.35     0.01*** 
 .+/"+ 5.18 5.14 5.02 5.06     0.01*** 
 &012 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21     0.01*** 
 312 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.44 
 4#%/ 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.44     0.01*** 
 &"%% 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05     0.01*** 
 &)"%% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01    0.04** 
 !+(#+5-- 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63  0.09* 
 6(+789$ 0.41 0.39 0.44 0.43     0.01*** 
 :";89$ 0.40 0.38 0.44 0.42     0.01*** 
 <;/) 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.36     0.01*** 
 5%%&,*+ 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11     0.01*** 
 6#+6+"= 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.39     0.01*** 
 3+#'"+&(>" 0.45 0.43 0.39 0.40     0.01*** 
 ?#7$*;(") 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.46     0.01*** 
 ??1)"+ 4.18 4.48 4.78 4.65     0.01*** 
 !+(#+!*+,(-($*," 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.73     0.01*** 
This table presents the means of analyst-management relationship variables and analyst characteristics variables 
according to people skills. The last column presents the ,-test statistic of the difference of the means between the 
highest people skills group and the lowest people skills group. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 







Table 3.5. Analysts’ People Skills and Ingratiation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 <;A+*,(*,(#; <;A+*,(*,(#; <;A+*,(*,(#; 
 !"#$%"&'(%%)    -0.116***   -0.116***    -0.549*** 
 (-4.94) (-4.91) (-7.01) 
 !"#$%"&'(%%)B   0.010***   0.010***    0.053*** 
 (5.07) (5.11) (6.95) 
 &012  0.037* 0.033* 
  (1.83) (1.66) 
 312    -0.037**   -0.037** 
  (-2.00) (-1.99) 
 &"%%  -0.014 -0.011 
  (-0.32) (-0.25) 
 &)"%%    -0.181**  -0.170* 
  (-2.03) (-1.92) 
 5%%&,*+   -0.054**   -0.056** 
  (-2.12) (-2.17) 
 !+(#+5--  0.009 0.008 
  (0.42) (0.39) 
 6(+789$    -0.063**   -0.062** 
  (-2.05) (-2.01) 
 :";89$     -0.116***   -0.108*** 
  (-4.10) (-3.83) 
 <;/)    0.125***   0.118*** 
  (4.35) (4.07) 
 6#+6+"=     -0.071***    -0.066*** 
  (-2.79) (-2.59) 
 3+#'"+&(>"     -0.079***    -0.083*** 
  (-3.26) (-3.41) 
 ?#7$*;(")   0.065** 0.056* 
  (1.98) (1.71) 
 ??1)"+     -0.012***     -0.011*** 
  (-4.95) (-4.60) 
 !+(#+!*+,(-($*,"     -0.090***    -0.091*** 
  (-2.69) (-2.72) 
 C"-4#+(>#;  0.000 0.000 
  (0.44) (0.50) 
 D5&     0.007*** 
   (4.26) 
 E5<     0.0015** 
   (2.06) 
 FG.HI&      -0.004*** 
   (-2.87) 
 <IC      -0.019*** 
      (-5.55) 
 Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
 Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes 
 N 80,160 80,160 80,160 






Table 3.5. (Continued) 
 
This table presents the results of validating the operational construct of analysts’ people skills by assessing 
the relation between the construct and analysts’ ingratiation behaviour during conference calls using OLS 
regressions (i.e. Eq. (3.4)). The dependent variable, <;A+*,(*,(#;, is measured as the total number of 
ingratiation words scaled by the total number of words by that analyst (expressed as a percentage). The test 
variable, !"#$%"&'(%%), is measured as the first principal component of an analyst’s three ethnic cultural 
traits: individualism, trust and power distance. ,-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm-call. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 







Table 3.6. Analysts’ People Skills and Conference Call Participation Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pr	(!*+,(-($*,") Pr	(!*+,(-($*,") Pr	(!*+,(-($*,") Pr	(!*+,(-($*,") 
 !"#$%"&'(%%)    0.018*** 0.009*** 0.071*** 
  (6.81) (3.05) (10.08) 
 &012   0.549***  0.549*** 0.549*** 
 (42.49)  (42.49) (42.47) 
 312  0.503***  0.504*** 0.502*** 
 (41.59)  (41.63) (41.45) 
 &"%%  -0.317***  -0.317*** -0.316*** 
 (-11.53)  (-11.52) (-11.49) 
 &)"%% -0.123**  -0.123** -0.127*** 
 (-1.99)  (-2.00) (-2.05) 
 O57(;  0.027***  0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (40.42)  (40.42) (40.38) 
 P175;*%2),  -0.021***   -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (-47.02)  (-46.97) (-47.01) 
 5%%&,*+  0.135***  0.136*** 0.149*** 
 (7.72)   (7.73) (8.45) 
 !+(#+5--           0.030*  0.030*** 0.030** 
 (1.95)  (1.98) (1.98) 
 6(+789$   -0.116***  -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (-6.48)  (-6.55) (-6.52) 
 :";89$   -0.180***  -0.183*** -0.186*** 
 (-10.27)  (-10.42) (-10.53) 
 <;/)   -0.143***  -0.142*** -0.148*** 
 (-8.25)  (-8.21) (-8.52) 
 6#+6+"=  0.169***  0.168*** 0.165*** 
 (10.34)  (10.25) (10.05) 
 3+#'"+&(>"  0.188***  0.191*** 0.188*** 
 (11.88)  (12.05) (11.84) 
 ?#7$*;(")  -0.810***   -0.811*** -0.803*** 
 (-37.90)  (-37.93) (-37.52) 
 ??1)"+  0.173***  0.173*** 0.173*** 
 (117.91)  (117.65) (117.83) 
 !+(#+!*+,(-($*,"  1.786***  1.787*** 1.789*** 
 (108.40)  (108.41) (108.47) 
 C"-4#+(>#;  -0.001***   -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-19.62)  (-19.61) (-19.54) 
 D5&    -0.011*** 
  
  (-16.22) 
 E5<    0.004*** 
  
  (7.84) 
 FG.HI&    0.003*** 
  
  (4.31) 
 <IC    -0.002** 
  
  (-2.23) 
 N 239,153 239,153 239,153 239,153 









Table 3.6. (Continued) 
This table presents results from estimating the relation between analysts’ people skills and conference call 
participation probability using logistic regressions (i.e. Eq. (3.1)). The dependent variable is the probability 
of conference call participation. !*+,(-($*," is measured as 1 if the analyst asked a question during the call, 
and 0 otherwise. The test variable, !"#$%"&'(%%), is measured as the first principal component of an analyst’s 
three ethnic cultural traits: individualism, trust and power distance. ,-statistics appear in parentheses and are 
based on standard errors clustered by firm-call. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 









Table 3.7. Analysts’ People Skills and Conference Call Question Order 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  .+/"+ .+/"+ .+/"+ 
 !"#$%"&'(%%)    -0.020***  -0.024*** -0.037** 
 
 (-2.62) (-3.28) (-2.07) 
 &012    -0.749***  -0.751*** 
 
 
 (-23.79) (-23.86) 
 312    -0.885***  -0.888*** 
 
 
 (-30.36) (-30.46) 
 &"%%   0.693*** 0.690*** 
 
 
 (10.64) (10.59) 
 &)"%%   1.264*** 1.255*** 
 
 
 (7.84) (7.79) 
 5%%&,*+    -1.065*** -1.069*** 
 
 
 (-26.25) (-26.39) 
 !+(#+5--   -0.041 -0.040 
 
 
 (-1.32) (-1.29) 
 6(+789$    -0.656***  -0.659*** 
 
 
 (-15.07) (-15.13) 
 :";89$   0.298*** 0.296*** 
 
 
 (7.38) (7.33) 
 <;/)   0.079** 0.086** 
 
 
 (2.05) (2.23) 
 6#+6+"=   0.022 0.021 
 
 
 (0.59) (0.57) 
 3+#'"+&(>"    -1.080***  -1.081*** 
 
 
 (-28.55) (-28.57) 
 ?#7$*;(")    -0.284***  -0.281*** 
 
 
 (-6.17) (-6.10) 
 ??1)"+    -0.048***  -0.048*** 
 
 
 (-14.18) (-14.25) 
 !+(#+!*+,(-($*,"    -0.635***  -0.636*** 
 
 
 (-13.46) (-13.50) 
 C"-4#+(>#;   0.000 0.000 
 
 
 (0.70) (0.68) 
 D5&    -0.003 
 
 
  (-1.55) 
 E5<     -0.003*** 
 
 
  (-2.65) 
 FG.HI&     0.008*** 
 
 
  (4.95) 
 <IC    0.004* 
        (1.91) 
 Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes 
 Year-Qtr FE  Yes Yes Yes 
 N  80,160 80,160 80,160 










Table 3.7. (Continued) 
 
This table presents results from estimating the relation between analysts’ people skills and conference call 
question order using OLS regressions (i.e. Eq. (3.3)). The dependent variable, .+/"+, is the order of 
questions in conference calls. .+/"+ is as 1 if the analyst asks the first question, 2 if the second, etc. The 
test variable, !"#$%"&'(%%), is measured as the first principal component of an analyst’s three ethnic 
cultural traits: individualism, trust and power distance. ,-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm-call. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 













Table 3.8. Robustness Tests: Downsized British Ethnic Group 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 <;A+*,(*,(#; Pr	(!*+,(-($*,") .+/"+ 
 !"#$%"&'(%%)    -0.500***  0.082***  -0.046** 
 (-5.36) (10.76) (-2.06) 
 !"#$%"&'(%%)B   0.048***   
 (5.29)   
 &012 0.048  0.636***  -0.830*** 
 (1.29) (30.82) (-14.97) 
 312 -0.062*  0.583***  -0.928*** 
 (-1.93) (30.01) (-18.52) 
 &"%%   -0.135**   -0.213*** 0.619*** 
 (-2.02) (-4.89) (5.54) 
 &)"%% -0.054 -0.103 1.719*** 
 (-0.32) (-1.03) (5.92) 
 5%%&,*+ 0.040  0.167***  -0.801*** 
 (0.74) (5.99) (-10.67) 
 !+(#+5-- 0.048 -0.004 -0.068 
 (1.27) (-0.17) (-1.29) 
 6(+789$ -0.012    -0.176***   -0.452*** 
 (-0.22) (-6.15) (-5.57) 
 :";89$    -0.224***   -0.263***  -0.231*** 
 (-4.31) (-9.08) (-3.04) 
 <;/)  0.125**   -0.182***  0.421*** 
 (2.23) (-6.45) (6.01) 
 6#+6+"= -0.075   0.167*** 0.127* 
 (-1.64) (6.33) (1.93) 
 3+#'"+&(>"  -0.115**   0.243***  -1.151*** 
 (-2.44) (9.48) (-16.38) 
 ?#7$*;(")    0.154***   -0.833***  -0.534*** 
 (2.61) (-24.07) (-6.43) 
 ??1)"+ -0.006  0.181***  -0.050*** 
 (-1.27) (71.44) (-8.26) 
 !+(#+!*+,(-($*," -0.006 1.806***   -0.601*** 
 (-0.11) (68.34) (-7.48) 
 C"-4#+(>#; 0.000  -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.23) (-12.16) (-0.70) 
 O57(;  0.027***  
  (26.48)  
 P175;*%2),   -0.020***  
  (-30.15)  





Table 3.8. (Continued) 
 D5&   0.005**   -0.010***  -0.007*** 
 (2.38)  (-13.78) (-3.35) 
 E5< 0.001  0.004***  -0.004*** 
 (0.70)                 (7.38) (-2.79) 
 FG.HI& -0.003*  0.002***   0.011*** 
 (-1.78)                 (3.04) (5.82) 
 <IC   -0.017***                 -0.001 0.005* 
 (-4.21) (-1.61) (1.96) 
Firm FE YES NO YES 
Year-Qtr FE YES NO YES 
N 30,196 30,196 92,079 
Pseudo CB . 0.20 . 
Adjusted CB 0.08 . 0.34 
This table presents results of robustness tests with downsized British Ethnic group. Column (1) presents the 
results on re-estimating Eq. (3.4). Column (2) presents the results on re-estimating Eq. (3.1). Column (3) 
presents the results on re-estimating Eq. (3.3). ,-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm-call. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 







Table 3.9. Robustness Tests: Additional Control Variables 
Panel A. Eq. (3.1) with controlling for manager ethnicity and analyst name fluency 
  (1)   (2) 
  Pr	(!*+,(-($*,")  Pr	(!*+,(-($*,") 
 !"#$%"&'(%%)    0.067***    0.068*** 
  (8.98) 
 (9.08) 
 &*7"8,ℎ;(-(,2   0.046**   0.045** 
  (1.87) 
 (1.85) 
 6%1";-2     0.010* 
      (1.85) 
 Controls  Yes  Yes 
 N  239,153  239,153 
 Pseudo CB  0.19   0.19 
     
Panel B. Eq. (3.3) with controlling for manager ethnicity and analyst name fluency 
  (1)   (2) 
  .+/"+  .+/"+ 
 !"#$%"&'(%%)    -0.043***    -0.041*** 
  (-2.31) 
 (-2.20) 
 &*7"8,ℎ;(-(,2  0.067  0.066 
  (1.15) 
 (1.13) 
 6%1";-2    0.015 
      (1.12) 
 Controls  Yes  Yes 
 Firm FE  Yes  Yes 
 Year-Qtr FE  Yes  Yes 
 N  80,160  80,160 
 Adjusted CB  0.30   0.30 
This table presents results of robustness tests with additional control variables. Panel A presents results 
from estimating the relation between analysts’ people skills and conference call participation 
probability (i.e. Eq. (3.1)) with controlling for &*7"8,ℎ;(-(,2 and 6%1";-2. Panel B presents results 
from estimating the relation between analysts’ people skills and conference call question order (i.e. 
Eq. (3.3)) with controlling for &*7"8,ℎ;(-(,2 and 6%1";-2. ,-statistics appear in parentheses and are 
based on standard errors clustered by firm-call. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 







Table 3.10. Analysts’ People Skills and Forecast Accuracy: Mediation analysis 
Panel A. Multivariate analysis  
 (1) (2) 
 6#+5-- 6#+5-- 
 !"#$%"&'(%%)   0.842***   0.836*** 
 (4.68) (4.64) 
 !*+,(-($*,"     0.510** 
     (2.07) 
 Controls Yes Yes 
 Firm FE Yes Yes 
 Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes 
 N 123,179 123,179 
 Adjusted CB 0.03 0.03 
     
Panel B. Mediation test statistics  
 Test statistics $-value 
 Sobel test 2.02** 0.043 
 Aroian test 2.02** 0.044 
 Goodman test 2.03** 0.042 
This table presents the results from estimating the relation between analysts’ people skills and forecast 
error, as well as the mediating effects of analysts’ management relationships (i.e. Eq. (3.5) and (3.6)). 
The dependent variable, 6#+5--, is the relative absolute forecast accuracy of the analyst’s quarterly 
earnings forecast issued within the quarter after the call date. The test variables are !"#$%"&'(%%) and !*+,(-($*,". !"#$%"&'(%%) is measured as the first principal component of an analyst’s three ethnic 
cultural traits: individualism, trust and power distance. !*+,(-($*," is measured as 1 if the analyst 
asked a question during the call, and 0 otherwise. Panel A presents the results on estimating Eq. (3.5) 
in column (1) and Eq. (3.6) in column (2). ,-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm-call. Panel B presents mediation analysis test statistics. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate 








Chapter 4. Analyst Discourse, Politeness Behaviour and Identities 
4.1. Introduction 
 Sell-side financial analysts (hereinafter, analysts) play an essential role as 
information intermediaries in financial markets. They gather and process firm-specific 
information, produce earnings and revenues forecasts and stock recommendations, and 
serve as professional communication channels between managers and investors (Cheng 
et al., 2006; Lu et al., 2016). They contribute to society by assisting the conversion of 
intellectual capital into economic capital in financial markets (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). 
As a professional group, analysts need to present socially desirable images to investors, 
managers and the media, in order to establish and maintain their professional standing. 
Professional identity represents not only the profession that individuals work in but also 
their beliefs, values and motives (Ibarra, 1999; Slay and Smith, 2011). This chapter 
investigates whether and how sell-side analysts construct and promote identities through 
their use of language to enact politeness in analyst-manager interactions during earnings 
conference calls. 
 Analysts have two identities, namely “competent professionals” and 
“dependants of firms”, due to their responsibilities and institutional incentives. Analysts’ 
primary responsibility is to investor clients. In their relationship with investor clients, 
analysts are “competent professionals” because they are expected to be objective and 
play an external monitoring role to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001). Analysts therefore need to appear independent from managers 
to maintain credibility and reputation with investors (Brown et al., 2015). They have two 
main incentives to be accurate and neutral. First, reputation and career concerns motivate 




investors’ performance ratings motivate them to provide accurate information because 
institutional investors prefer high-quality information (Cowen et al., 2006).  
 On the other hand, analysts are also “dependants of firms” because they have 
incentives to act favourably towards firms and management. Analysts may behave over-
optimistically to maintain good management relationships and, hence, gain superior 
knowledge of firm-specific information (Mest and Plummer, 2003; Mayew et al., 2013). 
Moreover, they may show optimistic tendencies to generate investment banking work 
(Agrawal and Chen, 2008). Additionally, analysts may issue optimistic opinions to 
generate trading volume and increase the revenue of brokerage firms (Jackson, 2005).  
 Although analysts are essential participants in financial markets, they are subject 
to minimal rigorous regulation, leading to a high level of discretion over how they 
perform their professional tasks (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). As a result, and despite 
decades of research, analysts’ work remains hidden in a black box (Bradshaw, 2011), a 
mystery to the public. Consequently, there has been hardly any major challenge to 
analysts’ professional identities. 
 The increasing use of earnings conference calls as a medium of financial 
communication can potentially disturb analysts’ identities by exposing their workplace 
behaviour to public scrutiny. The question-and-answer (hereinafter, the Q&A) section of 
the conference call involves ad hoc analyst-manager interactions. Analysts can challenge 
managers’ interpretation of firm performance, ask managers to confirm information, and 
require information that managers are unwilling or unable to disclose (Hollander et al., 
2010). Due to the introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure by the SEC in 2000, 
conference calls are required to be publicly accessible in the U.S, meaning that analysts 




Investors and the media become the silent third parties in conference calls, observing and 
monitoring analyst behaviour.  
From a social constructivist perspective, analysts’ identities as competent 
professionals as well as dependants of firms can be seen as processes that are located in 
particular interactions in which these identities are negotiated, not least through 
discursive work (De Fina et al., 2006: 2). Ranging from professional interactions to 
informal everyday conversations, individuals use discourse to structure texts, establish 
identities and relationships, and represent events and entities (van Dijk, 1997: 2; Halliday 
and Matthiessen, 2004: 29-30). Prior research in financial communication finds that 
organisations and professional groups use discourse to construct identities and 
impressions (e.g. Craig and Amernic, 2004; Amernic and Craig, 2013; Clarke et al., 2009; 
Beelitz and Merkl-Davies, 2012). During conference calls, analysts can establish and 
promote their identities through the way they frame their questions to managers. If 
analysts behave in a manner that is inconsistent with the expectation of investors, the 
media or managers, their respective identities might be challenged, causing negative 
impacts on their credibility, reputation and career. Thus, analysts are expected to actively 
engage in identity construction during conference calls. 
I examine how analysts construct and sustain identities through politeness in 
language. Politeness is constantly used in social interaction, including professional 
settings, to promote relationships and reduce confrontation (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 
1; Thomas, 1995: 179; Leech, 2014: 9). Politeness is a critical aspect of analyst behaviour 
because it represents not only their existing relationships with managers but also the 
process by which analysts actively preserve and promote socially desirable identities 




dependants of firms, they can frequently enact politeness in language to mitigate their 
questions to managers, instead of using aggressive questioning strategies. On the other 
hand, if analysts attempt to emphasise their identity as competent professionals, they may 
avoid overly polite language and ask questions in a more direct manner (Salzedo et al. 
2018). Collectively, through the strategic use of politeness in different situations, analysts 
aim to foster the impression that they are independent of firm management and yet 
sufficiently close to obtain firm-specific information (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). 
 To investigate the politeness strategies that analysts use in conference calls, I 
perform quantitative and qualitative discourse analyses on a sample of conference call 
transcripts of 46 U.S. non-financial firms that report extreme earnings change. Results 
show that analysts adopt various politeness strategies and questioning styles to negotiate 
and enhance their different identities according to the performance of the firm. During 
calls of firms that report extreme earnings increases, analysts protect their identity as 
dependants of firms by asking questions in stages with frequent use of politeness 
strategies to justify questions. During calls of firms that report extreme earnings 
decreases, however, analysts prioritise their identity as competent professionals by using 
politeness to distance themselves from managers and asking questions in a more 
confrontational and less polite manner.  
It is important to note that this study is different from a recent qualitative study 
by Abraham and Bamber (2017). Abraham and Bamber (2017) draw on sociology 
theories on surveillance and interaction ritual and use interview and observational data to 
examine analysts (dis)incentives to participate in conference calls in the U.K. Whereas, 
this study is different from theirs in three main aspects. First, we examine different 




analysts’ motivations to participate in calls, and document that analysts’ decisions to 
participate is driven by self-promotion incentives and use participation to showcase their 
expertise. I focus on how analysts use language to sustain professional identities in a 
public disclosure event and emphasise the importance of linguistic politeness in financial 
communication. Second, we draw on different theories and employ different research 
methods. Abraham and Bamber (2017) rely on sociology theories and use observational 
and interview data to analyse analysts’ motivations from a social and political perspective. 
In this study, I study analysts’ use of language in conference calls using theories and 
close-reading discourse analysis methods from linguistics research. Third, they study 
conference calls in the U.K., while my data consists of calls of U.S. firms. The two 
countries have different institutional settings that might affect analysts’ incentives and 
behaviour.  
I make two contributions to the literature. First, I contribute to research in 
financial communication by highlighting the importance of politeness. Politeness 
behaviour is essential to social interaction and has been examined in various types of 
discourse (e.g. Pilegaard, 1997; Holmes, 2000; Harris, 2001; Jansen and Janssen, 2010). 
Given the complexity of analysts’ identities, politeness is crucial in establishing and 
sustaining their identities and social relationships. I provide evidence on how analysts 
actively engage in identity construction using various politeness strategies during 
conference calls. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study investigating analysts’ 
politeness behaviour in financial communication. I suggest a new direction in financial 
communication research. Politeness is a fundamental element in financial 
communication because it can be used to construct, sustain and promote relationships 




linguistic politeness behaviour in not only analyst-manager interaction, but also the 
communication between firms and other parties. 
Second, I contribute to a better understanding of analyst behaviour by shedding 
light on how they use language to present and enhance socially desirable identities. Given 
that analysts play an important role in wealth creation and distribution, the construction 
and maintenance of their identities are closely related to the stability of the financial and 
economic systems (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). However, evidence on how analysts 
negotiate their identities through interaction with other parties in financial 
communication is currently limited. One reason for the limited evidence is the lack of 
opportunity for researchers to directly observe analysts’ behaviour in a daily-task 
environment. Naturally occurring analyst-manager interactions constitute an important 
information input into analysts’ decision-making processes (Bradshaw, 2011). Using the 
unique setting of earnings conference calls, I am able to observe and analyse analysts’ 
natural linguistic behaviour in their interactions with firm management. This study 
thereby illuminates how analysts use language to construct and balance desirable 
professional identities in a real-life setting. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces 
politeness theory. Section 4.3 explains the sample and the discourse analysis methods. 
Section 4.4 presents the results and interprets the findings. Section 4.5 concludes.  
 
4.2. Politeness theory 
 Discourse refers to the linguistic elements of social life and social interaction, and 




Leeuwen, 2008: 6; Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012). Discourse analysis investigates 
relations between the form and function of communication by studying the content and 
linguistic features of language in use (Renkema, 2004: 1; Gee, 2011: 8). Given the various 
facets of social interaction, linguists have developed a variety of theories and methods to 
study the different aspects of discourse. One of the most essential aspects of spoken 
interaction is politeness (Brown, 2001: 11620; Culpeper, 2011a: 1). 
 
4.2.1. Definition and importance of politeness 
 Politeness is defined as the use of communicative strategies to reduce conflict and 
confrontation, and to establish, sustain and enhance social harmony (Leech, 1983: 82; 
Brown and Levinson, 1987: 1; Lakoff, 1989: 102; Thomas, 1995: 179; Leech, 2014: 9).29 
During the past thirty years, the interdisciplinary nature of politeness and its importance 
in social interaction have strengthened its prevalence in social science research (Culpeper, 
2011a: 1). Politeness does more than depict external reality, it also contributes to 
constituting reality and negotiating social identities and relationships. As one of the 
pioneers in politeness research, Brown (2001: 11,620) states, “politeness in 
communication goes to the very heart of social life and interaction; indeed it is probably 
a precondition for human cooperation in general.” 
 The definition of politeness is consistent with analysts’ aims in analyst-manager 
interactions during conference calls. While analysts are expected to obtain information 
 
29  It is important to distinguish between politeness and impoliteness. Unlike politeness, impoliteness 
consists of the use of communicative strategies that violate obligations, anticipations or desires, and cause 
offense and negative emotional reactions, e.g. anger and hurt (Culpeper, 2015: 1). Typical examples of 
impoliteness include swearing, insults and threats (Culpeper, 2011b; Culpeper, 2015: 1). This chapter only 




from managers and behave in an objective manner, they are also expected to maintain 
good relationships and minimise conflicts with managers. Politeness serves an 
interpersonal function in social interaction (Brown and Levinson, 1987). During 
conference calls, analysts are expected to actively establish and sustain socially desirable 
identities through politeness behaviour in analyst-manager interactions.  
 
4.2.2. Faced-based politeness theory 
 Numerous studies model politeness on a theoretical level (Culpeper, 2011a: 4; 
Kádár and Haugh, 2013: 13). A classic work that continues to function as a benchmark 
for current developments is Brown and Levinson’s (1987) (hereinafter, B&L) face-based 
politeness theory. As arguably the most influential work in linguistic politeness research, 
this theory has an unprecedented status in both linguistics and other social science fields 
(Kádár and Haugh, 2013: 15). It consists of an extensive taxonomy of linguistic strategies 
of politeness, and provides explanations of individuals’ intentions when a strategy is used. 
The theory conceptualises politeness through straightforward day-to-day linguistic 
behaviour (Werkhofer, 1992: 155; Kádár and Haugh, 2013: 15). The comprehensive and 
systematic nature of B&L’s theory makes it an appropriate starting point to understand 
politeness in analyst discourse. 
 
4.2.2.1. Face and face threatening acts 
 B&L’s framework is based on Goffman’s (1967: 5) concept of “face”, which is 
defined as an image of the self that people present in social interaction as based on how 




present an image of self that is consistent with our own expectations (Goffman, 1967: 5). 
We also protect others’ face because such cooperative behaviour is useful in establishing 
an image of kindness and friendliness, which can be an important aspect of our identity 
(Culpeper, 2011a: 12). Additionally, we expect others to respect our own face and, hence, 
have expectations of how others will behave (Kádár and Haugh, 2013: 14). 
 B&L identify two aspects of face, namely negative and positive face. It is 
important to note that the terms ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ are technical terms with no 
evaluative meaning in B&L’s framework. B&L (p. 62) define negative face as “the want 
of every competent adult member that his actions be unimpeded by others” (i.e. the desire 
to have freedom of action), and positive face as “the want of every member that his wants 
be desirable to at least some others” (i.e. the desire to be liked or admired). 
 However, face threatening acts (hereinafter, FTAs), which are actions that “run 
contrary to the face” of oneself or that of others (B&L: 65), are inevitable in social 
interaction (Jansen and Janssen, 2010). Based on the type of face that is threatened, FTAs 
are divided into positive and negative FTAs. In analyst-manager interaction, analysts can 
perform FTAs to managers’ positive face by disagreeing with managers or expressing 
criticism.30 Positive FTAs make managers appear less likable, competent or reputable, 
while FTAs that threaten managers’ negative face include orders, requests, probing 
questions and suggestions. Negative FTAs hinder managers’ freedom of action and 
territorial integrity by establishing expectations of certain behaviour on their part. 
 
30 Analyst-manager interactions are used as examples to explain the face-based politeness theory. In the 
context of this study, analysts (managers) are always the speaker (the hearer) in the interaction and the ones 
who perform FTAs. In actual Q&As of earnings conference calls, the roles of course switch back and forth 




 Importantly, FTAs towards managers also have an indirect impact on analysts’ 
own face and identities. As individuals want to maintain their own face and expect that 
others will cooperate to protect their face, analysts are assumed to have expectations of 
managers’ reaction to FTAs. That is, analysts can predict that managers expect them to 
avoid FTAs and are offended when FTAs are enacted. Given such predictions, analysts 
have to decide whether to perform FTAs or not. If they perform FTAs, then managers 
will be offended. Consequently, analysts’ own positive face – being appreciated by 
managers - and their identity as dependants of firms will also be damaged. On the other 
hand, analysts’ own negative face and their identity as competent professionals will be 
enhanced because they perform FTAs to obtain information from managers. Conversely, 
if analysts do not perform FTAs in the first place, they will avoid offending managers 
and, hence, protect managers’ face. Thus, analysts’ own positive face and identity as firm 
dependants will be protected because they have not threatened managers’ face. By doing 
so, however, analysts will damage their own negative face and their identity as competent 
professionals because their freedom of seeking information is hindered.  
 
4.2.2.2. Politeness strategies 
 As Culpeper and Hardaker (2018, p. 457) explain, there are many ways of being 
polite including indirectness, compliments, humour, self-deprecation, friendliness, 
deference and others. B&L (pp. 91-227) summarise various politeness strategies, each 
with specific linguistic features that mitigate face threats. While their categorisation is 
useful, it needs to be kept in mind that “it is speakers rather than utterances that are … 
polite” (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, 2013, p. 3): the polite meaning does not reside in the 




focuses on analysts’ use of positive politeness and negative politeness strategies. Using 
positive politeness strategies mitigates face threats by maintaining managers’ positive 
face and indicating that analysts understand managers’ desires. When analysts use 
negative politeness strategies, on the other hand, they mitigate face threats by maintaining 
managers’ negative face, i.e. their freedom of action.  
 Both positive and negative politeness strategies require analysts to give face to 
managers and counterbalance the expected face damage of FTAs (Culpeper, 2011a: 9). 
Positive and negative politeness strategies as summarised by B&L are listed and 
explained in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. These strategies are used to weaken the 
strength of FTAs, where the strength of an FTA is negatively associated with the degree 
of politeness (Kádár and Haugh, 2013: 15). It is important to note that using fewer 
politeness strategies (i.e. being less polite) does not equal being impolite. Indeed, 
politeness and impoliteness can be seen as two extremes with a neutral middle ground. 
For example, to correct a misunderstanding, one may take the polite approach and say 
‘I’m afraid I didn’t make that quite clear’ (a polite version with the speaker apologising 
and taking the onus on themselves); or may be impolite and say ‘You are remarkably 
slow in understanding what I’m saying’ (blaming the other and calling their competence 
into question); or may use a neutral formulation such as ‘Actually, the point is that…’. In 
the context of conference calls, being less polite indicates that analysts put less effort into 
redressing the FTA, while still intending to save managers’ face to some extent.  
 Positive politeness represents familiar and cooperative behaviour in social 
interaction (B&L: 129). Analysts can show positive politeness by expressing that they 
understand or share managers’ wants and needs (B&L: 101). In addition, positive 




that they wish to maintain a friendly and close relationship with managers (B&L: 103). 
As listed in Table 4.1, positive politeness strategies are categorised into three broad 
groups (B&L: 101-129). First, analysts may claim common ground with managers, by 
indicating that they and managers share values and aims. For example, analysts can 
achieve this by agreeing with managers. Second, analysts may attend to managers’ 
positive face by conveying that they and managers are cooperatively involved in the 
activity at hand. Third, analysts can express positive politeness by directly satisfying 
some of managers’ desires and, hence, showing they care about managers’ face. An 
example of this strategy is to congratulate managers on good performance. 
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
 Negative politeness represents respect behaviour (B&L: 129). As shown in Table 
4.2, negative politeness strategies can be classified into five broad mechanisms. First, 
analysts can be conventionally indirect by using sentences and phrases with contextually 
unambiguous meanings that are different from their literal meanings. For example, 
instead of saying ‘Tell me about x’ during conference calls, they could ask ‘Can you tell 
me about x?’, which functions as an assertion that analysts require managers to disclose 
information, rather than a question about whether managers are able to do so. Such 
formulations can make requests efficiently, while simultaneously redressing managers’ 
negative face by using so-called indirect speech acts with a conventional meaning. In the 
above example, the form is that of an interrogative (‘Can you tell me about x?’) but the 
function is that of a request.  
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
Second, analysts may protect managers’ negative face by formulating questions 




disclosing information that is unfavourable to the firm. A typical example is to use 
mitigating words, also known as hedging devices. For instance, the question ‘Could you 
give a bit of colour on what has changed?’ is less direct and more polite than the blunt 
‘What has changed?’ Third, analysts can indicate their intention of not coercing managers. 
This type of strategy is used when the FTA is about requiring certain actions of managers. 
For example, analysts can minimise the imposition by stating, for example, ‘Perhaps you 
can discuss this a little bit’. Fourth, analysts can express their awareness of managers’ 
negative face and take it into consideration in deciding how to perform FTAs, e.g. 
apologising for performing the FTA. Fifth, analysts may attend to managers’ negative 
face by going on record as incurring a debt (B&L: 209), e.g. ‘Can you just explain that 
for me please?’ 
 
4.2.3. Criticisms of face-based politeness theory  
While still an influential model of linguistic politeness, B&L’s theory has 
attracted criticisms since its inception. First, B&L have been criticised for theorising face 
as ‘a cognitive and individualistic construct that was possessed by a rational, rather than 
emotional, model person’ (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, 2013: 11). Previous research on 
financial analysts has demonstrated the role of emotion and cognitive process in analysts’ 
behaviour (e.g. Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2013; Ho and Cheng, 2016). 
Second, B&L discuss acts that threaten or redress face but fail to address acts that 
enhance face (Culpeper and Hardaker, 2018: 463) such as analysts praising firm 
performance or managers’ decisions.  To make up for that gap, Arundale (2010) proposes 
face-constituting theory as accounting for both separation and connection, threatening 




Lastly, B&L’s claim that their theory captures “universals in language usage” has 
been roundly refuted. B&L’s notion of politeness, far from being universal, is in fact 
indebted to Western ideals of individualism (Culpeper and Hardaker, 2018: 462). 
Nonetheless, such a limitation of B&L’s theory does not diminish the validity of the 
analysis in this study because the analysis is performed using U.S. firms’ conference calls 
and the U.S. has an individualistic culture (Hofstede, 2001). 
 
4.3. Discourse analysis: sample and methods 
4.3.1. Sample 
 Following prior literature, the analysis of analyst politeness behaviour is based on 
a sample of U.S. non-financial firms with extreme earnings changes because the effects 
on financial communication behaviour are expected to be more detectable when firms 
experience extreme performance change (e.g. Courtis, 1998; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; 
2006). Change in earnings is measured by annual percentage change in net income 
(Compustat item: NI): {(P<S − P<SUV)	 |P<SUV|⁄ } 	× 	100%.31 I focus on year-end annual 
conference calls because the Q&A section of these calls are typically longer than Q1 – 
Q3 conference calls, therefore providing a richer setting to observe analysts’ linguistic 
behaviour. 
The sample selection process consists of the following steps. First, data on current 
and past annual net income of U.S. non-financial firms for the last fiscal year ended on 
or before 31 December 2014 were obtained from Compustat. After the calculation of 
 
31 Careful examination of the data is performed to ensure that the performance changes in the sample are 




annual percentage change in earnings, firms are ranked by the value of percentage 
earnings change. Then, conference call transcripts of firms that experience extreme 
earnings change for the fiscal year were downloaded from either Factiva or SeekingAlpha. 
For the increasing (decreasing) earnings sub-sample, starting from the firm with the 
largest earnings increase (decrease), transcripts were downloaded until 25 transcripts, 
which is a manageable sample size for discourse analysis, had been obtained.32 Within 
each sub-sample, there are two transcripts that contain no Q&A section. Therefore, the 
final sample consists of 23 call transcripts of firms with the most extreme earnings 
increase and 23 of firms with the most extreme earnings decrease.  
 
4.3.2. Discourse analysis methods 
I proceed to discourse analysis after sample construction. I use both quantitative 
and qualitative methods to discourse analysis to obtain comprehensive evidence on 
analysts’ politeness behaviour. In discourse analysis, the development of a priori 
hypotheses is not needed. Quantitative discourse analysis is useful in identifying the 
frequency and patterns of the linguistic devices of interest, and establishing associations 
between linguistic features and contextual factors (Lazaraton, 2002; Baker, 2006: 2; 
Connor-Linton and Amoroso, 2014). Qualitative discourse analysis lies within the 
interpretive or critical research tradition, focusing on how and why language is used in a 
particular context (Larazaton, 2002). It reinforces the results of quantitative analysis by 
providing more accurate and in-depth description of language use and establishing 
relationships between language and the broader contexts (Johnston, 2002: 69-70; Craig 
 





et al., 2013). Quantitative and qualitative approaches are complementary and form a cycle 
of research (Jick, 1979). 
 
4.3.2.1. Quantitative discourse analysis 
The coding procedure for quantitative analysis consists of four steps. First, both 
the presentation and the Q&A sections of conference call transcript and the firm’s 10-K, 
which is accessed through EDGAR, are read. The purpose is to establish the context of 
firm performance and economic fundamentals because context is important in analysing 
politeness in situated interactions (Kádár and Haugh, 2013: 109). 
 Second, all analyst-manager interactions in the Q&A section are examined to 
determine whether analysts’ questions constitute FTAs to managers. Following B&L’s 
politeness framework, an analyst performs an FTA if an utterance, or a series of 
utterances together, is potentially considered by managers or analysts to compromise the 
positive and/or negative face wants of managers. 33  Table 4.3 summarises the 
circumstances under which utterance(s) by analysts are coded as a positive and/or 
negative FTA. As explained in Panel A, utterance(s) is (are) classified as a positive FTA 
if it is (they are) related to: (1) the firm’s poor operational, financial, cash flows and/or 
stock market performance, poor future outlook or high risk; (2) the firm’s legal problems; 
(3) the firm’s unexpected or problematic executive turnovers; (4) the firm’s better-
performing competitors; and (5) investors lost confidence in the firm or the management 
team. Additionally, utterance(s) is (are) classified as a positive FTA if the analyst 
 
33 Utterances are the unit of analysis in discourse analysis. In the analysis in this chapter, an utterance is a 




challenges managers’ interpretation of firm performance or future outlook, or indicates 
that the utterance(s) may offend managers. 
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
As explained in Panel B, utterance(s) is (are) classified as a negative FTA 
according to the following criteria: (1) the analyst indicates that managers might be 
reluctant to react to the utterance(s) (i.e. reluctant to provide the information the analyst 
seeks); (2) managers indicate they are reluctant to react, but still provide the information 
the analyst seeks; (3) managers refuse to react; and (4) managers react to the utterance(s) 
without actually providing the information the analyst seeks. 
Utterance(s) is (are) classified as a positive FTA when it (they) meets (meet) only 
the criteria of positive FTA; and negative FTA when only the criteria of negative FTA. 
If the criteria of both types of FTA are met, then it is classified as an FTA to managers’ 
both positive and negative face. If the criteria of both types of FTA are not met, then it is 
classified as a non-FTA. After the classification of positive/negative FTAs, the name of 
the analyst who performs the FTA, the FTA texts, and the type of managers’ face 
threatened were recorded. The total numbers of FTAs and non-FTAs in the call were also 
recorded. 
 Third, each FTA is then examined to identify positive and negative politeness 
strategies, following B&L’s framework. As politeness strategies need to be understood 
in context, I do not restrict the search to certain pre-defined expressions or automate the 
coding process. Instead, for each politeness strategy identified, its type (i.e. positive or 
negative), linguistic marker (i.e. the word, phrase or sentence that is used to implement 




numbers of positive politeness strategy markers and negative politeness strategy markers 
for each call transcript are counted and recorded. 
 Fourth, given that the only coder was one of the authors and a coder’s judgement 
may fluctuate among various occasions, intra-coder reliability is assessed (Chen and 
Krauss, 2004). Intra-coder reliability is measured using percentage agreement, which is 
the percentage of all coding decisions made by the coder on which the coder agrees on 
two coding occasions (Lombard et al., 2002). All transcripts are coded again after a lapse 
of three months with a resultant level of agreement of 87.21% for the entire sample on 
the use of politeness strategies. For the increasing earnings and decreasing earnings sub-
samples, the agreement levels are 86.98% and 87.45%, respectively. Research suggests 
that an agreement level of 80% is acceptable (Lombard et al., 2002; Neuendorf, 2002: 
145). Therefore, the reliability level of my study is adequate. 
 
4.3.2.2. Qualitative discourse analysis 
 The study then embarks on qualitative discourse analysis. One purpose is to 
examine if the results of quantitative analysis can be upheld. Another purpose is to 
provide more in-depth analysis on how analysts structure FTAs and use politeness 
strategies under various circumstances and, hence, investigate how analysts use 
politeness in language to present socially desirable identities.  
 The analysis relies on turn-by-turn analysis of the cumulative linguistic 
realisations of analysts’ politeness strategies. Defined as participants’ contributions to a 
conversation, turns are a constitutive feature of spoken interaction. Commonly, 




analysis follows three steps. First, each transcript is read to investigate analysts’ 
politeness behaviour in detail. The main foci are the structure of FTAs, how specific 
politeness strategies are used, and the directness of analysts’ questioning style. Here, the 
concept of direct and indirect speech acts (Searle, 1969) is used: for the former, the form 
and function of an utterance converge, e.g. an interrogative is used to ask a question (e.g. 
“When did XY hand in her notice?”). In indirect speech acts, however, form and function 
diverge, e.g. an interrogative is used to make a request (e.g. “Can you give some colour 
on upfront costs?”). Indirect speech acts are an important linguistic resource for enacting 
negative politeness strategies.  
Following the investigation into individual transcripts, typical examples of 
politeness and questioning strategies are recognised for increasing and decreasing 
earnings sub-samples, separately. The analysis then identifies how analysts promote one 
specific identity or balance their two identities through politeness in language. Finally, I 
compare analysts’ politeness behaviour and identity construction across the two extreme 
earnings changes sub-samples. 
 
4.4. Results and findings 
4.4.1. Quantitative discourse analysis results 
 To obtain an overview of analysts’ politeness behaviour, I begin by investigating 
the frequencies and patterns of FTAs and politeness strategies using quantitative 
discourse analysis. Table 4.4 lists the proportion of FTAs and the frequency of politeness 
strategies in both increasing and decreasing earnings sub-samples. The proportion of 
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(4.1) 
In the increasing earnings sub-sample, the average proportion of FTAs during a 
conference call is 41.1%. By contrast, in the decreasing earnings sub-sample, the average 
FTAs proportion is 65.54%. A t-test shows that the null hypothesis, i.e. that there is no 
difference between the mean values of proportions of FTAs for increasing earnings and 
decreasing earnings firms, should be rejected ($ -value < 0.01). This indicates that 
analysts perform more FTAs during calls with firms reporting decreasing earnings than 
those reporting increasing earnings.  
 [Insert Table 4.4 here] 
In terms of the frequency of politeness strategies, analysts on average use 8.34 
politeness strategy markers, which contain 4.18 positive politeness and 4.16 negative 
politeness strategy markers, per FTA during calls with increasing earnings firms. In the 
decreasing earnings sub-sample, the mean value of politeness strategy markers per FTA 
is 5.75, with 2.59 positive politeness and 3.16 negative politeness strategy markers. 
According to t-tests, the null hypotheses that there is no difference between the mean 
values of (1) positive politeness strategy markers per FTA; (2) negative politeness 
strategy markers per FTA; and (3) positive and negative politeness strategy markers per 
FTA, for increasing and decreasing earnings firms, should all be rejected. Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests reveal similar patterns in the differences between the median values of the 
proportion of FTAs and the number of politeness strategies. These results suggest that 
analysts use fewer politeness strategies during decreasing earnings firm calls than 




 Results in Table 4.4 are consistent with theory and prior evidence in financial 
communication research. The primary goal of conference calls is to discuss firm 
performance. Managers’ positive face is more easily threatened when performance is 
poor because analysts’ questions on poor performance or challenges to managers’ 
interpretations will make managers appear to be less competent and qualified. Moreover, 
managers’ negative face is also more easily threatened when the firm experiences an 
extreme decrease in earnings because managers of poorly performing firms are likely to 
obfuscate information (e.g. Garcia Osma and Guillamón-Saorín, 2011; Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007; Patelli and Pedrini, 2014). Thus, analysts perform both positive and 
negative FTAs more often when firms experience an extreme decrease in earnings. 
Additionally, as managers may be reluctant to disclose information when firm 
performance is poor, analysts’ identity as competent professionals is at stake because 
their aim for participating in earnings conference calls is to seek information. To sustain 
such an identity, analysts need to perform FTAs with efficiency, i.e. use fewer politeness 
strategies to mitigate FTAs. This indicates asking questions in a more confrontational 
manner. 
 Next, I compare analysts’ use of positive and negative politeness strategies 
because these two types of politeness strategy are driven by different communication 
incentives. While positive politeness strategies indicate a friendly and close relationship 
between analysts and managers, negative politeness strategies help analysts distance 
themselves from managers. Table 4.5 compares the frequencies of positive and negative 
politeness strategies for the full sample, and for both the increasing and decreasing 
earnings sub-samples. In the decreasing earnings sub-sample, analysts on average use 
2.59 positive politeness strategy markers and 3.16 negative politeness strategy markers 




markers are statistically significant ($-values < 0.05). These results indicate that analysts 
use positive politeness strategies less frequently than negative politeness strategies during 
the calls of firms with extreme earnings decreases.34 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
 As positive politeness strategies represent familiar and friendly behaviour, 
frequent use of such strategies can cultivate the impression that analysts are too close to 
managers and potentially biased towards them. As managers of poorly performing firms 
have incentives to obfuscate information, analysts need to emphasise their identity as 
competent professionals. The use of negative politeness enables analysts to clarify their 
distance to managers. To create the impression of independence and competence, 
analysts may therefore use negative politeness strategies more frequently than positive 
politeness strategies during conference calls with firms that report extreme earnings 
decreases. However, as evident in Table 4.5, results for the increasing earnings sub-
sample and the full sample reveal no significant difference between the mean values of 
positive and negative politeness strategy markers per FTA. These results suggest that 
analysts only pay attention to avoiding positive politeness strategies when managers are 
likely to hinder information disclosure, so as not to endanger analysts’ identity as 
competent professionals. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests provide similar results for medians 
of the use of positive and negative politeness strategies. 
Collectively, results from quantitative discourse analysis show that analysts use 
fewer politeness strategies during calls with decreasing earnings firm than increasing 
 
34 There is concern that analysts’ linguistic behaviour may vary by industry. To resolve such a concern, t-
tests, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are performed after firms are classified into 
sub-samples based on industries. Untabulated results show that there are no statistically significant 
differences of analysts’ politeness behaviour between: (1) manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms; 




earnings firm calls. Results also show that analysts use negative politeness strategies 
more frequently than positive politeness strategies during calls of firms with extreme 
earnings decreases. These results indicate that analysts adopt more confrontational 
questioning strategies and attempt to promote their identity as competent professionals 
when firms experience extremely poor performance.  
 
4.4.2. Qualitative analysis 
As discussed above, generally, the more politeness strategies analysts use to 
mitigate FTAs, the weaker FTAs become. To provide further insights, I perform 
qualitative discourse analysis to examine how analysts use various politeness and 
questioning strategies to promote and balance professional identities in different contexts. 
FTAs that concern the same topic from calls of increasing earnings firms and those of 
decreasing earnings firms are analysed and compared. Excerpts 1 and 2 show how 
analysts enact negative FTAs toward managers of increasing earnings and decreasing 
earnings firms, respectively. Both FTAs involve analysts seeking information on earnings 
and revenues. 
 
[Earnings Conference Call Excerpt 1: Increasing earnings sub-sample]  
1 Analyst 1: And just the one housekeeping thing. I don’t know, Tom,  
2  whether you have any color on just your pro forma figures  
3  for 2014 on revenue and EBITDA, and free cash flow, just  
4  as we’re tuning up our models for going forward? 
5 Manager 1: I don’t have anything at my fingertips to do that, but I can  
6  try and give you some help. I think -- what I have done,  
7  obviously, is give you Q4 same-station growth, and so you  
8  can back into what those numbers were in previous years.  
9  But I can try and give you some guidance on that, I just  




11 Analyst 1: Great. Okay. Thank you. 
(Nexstar Broadcasting Group, Q4 2014 Earnings Call, 26 February 2015) 
  
In Excerpt 1, an analyst performs a negative FTA to managers of an increasing 
earnings firm by asking for earnings, revenue and free cash flow information with various, 
mostly negative politeness strategies. The analyst repeatedly minimises the imposition 
on management through the use of ‘just’ (lines 1, 2 and 3; being negatively polite) and 
indirectly shows his reluctance by saying “I don’t know, Tom” (line 1; being negatively 
polite). He then moves on to attacking the manager’s negative face in “whether you have 
any color on just your pro forma figures for 2014 on revenue and EBITDA, and free cash 
flow” (lines 2-3). Although that utterance has the form of a declarative, it functions as a 
question (as also indicated by the question mark in the transcript), making it an indirect 
speech act and hence another negative politeness strategy. The analyst then explains that 
the reason he asks the question is to help with his forecasting models (lines 3-4, being 
positively polite). The manager answers the question by stating that he does not have the 
numbers (lines 5-10) and while this threatens the manager’s own positive face, he uses 
positive politeness towards the analyst by repeating his willingness to help. The analyst 
finishes the interaction by thanking the manager (line 11, being positively polite). This 
example illustrates how the analyst performs an identity as dependant of a firm with 
increasing earnings by minimising the FTAs performed. 
 
[Earnings Conference Call Excerpt 2: Decreasing earnings sub-sample]  
1 Analyst 2: Finally, the 18% to 22% exiting EBITDA margin target, at  




3  level that’s consistent with that, so we get a sense of --? 
4 Manager 2: Glenn, as we said in the remarks, these bookings will be in  
5  the high single digits. There is the lead in the -- the lag in the  
6  lead with the revenue in bookings; so at a constant-currency  
7  basis, the revenue growth would be lower single digits from 
8  a revenue standpoint. 
9 Analyst 2: Great. Thanks a lot, guys. 
 
 (Monster Worldwide, Q4 2014 Earnings Call, 10 February 2015) 
 
In Excerpt 2, the analyst performs a negative FTA towards managers of a 
decreasing earnings firm by seeking information on earnings and revenue targets. He 
starts by explaining this is his final question (“Finally”, line 1; being negatively polite). 
He then enacts the FTA by directly asking a question about revenue expectations (lines 
1-3). He attempts to provide reasons for the FTA by saying “so we get a sense of” (line 
3, being positively polite), after which he gets interrupted by a manager. While the 
interruption itself could be seen as an attack on the analyst’s negative face, the manager 
nevertheless starts his answer with a positive politeness marker, i.e. directly addressing 
the analyst (line 4). It should be noted that the manager’s response does not provide the 
information that the analyst seeks, but the analyst ends the interaction by thanking the 
managers anyway (line 9, being positively polite). By comparing Excerpts 1 and 2, it is 
evident that the less frequent use of politeness strategies by analysts makes FTAs 
potentially stronger during the call with decreasing earnings firms than with increasing 
earnings firms.  
 Another noticeable pattern of analysts’ politeness strategies with increasing 
earnings firms is that they ask questions in stages to justify and gradually enact FTAs. In 




more direct questioning style, instead of paving the way for FTAs. Excerpts 3 and 4 below 
illustrate this pattern by showing analysts performing negative FTAs during calls of oil 
and gas firms in the increasing earnings and decreasing earnings sub-samples, 
respectively. The FTAs in both excerpts relate to cost control. 
 
[Earnings Conference Call Excerpt 3: Increasing earnings sub-sample]  
1 Analyst 3: Hopefully my second answer is a little quicker. Obviously,  
2  there’s a lot of debate over how quickly and what scale of  
3  cost reduction the industry can expect in this lowered oil price  
4  environment. If you could give us Devon’s perspective, please, 
5  in terms of what have you assumed in your capital budget by  
6  way of cost reduction and ultimately what do you think it can  
7  get to by year end as opposed to the average for the year?  
8 
 
I’ll leave it there. Thank you. 
(Devon Energy, Q4 2014 Earnings Call, 18 February 2015) 
 
 In Excerpt 3, the analyst performs a negative FTA to managers of an increasing 
earnings oil and gas firm by seeking information on cost reduction. The analyst starts by 
presumably trying to minimise the imposition on managers (“Hopefully my second 
answer is a little quicker”, line 1; being negatively polite).35 He then attempts to give 
reasons for his questions by linking them to an impersonal ‘debate’ (“Obviously, there’s 
a lot of debate”, lines 1-2; being positively and negatively polite), before gradually 
getting to the questions (lines 4-7). These are introduced with a conditional clause using 
a modal verb and the marker ‘please’ (“If you could give us Devon’s perspective, please”), 
consistent with the analyst using a cluster of negative politeness strategies. Next, to avoid 
 
35 It is assumed that the analyst meant to say “hopefully, my second question will be a little quicker”. 




putting too much pressure on managers, the analyst seeks to minimise the imposition by 
saying “I’ll leave it there” (line 8, being negatively polite), and ends his turn by saying 
“Thank you” (line 8, being positively polite).  
 Here, it is clear to see a tension between the analyst’s need to perform the FTA 
and undertake his work as a competent professional on the one hand, and the need to 
protect his identity as a dependant of the firm on the other. He performs the FTA in stages 
with various politeness strategies so that it becomes more polite and less strong. 
Additionally, he justifies the FTA by stating that there is a debate surrounding this issue. 
By doing so, the analyst distances himself from the FTA and preserves his identity as a 
dependant of the firm. On the other hand, the fact that he attempts to weaken the strength 
of the FTA indicates that he understands that managers may be reluctant to provide the 
information and that his own identity as a dependant of the firm might be impaired. 
Nevertheless, the analyst still performs the FTA to maintain his identity as a competent 
professional.  
 
[Earnings Conference Call Excerpt 4: Decreasing earnings sub-sample]  
1 Analyst 4: The last one for me: In terms of achieving those cost savings, 
2  particularly on the G&A side, do you think there will be any 
3  upfront costs associated with that, or are you just going to  
4  be able to start to recognize the decreases over the next couple 
5 
 
of quarters, and will you be (multiple speakers) --? 
(Swift Energy, Q4 2014 Earnings Call, 26 February 2015) 
 
 Excerpt 4 shows how an analyst performs a negative FTA to managers of an oil 




by minimising the imposition (“The last one for me”, line 1; being negatively polite) and 
then directly identifies the topic of the FTA (lines 1-2), before stating his questions (lines 
2-5). The FTA is mitigated only by asking about managers’ thoughts rather than actual 
forecasts (“do you think there will be any upfront costs”, lines 2-3; being negatively 
polite), thereby giving management more leeway to refute the answer later, should it turn 
out to be incorrect. 
 On balance, the questioning style of Analyst 4 is more confrontational than that 
of Analyst 3. Analyst 4 does not provide justification for the FTA but identifies the topic 
directly. Moreover, he uses fewer politeness strategies than Analyst 3. By comparing the 
politeness behaviour of Analysts 3 and 4, one can see a tension between analysts’ need 
to sustain their different identities. During calls with increasing earnings firms, analysts 
appear to make great efforts to weaken FTAs and hence enhance their identity as 
dependants of firms. During calls with decreasing earnings firms, analysts’ identity as 
competent professionals is at risk because managers may be reluctant to discuss the poor 
performance and future prospects. Thus, analysts adopt a more confrontational and less 
polite questioning style to pressure managers into talking, so that analysts can present 
themselves as competent professionals. 
 Nevertheless, some analysts also perform FTAs in stages and provide justification 
for FTAs during decreasing earnings firm calls. Under such circumstances, they adopt 
other strategies to maintain their identity as competent professionals. As illustrated in 
Excerpt 5, one strategy is to directly construct a public image as a competent professional. 
 
[Earnings Conference Call Excerpt 5: Decreasing earnings sub-sample]  




2  I understand the difficulty of the situation, and your need for  
3  limited comments, but nonetheless I think investors are certainly 
4  very focused on how a search for replacing senior executives,  
5  particularly now in light of the fact your COO has resigned, they  
6  really would desire some more color as you’re conducting both  
7  a search for Board members, a search for executives presumably,  
8  as well as undertaking this assessment of strategic alternatives.  
9  How is the Board thinking about recruiting some high quality  
10  talent, while there’s a strategic alternatives analysis underway?  
11  And related to that is your acting COO on the call today? 
 
 (Campus Crest Communities, Q4 2014 Earnings Call, 26 February 2015) 
 
 In Excerpt 5, the analyst performs FTAs both to managers’ positive face (by 
mentioning the difficult situation the firm is in) and negative face (by demanding 
information managers are unwilling to disclose). The analyst performs the FTA in stages. 
She starts by saying “Good morning” (line 1, being positively polite), and then asserts 
her understanding of the situation and managers’ needs (lines 2-3, being positively polite). 
The description of the firm’s chaotic situation is possibly intended to justify the FTA, but 
nevertheless also constitutes an attack on managers’ positive face. The analyst further 
justifies the FTA by ascribing it to their clients (“investors are certainly very focused on 
how a search for replacing senior executives … they really would desire some more 
color”, lines 3-6). However, she also reinforces the (ascribed) FTA through intensifiers: 
“investors are certainly very focused”, “they really would desire some more color”. 
Finally, she targets managers’ negative face by asking questions directly, although the 
first of them is about the firm’s thoughts (“How is the board thinking about recruiting 
high-quality talent, while there’s a strategic alternatives analysis underway?”, lines 9-10; 




 While Analyst 5 enacts the FTA in stages and justifies it, her questioning style 
still appears to be confrontational because she does not use many politeness strategies 
and, importantly, she explicitly establishes a public image for herself as acting on behalf 
of investors. As a result, she reinforces her identity as a competent professional and 
distances herself from the firm.  
Additionally, as illustrated by Excerpt 6 below, where managers avoid disclosure 
of information, analysts sustain the identity as competent professionals by continuing to 
probe managers for answers. 
 
[Earnings Conference Call Excerpt 6: Decreasing earnings sub-sample]  
1 Analyst 6: What was the I guess surrounding Angel’s resignation, who is  
2  running operations today? When did that happen? How do you  
3  go forward? 
4 Manager 6:  So Angel chose to resign to pursue opportunities in the  
5  Southwest near his family. We have been, that was an amicable  
6  and friendly resolution. And I can assure you I’ve been working  
7  day to day with our leasing and operations and facilities teams to  
8  deliver leasing results, and respond to tenant inquiries and tenant  
9  needs, and we’ve been doing that for a good while here. And I  
10  think it’s evident in the results. 
11 Analyst 6: When did that occur? 
12 Manager 6:  When did it occur? I don’t know, I’ve been actively involved  
13  with things since the seven months I’ve been here, and [sic] team  
14  obviously has years of experience. 
15 Analyst 6: When did Angel--? 
16 Manager 6:  As stated in the 8-K Angel formally gave his formal resignation  
17  on the 20th, and it is effective now. 
 
(Campus Crest Communities, Q4 2014 Earnings Call, 26 February 2015) 
 
 In Excerpt 6, the analyst enacts an FTA towards managers’ negative face (by 




mentioning the resignation of an executive). The analyst first identifies the topic of the 
FTA with a hesitancy marker (“What was the I guess surrounding Angel’s resignation”, 
line 1; being negatively polite), and then directly targets managers’ negative face by 
asking three unmitigated questions in a row “who is running operations today? When did 
that happen? How do you go forward?” (lines 1-3). The manager’s response, while 
including a positive politeness strategy (“I can assure you”, line 6), does not provide the 
information that the analyst seeks. The analyst keeps putting pressure on managers by 
asking another unmitigated question (“When did that occur?”, line 11). As the manager 
again fails to provide a satisfactory answer, the analyst attempts to rephrase the question 
by asking “When did Angel--?”, before he is interrupted by the manager who provides 
information from the firm’s 8-K.  
 The analyst-manager interaction in Excerpt 6 takes several turns because of the 
manager avoiding disclosing the requested information. The analyst prioritises his 
identity as a competent professional. Although the manager implies that he feels 
threatened by the FTA, the analyst keeps threatening the manager’s face to obtain 
information and fulfil his responsibilities to investor clients. 
 In sum, qualitative discourse analysis provides more in-depth analysis of analysts’ 
politeness behaviour. While both identities drive analysts’ politeness behaviour to some 
extent, their importance varies according to firm performance. During calls with 
increasing earnings firms, analysts perform FTAs in stages with frequent use of 
politeness strategies to justify FTAs and weaken the strength of face threats to managers. 
During calls with decreasing earnings firms, analysts are willing to threaten managers’ 
face and pressure them into talking, even though doing so might damage analysts’ 




confrontational manner than during increasing earnings firm calls, suggesting that they 
intend to perform FTAs more efficiently. 
 
4.4.3. Discussion 
 Three main findings emerge from the analyses above. First, analysts strategically 
use various politeness strategies during earnings conference calls to construct and 
enhance socially desirable identities. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses show that 
analysts enact politeness in language to construct different identities according to the 
circumstances. Second, analysts’ use of politeness strategies varies with firm 
performance and managers’ incentives to withhold information. Analysts make great 
efforts to redress FTAs during earnings conference calls with increasing earnings firms 
and perform FTAs more directly during decreasing earnings firm calls. Third, when 
necessary, analysts are willing to risk their identity as dependants of firms and prioritise 
the identity as competent professionals. 
 During earnings conference calls of firms that report decreasing earnings, analysts 
prioritise their identity as competent professionals. They perform FTAs to managers of 
decreasing earnings firms in a more confrontational manner with fewer politeness 
strategies, indicating they are willing to risk their identity as dependants of firms to 
maintain their identity as competent professionals. Nevertheless, the fact that analysts 
prioritise their identity as competent professionals when firm performance is poor does 
not mean that the identity as dependants of firms has no impact on analysts’ language use. 
During calls of firms with increasing earnings, the identity as a competent professional 
is unlikely to be at risk because managers are expected to be relatively cooperative. Thus, 




to promote their identity of dependants of firms. These findings are consistent with 
Fogarty and Roger’s (2005) statement that analysts aim to display a public image that 
they are independent from managers but still sufficiently close to gain information 
unavailable from other sources. 
 Collectively, there are two alternative interpretations for the findings of the 
present study. First, analysts may attempt to fulfil their responsibilities for investor clients 
by prioritising their identity of competent professionals in analyst-manager interaction 
where firm performance is poor. They sacrifice their identity as dependants of firms and 
perform FTAs to managers in a relatively confrontational and direct manner to pressure 
managers into disclosing information, keep a distance between themselves and managers, 
and stay impartial and rigorous. Such an interpretation of analysts’ politeness behaviour 
is consistent with traditional agency theory, which suggests that analysts reduce agency 
costs by performing a monitoring role for shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001; Chen et al., 2016). 
 Second, analysts use politeness in language as an impression management tool to 
construct a public image that is consistent with investors’ and the media’s expectation, 
improve their credibility and, hence, sustain their identity as competent professionals.  
Analysts’ intentions may merely be to construct a socially desirable image, instead of 
actually fulfilling their responsibilities as competent professionals. Therefore, during 
calls with decreasing earnings firms, analysts prioritise the competent professional 
identity so that they can portray themselves as neutral and impartial.  
 Brown et al.’s (2015) survey and interview evidence reveals analysts consider the 
enhancement of their credibility with investors as a more likely result of issuing 




participate in the Q&A section of earnings conference calls. This finding suggests that 
issuing unfavourable forecasts and stock recommendations, which are essentially 
positive FTAs to managers, promotes analysts’ identity as competent professionals 
without severely damaging their identity as dependants of firms. Similarly, it suggests 
that performing FTAs to managers during earnings conference calls might not seriously 
undermine analysts’ identity as dependants of firms. Thus, when firm performance is 
poor, analysts take the opportunity to construct and promote their identity as competent 
professionals to the public. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates how analysts use politeness in language to establish and 
maintain socially desirable identities in publicly accessible analyst-manager interaction. 
During earnings conference calls of firms with increasing earnings, analysts adopt more 
polite communicative strategies to maintain their relationships with managers. During 
calls of decreasing earnings firms, however, the need to sustain the competent 
professional identity appears to dominate analysts’ politeness behaviour. These results 
are consistent with Fogarty and Rogers’ (2005) statement that analysts aim to promote a 
social image that they are independent from managers, but close enough to obtain firm-
specific information. 
Analysts are a professional group that is closely related to the stability of financial 
markets. Investigating the language of analyst discourse (as demonstrated in this chapter) 
is important, because analysts have significant influence over the allocation and 




their social life. Due to the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure and the 
increasing use of earnings conference calls, analyst behaviour is under greater scrutiny 
by investors and the media. As a result, analysts actively engage in identity construction 
to present a publicly desired image during these calls. Importantly, given that analysts’ 
biased behaviour towards firms is widely documented, analysts can use discourse as a 
means of constructing identities that are consistent with investors’ expectations.  
 As the first to explore how analysts use politeness to construct identities in 
naturally occurring social interaction, this study provides a glimpse into analysts’ 
language use, politeness behaviour and identity construction. It would be useful for future 
research to examine and discriminate between the two alternative interpretations of the 
findings of this study. This may be achieved by using regression analysis and linking 
analysts’ politeness behaviour to the properties of earnings forecasts. Moreover, the 
implication of analysts’ politeness behaviour in analyst-manager interaction is worth 
studying. It would be interesting to investigate how investors perceive and benefit from 
analysts’ politeness behaviour. Additionally, given the fundamental role of politeness in 
social interaction, future research may examine the politeness behaviour of various 
participants in financial communication, which this study could only hint at, e.g. 
managers, investors, and other stakeholders. This will enhance our understanding of how 







Table 4.1. Positive Politeness Strategies as Summarised in B&L 
Mechanism Strategy Example 
Claim common 
ground 
1. Notice, attend to hearer (his 
interests, wants, needs, goods) 
That positioned you much better than your 
competitors. (China Ceramics Co. Ltd., Q4 and 
Fiscal Year-end 2014 Earnings Conference Call) 
2. Exaggerate (interest, approval, 
sympathy with hearer) Your performance is absolutely sensational!* 
3. Intensify interest to hearer I will be there in one second.* 
4. Use in-group identity markers 
Are you guys expecting flat EBIT in that segment 
as well? (Gibraltar Industries, Inc., Q4 2014 
Earnings Conference Call) 
5. Seek agreement We did a great job, don’t you think?* 
6. Avoid disagreement 
Yes, I know. But you indicated earlier that there 
was a problem with ThinkGeek Solutions getting 
up and running in the third quarter. (Geeknet, Inc., 
Q4 2014 Earnings Conference Calls) 
7. Presuppose/raise/assert common 
ground 
Just a quick follow-up, and I know you can’t give 
color on the strategic review, so I’m not going to 
ask that. (Campus Crest Communities, Inc., Q4 
2014 Earnings Conference Call) 
8. Joke 
I’m very sad that San Francisco is not on the initial 
list. (laughter). (Container Store Group, Inc., Q4 





9. Assert or presuppose speaker’s 
knowledge of and concern for 
hearer’s wants 
And if you prefer to take it off-line, that is fine too. 
(TETRA Technologies, Inc., Q4 and Full Year 
2014 Earnings Conference Call) 
10. Offer, promise  Come on, I’ll buy you a drink.* 
11. Be optimistic You won’t mind if I borrow your book, right?* 
12. Include both speaker and hearer 
in the activity 
So let’s try to get our arms around what parts of the 
business are actually able to generate a profit for 
the firm. (Actions Semiconductor Co., Ltd., Q4 
2014 Earnings Conference Call) 
13. Give (or ask for) reasons 
Would you mind elaborating? I’m not familiar with 
what happened on Black Friday and Cyber 
Monday. (GeekNet, Inc., Q4 and Full Year 2014 
Earnings Conference Call) 
14. Assume or assert reciprocity I made the coffee yesterday, so it’s your turn today.* 
Fulfil hearer’s 
want 
15. Give gifts to hearer (goods, 
sympathy, understanding, 
cooperation) 
Got it. Great. Thank you and congrats on all the 
progress. (MacroGenics, Inc., Q4 and Full Year 
2014 Earnings Conference Call) 
This table lists all positive politeness strategies as summarised by B&L. An example is provided for each 
strategy. The sources of the example for strategies 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 15 are analysts’ questions from 
earnings conference call transcripts. For the other strategies, which are not used in analysts’ questions in sample 







Table 4.2. Negative Politeness Strategies as Summarised in B&L 
 
Mechanism Strategy Example 
Be indirect 1. Be conventionally indirect 
Can you please explain how the re-organization of 
the corporate structure resulted in impairment 
charge to intangibles? (Actions Semiconductor 
Co., Ltd., Q4 2014 Earnings Conference Call) 
Don’t 
presume/assume 2. Question, hedge 
So I am just wondering what has changed, if 
anything, with those programs in terms of size and 
timing? (Fuel System Solutions, Inc., Q4 and 
Year-end 2014 Earnings Conference Call) 
Don’t coerce 
hearer 
3. Be pessimistic 
And so Richard is not on the call currently? 
(Campus Crest Communities, Inc., Q4 2014 
Earnings Conference Call) 
4. Minimise the imposition 
Perhaps you can talk a little bit about the longer 
term dividend growth especially with 2017 in 
mind. (TerraForm Power, Inc., Q4 2014 Earnings 
Conference Call) 
5. Give deference 
So please add that. (Container Store Group, Inc., 
Q4 and Fiscal Year 2014 Earnings Conference 
Call) 
Communicate 
speaker’s want to 
not impinge on 
hearer 
6. Apologise 
I’m sorry if I missed this. Did you talk about the 
EPS impact due to foreign-exchange? (Fuel 
System Solutions, Inc., Q4 and Year-end 2014 
Earnings Conference Call) 
7. Impersonalise speaker and hearer 
It looked like the equity on the consolidated joint 
venture impact was a great big negative in the 
quarter (Campus Crest Communities, Inc., Q4 
2014 Earnings Conference Call). 
8. State the FTA as a general rule The university requires students to be in residence for a set number of terms.* 
9. Nominalise The report is due on Monday.* 
Redress other 
wants of hearer’s 
10. Go on record as incurring a 
debt, or as not indebting hearer 
I’d be extremely grateful if you could help me 
out.* 
 
This table lists all negative politeness strategies as summarised by B&L. An example is provided for each 
strategy. The sources of the example for strategies 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are analysts’ questions from earnings 
conference call transcripts. For the other strategies, which are not used in analysts' questions in sample 








Table 4.3. Classification Criteria of FTAs  
Panel A. Positive FTAs       
 
• Utterance(s) involve(s) firm’s poor operational, financial and cash flows performance, poor stock 
market performance, poor future outlook or high risk; 
• Utterance(s) involve(s) firm’s legal problems; 
• Utterance(s) involve(s) firm’s unexpected or problematic executive turnovers; 
• Utterance(s) involve(s) firm’s better-performing competitors; 
• Utterance(s) mention(s) that investors lost confidence in the firm or its management; 
• Utterance(s) challenge(s) managers’ interpretation of firm performance or future outlook; 
• The analyst indicates that the utterance(s) might offend managers; 
      
Panel B. Negative FTAs       
 • The analyst indicates that managers might be reluctant to react to the utterance (i.e. reluctant to 
provide the information the analyst seeks);  
• Managers indicate that they are reluctant to react to the utterance, but decide to provide the 
information the analyst seeks; 
• Managers refuse to react to the utterance; 
• Managers to react to the utterance(s) without actually providing the information the analyst seeks. 
 
      
 
This table presents the coding criteria for classifying analysts’ utterance(s) as either an FTA or a non-FTA. 
Panel A and B list the circumstances under which analysts’ utterance(s) are classified as an FTA to managers’ 
positive and negative face, respectively. If (an) utterance(s) meet(s) the criteria in both panels, it is coded as 
an FTA to both managers’ positive and negative face. If (an) utterance(s) meet(s) none of the criteria in both 








Table 4.4. Comparison of Politeness Behaviour for  
Increasing and Decreasing Earnings Sub-samples  
 Increasing earnings 
sub-sample 
 Decreasing earnings 
sub-sample 
 Mean Median  Mean  Median 
Proportion of FTAs (%) 41.10*** 40.00***  65.54 60.00 
Positive politeness strategy markers per FTA   4.18***   4.00***    2.59   2.46 
Negative politeness strategy markers per FTA  4.16**     4.20** 
 
  3.16   3.00 
Positive and negative politeness strategy 
markers per FTA 
   8.34***    7.67***   5.75    5.40 
      
 
This table lists and compares the frequency of analysts’ politeness behaviour for increasing and decreasing 
earnings sub-samples. Significance levels of the difference between means are tested based on t-tests. For 
the proportion of FTAs, the null hypothesis is 4`:	D"*;bcdefSghij 	= 	D"*;lmbcdefSghij , whilst the 
alternative hypothesis is 4V:	D"*;bcdefSghij 	< 	D"*;lmbcdefSghij . For positive politeness strategy 
markers per FTA, negative politeness strategy markers per FTA, and positive and negative politeness 
strategy markers per FTA, the null hypothesis is 4`:	D"*;bcdefSghij 	= 	D"*;lmbcdefSghij , whilst the 
alternative hypothesis is 4V:	D"*;bcdefSghij 	> 	D"*;lmbcdefSghij. Significance levels of the difference 
between medians are tested based on the Z-statistics from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. For the proportion of 
FTAs, the null hypothesis is 4`:	D"/(*;bcdefSghij 	= 	D"/(*;lmbcdefSghij , whilst the alternative 
hypothesis is 4V:	D"/(*;bcdefSghij 	< 	D"/(*;lmbcdefSghij. For positive politeness strategy markers per 
FTA, negative politeness strategy markers per FTA, and positive and negative politeness strategy markers 
per FTA, the null hypothesis is 4`:	D"/(*;bcdefSghij 	= 	D"/(*;lmbcdefSghij , whilst the alternative 
hypothesis is 4V:	D"/(*;bcdefSghij 	> 	D"/(*;lmbcdefSghij. *, **, and *** represent that the difference 












Table 4.5. Comparison of the Number of Positive and Negative Politeness Strategies  
 Positive politeness strategy 
markers per FTA 
 Negative politeness strategy 
markers per FTA 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Decreasing earnings sub-sample 2.59** 2.46**  3.16 3.00 
Increasing earnings sub-sample          4.18        4.00  4.16 4.20 
Full sample          3.38        2.84  3.66 3.37       
 
This table lists and compares analysts’ use of positive and negative politeness strategies. Significance levels 
of the difference between means are tested based on t-tests. For the increasing earnings sub-sample, the 
decreasing earnings sub-sample and the full sample, the null hypothesis is 4`:	D"*;bdpfSfqj	bdifSjmjpp 	=	D"*;mjrgSfqj	bdifSjmjpp , whilst the alternative hypothesis is 4V : D"*;bdpfSfqj	bdifSjmjpp 	<	D"*;mjrgSfqj	bdifSjmjpp.  Significance levels of the difference between medians are tested based on the Z-
statistics from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. For the increasing earnings sub-sample, the decreasing earnings 
sub-sample and the full sample, the null hypothesis is 4`:	D"/(*;bdpfSfqj	bdifSjmjpp 	=	D"/(*;mjrgSfqj	bdifSjmjpp , whilst the alternative hypothesis is 4V:	D"/(*;bdpfSfqj	bdifSjmjpp 	<	D"/(*;mjrgSfqj	bdifSjmjpp. *, **, and *** represent that the difference between mean or median is statistically 











This dissertation studies financial communication from both the firm managers’ 
and the sell-side analysts’ perspectives in the setting of earnings conference calls. As an 
important financial communication channel, these calls provide researchers with a 
powerful setting to directly observe the natural behaviour of and the interactions between 
managers and analysts. As financial communication is a multifaceted business and social 
process, this dissertation draws upon theories and employs empirical methods from 
various disciplines, such as accounting, linguistics and psychology. 
This dissertation consists of three related but self-contained studies, with each of 
them being an individual chapter. Chapter 2 focuses on managers’ voluntary disclosure 
behaviour in conference calls when the firm reports small non-negative earnings surprise. 
As firms have incentives to inflate earnings to meet or beat market expectations, previous 
research finds that investors penalize all firms with small non-negative earnings surprises, 
even those that genuinely achieve such performance (Keung et al., 2010). This leads to 
the question of whether non-manipulators attempt to separate intentionally through 
truthful communication strategies but fail, or if they do not proactively separate. This 
chapter extends the research on this pooling equilibrium by investigating how earnings 
manipulators attempt to pool through obfuscation, and whether non-manipulators use 
credible communication strategies to separate themselves. Results show that non-
manipulators are more forthcoming about negative future news and obfuscate less than 
manipulators, suggesting that they engage in credible conference call disclosure. 
Manipulators, on the other hand, intentionally pool by obfuscation. Moreover, the results 




underreaction throughout the following quarter, indicating that when opportunistic 
disclosers’ pooling effect is strong, the informativeness of credible disclosers’ conference 
calls is compromised. 
Chapter 2 contributes to the accounting literature in three ways. First, it 
contributes to the literature on earnings benchmark meeting and beating. While prior 
research tends to focus on managers’ incentives and market participant’s reactions to 
opportunistic benchmark meeting and beating behaviour, this study focuses on how 
earnings manipulators and non-manipulators design conference call communication 
strategies to react to the pooling equilibrium in this setting. Second, this chapter adds to 
the literature on corporate voluntary disclosure in conference calls by examining whether 
and how high earnings-quality firms adopt specific communication strategies to clarify 
the truthfulness and credibility of their results when they face strong pooling effects from 
opportunistic managers. Third, it contributes to the literature on the capital market effects 
of conference calls. While prior studies generally report that conference calls provide 
useful information to investors, this chapter shows that informativeness of credible 
disclosers’ conference calls can be compromised in certain circumstances. 
Chapters 3 of this dissertation focuses on sell-side analysts as conference calls 
allow researchers to gauge analyst-manager relationships through analysts’ conference 
call participation. Specifically, this chapter explores how analysts’ people skills affect 
their relationships with firm management and informational outputs. People skills have 
become increasingly valuable in the labour market over the past decades because such 
skills cannot be substituted by machines. This chapter develops an empirical measure of 
analysts’ people skills based on their ethnic cultural background. Consistent with theories 




empirical measure of people skills exhibits a U-shaped relation with analysts’ ingratiating 
behaviour in conference calls.  
The empirical results in Chapter 3 show that analysts with better people skills are 
more likely to participate in conference calls and ask earlier questions, indicating that 
these analysts have closer relationships with firm management than analysts with poorer 
people skills. To examine whether analysts can benefit from better people skills, 
mediation analysis results suggest that analysts with better people skills to some extent 
possess superior firm-specific information, which is partly facilitated by their closer 
relationships with firm management. 
Chapter 3 has both contributions to the literature and implications for practitioners. 
It contributes to the emerging literature on the value of people skills in the labour market. 
Recent economics research documents that people skills have become more and more 
crucial in determining labour market outcomes such as wages and productivity. I focus 
on the specific impacts of people skills on sell-side analysts, who are important 
informational intermediaries in financial markets. I provide the first evidence that good 
people skills lead to stronger management relationships and access to superior firm-
specific information for analysts. This chapter also contributes to the literature on 
analysts. Given analysts’ biased incentives and conflicts of interest, it is essential for both 
regulators and investors to understand which factors underpin the development of 
analyst-management relationships. This chapter extends the prior literature by 
documenting how analysts’ people skills affects their relationships with firm 
management. In terms of the practical implications, the financial press and investment 
banking professionals have recently advocated people skills development for business 




the findings in this chapter shed lights on why and how people skills matter in financial 
markets.  
Chapters 4 also focuses on sell-side analysts’ conference call communication 
behaviour. Different from Chapter 3, this chapter examines analysts’ linguistic politeness 
behaviour using theory from linguistics research and employs qualitative and quantitative 
discourse analysis methods. This chapter investigates how analysts use linguistic 
politeness in conference calls to establish socially desirable professional identities. They 
have two identities, i.e. competent professionals and dependants of firms. In their 
relationships with investor clients, analysts are competent professionals because they are 
expected to play an external monitoring role. In their relationships with managers, 
however, analysts are dependants of firms because they have incentives to build close 
and friendly relationships with managers. This chapter uses discourse analysis to study 
how analysts use politeness strategies to sustain and balance between the two identities 
in conference calls. During the conference calls of increasing earnings firms, analysts 
adopt more polite communication strategies to maintain friendly relationships with 
managers. During the calls of decreasing earnings firms, however, the need to maintain 
the competent professional identity dominates analysts’ politeness behaviour. 
Collectively, results suggest that analysts aim to promote a socially desirable image that 
they are independent from managers, yet close enough to obtain information. 
Chapter 4 contributes to financial communication research in two ways. First, it 
contributes to the literature by emphasising the importance of politeness in financial 
communication. While linguistics research shows that politeness is fundamental in social 
interactions and relationship construction, evidence on politeness in financial 




element in financial communication because it can be used to construct, sustain and 
promote relationships among firms, analysts and various stakeholders. Speaking to the 
value of politeness, I provide the first evidence on how analysts use politeness strategies 
in conference calls to sustain their professional identities in front of managers and 
investors. Second, this chapter furthers our understanding of analysts’ behaviour by 
examining how they use language to establish and promote socially desirable identities 
in a daily-task environment. Given the essential role that analysts play in financial 
markets, it is important to understand how they construct professional identities because 
it is closely related to the stability of the financial system. 
 
5.2. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The findings and conclusions from the studies in this dissertation are subject to 
several limitations, which yield opportunities for further research. First, in Chapter 2, the 
empirical results and inferences are limited to the extent to which earnings manipulators 
and non-manipulators can be accurately classified. To mitigate such a concern, the 
empirical research design incorporates various methods to classify non-manipulators and 
manipulators according to different criteria. Moreover, as Chapter 2 focuses on the post 
financial crisis period, the results might not be generalisable to the periods before or 
during the financial crisis, during which firms might manipulate earnings differently. 
Future research is encouraged to explore whether firms employ different communication 
strategies in conference calls during these time periods. 
Second, in terms of Chapter 3, the main caveat is that analysts’ people skills are 




by the theory and evidence that people skills are learned early in life and affected by 
ethnical culture background, as well as by the results of validation tests, the measure 
assumes that on average analysts do not experience significant variations in people skills 
as time passes. Due to the archival large-sample nature of this study, the time-varying 
component of people skills cannot be captured empirically. Thus, future research might 
use experimental or survey methods to further explore such a component of people skills 
and assess whether the level of analyst people skills vary significantly over time. 
Third, as for Chapter 4, the discourse analysis method inherently attenuates the 
external validity of the results. As discourse analysis requires close reading and 
examination of the data, it is unrealistic to conduct analysis on a large sample. At the 
current stage, techniques in computational linguistics research are unable to 
automatically measure various politeness strategies because the analysis relies on the 
specific context of the social interactions (Kádár and Haugh, 2013: 109). Thus, it would 
be useful for future research in computational linguistics to develop methods to 
automatically assess linguistic politeness behaviour. Moreover, this chapter only explores 
analysts’ politeness strategies in conference calls. Given the importance of politeness in 
social interactions in general, there are fruitful avenues for future research to evaluate the 
role of politeness in other financial communication settings. 
Lastly, all three studies in this dissertation are conducted based on samples of 
earnings conference calls of U.S. public firms. Therefore, the generalisability of the 
findings to other countries with different languages, business practices, culture or legal 
systems is limited (El-Haj et al., 2019). Therefore, it is useful for future research to 




Despite the limitations, this dissertation contributes to accounting research by 
examining firm managers’ and sell-side analysts’ financial communication incentives 
and behaviour in earnings conference calls. Given the interdisciplinary nature of this 
work, it contributes to our knowledge on financial communication from various unique 
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